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Abstract
What role does politics play in financial crises and how does this affect economic outcomes?
This thesis employs a political economy framework to examine the effect politics has on
the causes, containment, and resolution of financial crises. The first paper examines the
development of Irish financial regulation and supervision in the context of the politics of
financial services policy. It argues that domestic politics prior to the crisis in Ireland played
a significant contributing role in fostering a permissive banking environment which allowed
the build up of financial imbalances. The second paper, with Christopher Gandrud, aims to
understand why policymakers may end up choosing sub-optimal financial crisis containment
strategies when taking decisions under uncertainty. We develop a signalling model of finan-
cial crisis management to enhance our understanding of the interactions between bureaucrats
and decision-makers and to show how asymmetries of information can have significant impli-
cations for policy choice. The third paper, with Alessio Terzi, uses cross-country econometric
evidence to examine the impact that political and party systems have on the fiscal cost of
financial sector intervention. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that there is a
systematic relationship between political economy factors and the fiscal cost of financial
sector intervention in banking crises. We find that governments in presidential systems are
associated with lower fiscal costs when managing banking crises. Looking further at crisis
containment strategies, we show that these governments are are less likely to employ costly
bank guarantees and bank recapitalisations which expose the state to significant contingent
and direct fiscal liabilities, and are more likely to impose losses on depositors. The fourth
paper analyses reform of the framework for crises management in the EU from a political
economy perspective, following the 2007 financial and subsequent sovereign debt crisis. It
explains how the limits of coordination and unprecedented public support led to the proposal
for the establishment of a harmonised framework for bank resolution across the EU. How-
ever, the distributional consequences of financial sector support and the establishment of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism led to deeper integration for euro area Member States and
agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism. It analyses in detail the negotiations on the
financing structure for future resolution, decision-making procedures and crisis management
tools and demonstrates how the power of certain Member States and distributive conflict
with regard to legacy assets shaped the new architecture. It also highlights the important
role the European Parliament played in the negotiations.
This thesis makes a number of substantive contributions to political economy. The new
theoretical and empirical findings will help foster a better understanding as to how govern-
ments may react to future financial crises and show what factors lead to and shape reform.
It also has a number of policy implications. It stresses the need for a robust regulatory and
supervisory architecture which creates the appropriate incentives for bureaucrats to provide
timely and accurate information to decision-makers. It also highlights the need for a more
intrusive approach to supervision.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A political economy approach to financial crises
The 2007 global financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has had a
devastating effect on both economies and societies as a whole. The severity of the crisis
compels us to better understand the causes and consequences of such crises. This includes
analysis of the policies, costs and effectiveness of financial sector intervention. There is a
rich and voluminous literature on the macroeconomic and financial dynamics of financial
crises. However much of this research does not take political variables into account. Political
economy analyses the effect that politics has on economic choices and outcomes (Drazen,
2000).1
Banking crises, although common, are perhaps the least understood type of financial
1Political economy is a diverse field of research often defined by the methodological tools, theoretical
approaches or subject matter of investigation (see Drazen, 2000, Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Furthermore,
there is a debate as to whether political economy differs substantively from the theory of public choice
(Mueller, 2003). Blankart and Koester (2006) provide an overview of the similarities and differences between
the literatures. Whilst rational choice applications to governance, decision-making and allocation are the
primary focus of this thesis, other approaches to political science are also drawn from, such as historical
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, Pierson, 2000a, 2004), as well as constructivist approaches (Blyth,
2002, 2003).
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crises (Claessens and Kose, 2013, 18).2 Understanding the interaction between the politics
and economics of banking crises is particularly important given the special role banks have for
economic growth and development. Politicians, for example, decide upon the institutional
architecture to govern financial systems which may elevate or diminish the risk of crises
(Čihák et al., 2012). During a crisis, decisions by governments to intervene with public
resources to stabilise financial systems are ultimately political decisions. Also it is politicians
who decide on reforms of frameworks for crisis management or bank resolution following a
crisis. Political constraints may therefore explain the different and often sub-optimal policy
choices taken before, during, and after financial crises. From a political economy perspective
policies are the outcome of strategic interactions between politicians, voters, economic agents
and bureaucratic actors and are constrained by institutional rules. The processes by which
these variables interact, in this context, are the subject matter of the political economy of
financial crises.
The papers in this thesis broadly contribute to three categories of the political economy
of financial crises: causes, containment, and resolution. However each of the papers are also
designed to make a specific contribution to different sub-fields of political economy. From a
methodological perspective a mixed-methods approach is therefore most appropriate and a
number of different analytical tools are employed. The first paper contributes to the liter-
ature on the causes of banking crises by analysing specific features of bank regulation and
regulatory capture. To do this a case-study approach is used. This allows in-depth research
on the interactions between the politics of financial services policy, regulatory governance,
2This thesis deals primarily with a specific subset of financial crises - banking crises. Typologies of
financial crises can include currency crises, sudden stops, foreign and domestic debt crises, and banking crises
(Claessens and Kose, 2013). Bakker and Lipschit (2014) differentiate between conventional and insidious
macroeconomic balance sheet crises. The former are triggered by external imbalances with substantial foreign
currency exposures, the latter are triggered by internal imbalances following an equilibrating shift in relative
prices, resources and credit. However some prominent scholars oppose such classifications because “financial
crises ... involve a number of critical elements- speculation, monetary expansion, an increase in the prices of
securities or real estate or commodities, followed by a sharp fall and a rush into money” (Kindleberger and
Aliber, 2011, 34). The recent crisis in Europe is exemplar of this phenomenon.
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financial sector governance and financial stability. The second and third paper contribute to
the literature on financial crisis management. To do this two different methods of investiga-
tion are deployed. The second paper leverages formal modelling techniques to analyse some
political economy aspects of financial crisis containment. The third paper uses cross-country
econometric evidence to examine the fiscal costs of crisis management. The final paper
contributes to the wide literature on European public policy. It provides a positive policy
analysis of the emerging architecture for future crisis management in the EU. Together this
thesis hopes to provide a multifaceted view of the political economy of financial crises and
draw the relevant theoretical, empirical, and policy implications from the different types of
analysis. The remainder of this section will briefly discuss these three categories and give a
more extensive overview of the papers.
1.2 Causes
Although financial crises are multidimensional, they are typically preceded by substantial
changes in the volume of credit which encourage greater risk-taking and leverage, looser
credit standards, and unsustainable asset price increases which sharply deviate from fun-
damentals (Claessens and Kose, 2013, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and
Laeven, 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, Borio and Lowe, 2002, Schularick and
Taylor, 2009, McKinnon and Pill, 1997, Minsky, 1977).3 In principle regulation and su-
pervision can prevent, or at least mitigate the risk of banking crises. However “failures in
regulation and supervision remain the most mentioned cause for crises, despite significant
3This, for example, can result from global imbalances caused by internal microeconomic weaknesses
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009), or “excess elasticity” (whereby the financial system lacks sufficiently strong
anchors to prevent the build-up of unsustainable financial imbalances (Borio and Disyatat, 2011). In the
euro area, financial linkages increased considerably before the crisis with ‘core’ countries playing a dominant
role in financing current account deficits before the crisis (Hobza and Zeugner, 2014). Structural factors like
financial liberalisation or financial innovation also induce behaviour that is associated with financial crises
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998,
2000). However this thesis will not focus on the macroeconomic or financial causes of banking crises.
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upgrading of regulations, supervisory capacity and expertise over decades” (Claessens and
Kose, 2013, 19). The political economy literature has sought a deeper understanding of
these structural problems (Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976, Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Tirole,
1993, Dal Bó, 2006, Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, Čihák et al., 2012, Barth, Caprio and
Levine, 2004). For example, Calomiris and Haber (2014) trace the co-evolution of banking
and politics in several countries and argue that the emergence of different banking systems,
the abundance or scarcity of credit, and hence the stability of the financial system is the
result of a game of political bargains between government, bankers, minority shareholders,
debtors and depositors. They explain that because banking systems cannot develop without
the active encouragement of government, and regulatory outcomes are the result of polit-
ical bargains, banking systems, they argue, are “fragile by design”. Others stress the role
and strength of political and legal institutions in implementing regulatory policies (see for
example Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, La Porta et al., 1997).
The first paper (chapter 2) looks at regulatory and supervisory failure in Ireland. Using
the framework provided by capture theory, it analyses the evolution of Irish financial regu-
lation and supervision in the context of the politics of financial services policy. It explains
the reluctance of supervisors from taking remedial action against financial institutions prior
to the crash as the result of the establishment of an inadequate framework for regulation
and supervision. This however resulted from the primacy placed by successive Irish govern-
ments on the attraction of financial services to Ireland and an active policy to encourage
the provision of credit. Politics in Ireland, prior to the crisis, therefore played a significant
contributing role in fostering such a permissive banking environment.
15
1.3 Containment
Financial intermediation theory suggests that banks are inherently fragile because of their
role in liquidity creation and maturity and risk transformation (Bryant, 1980). Shocks to
financial markets can therefore lead to self-fulfilling crises and bank runs (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983), or a downturn in an economy can lead depositors to anticipate a crisis,
causing a banking panic (Allen and Gale, 1998). Whether because of market psychology
or ‘animal spirits’ (Keynes, 1936), widespread panic, contagion and spillovers across the
financial system, may require government intervention to stabilise financial markets and
contain a crisis.
There has been a growing literature in political economy which analyses the public re-
sponses to banking crises (Alesina and Drazen, 1991, Keefer, 2007, Rosas, 2006, 2009, Pe-
pinsky, 2014). The second and third papers (chapter 3 and chapter 4 of this thesis) aim
to further enhance our understanding of decision-making during banking crises. Previous
political economy explanations as to how decision-makers choose policies to contain crises
are substantively incomplete as many of them unrealistically assume that policymakers, es-
pecially in advanced countries, have complete information. Drawing on the seminal models
by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and recent application by
Satyanath (2006), the second paper develops a signalling game of crisis containment. To
choose the appropriate level of public intervention, decision-makers must rely primarily on
financial bureaucrats and other banking system actors for information about the propor-
tion of non-performing loans in a banking system and the recovery value of these loans in
the aftermath of shocks. The model predicts that if information providers have different
preferences than decision-makers they are likely to give vague or even uninformative mes-
sages, harming the decision-makers’ ability to choose their preferred policy responses. The
model also predicts that where preferences are closely aligned, the decision-maker will receive
16
accurate information.
Using a dataset of 147 systemic banking crises from 1970-2011, the third paper (chapter
4) tries to better understand how political variables may condition policy choice in banking
crises and hence impact economic outcomes. It quantitatively assesses the impact political
and party systems have on the fiscal cost of banking crises. Our empirical findings suggest
that the fiscal costs of financial sector intervention are systematically associated with political
economy factors. We find that crisis management in presidential systems are associated with
lower fiscal costs of financial crisis management. We further explore the channels through
which this may occur and find that governments in these systems are less likely to use fiscally
expensive tools such as guarantees on bank liabilities and bank recapitalisations and more
likely to impose losses on depositors.
1.4 Resolution and reform
The political economy of reform literature tries to better understand the political factors
that make reforms successful (e.g. Williamson, 1994, Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998).
Financial crises upset old political economy equilibria and can lead to reform because of
the large public support provided during crises and the distributional consequences of this
support. Crises also affect bureaucratic incentives and change the relative costs and benefits
of reform (Kroszner, 1998).
The final paper (chapter 5) analyses reform of the framework for financial crisis manage-
ment in the EU, particularly focusing on the new framework for the resolution of financial
institutions as provided for in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the
establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It explains how the limitations
of coordination and unprecedented public support to financial sectors led to the push for
greater harmonisation in crisis management across the EU. However the distributional con-
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sequences of financial sector support and establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) led to a consensus to complete Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and agreement
on the creation of the SRM. The paper analyses the negotiations on the financing structure
for resolution, decision-making procedures, and crisis management tools and emphasises how
the power of certain Member States and distributive conflict with regard to legacy issues,
shaped the new architecture. It also highlights the important role the European Parliament
played in the negotiations as well as the different conceptions the negotiators had regarding
the role of the State in crisis management.
This thesis provides a number of substantive empirical and theoretical contributions to
the literature, as well as implications for policy. These, as well as the directions for future
research, are discussed in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 2
Capture and Containment of the Celtic
Tiger?
Abstract:1 Regulatory and supervisory failure have been widely attributed as
a being one of several simultaneous forces which allowed the build-up of signific-
ant imbalances in the financial system ultimately leading to the financial crisis
in Ireland. The causes of such failure have received less attention. This paper
provides a broad analysis of Irish regulation and supervision in the context of
the politics of financial services policy. It assesses the case of capture of Irish fin-
ancial supervision and regulation and finds that although some examples appear
consistent with the conditions necessary to identify capture, a more complex pic-
ture emerges when analysed in its political context. Whilst in principle Ireland
had a seemingly robust architecture for regulation and supervision, in practice
the primacy placed by successive Irish governments on the attraction of financial
services to Ireland and an active policy to encourage greater competition in the
Irish financial sector led to the establishment of a regulatory framework and su-
pervisory approach that was weak and inadequate. This can in turn explain why
supervisors were reluctant to take action against Irish financial institutions, or
correct the governance problems identified in credit institutions prior to the crisis.
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the European
Central Bank (ECB) should help prevent some of the problems identified in this
paper from developing in the future.
1The author would like to thank Simon Hix, Jim O’Keeffe, Philip Lane, and Stefano Pagliari for their
helpful comments, as well as the interviewees who generously gave their time.
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2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis has led to widespread reform at the global, European and national levels.
This has included the reinforcement of institutional structures of regulatory governance to
better cope with the complexities and finance and the overhaul of supervisory practices.
In Ireland, a deep restructuring of the financial sector is ongoing, as well as a determined
programme of institutional and legislative reform. The macroeconomic background to the
crisis, the role of the authorities the banks and auditors have been thoroughly examined (see
Nyberg, 2011, Honohan, 2010, Regling and Watson, 2010). However, despite the establish-
ment of a Commission of Investigation, many questions remain unanswered. Consequently,
in November 2014, the Dáil (Irish Parliament) decided that a Committee of Inquiry into
the Banking Crisis should be established to “to inquire into the reasons Ireland experienced
a systemic banking crisis, including the political, economic, social, cultural, financial and
behavioural factors and policies which impacted on or contributed to the crisis and the
preventative reforms implemented in the wake of the crisis”.2
There is now a clear consensus that “Ireland’s mounting financial vulnerabilities meant
that strong action was called for to over-ride the prevalent light-touch and market fash-
ions in supervision” (Regling and Watson, 2010, 38). Why did Irish supervisors not take
measures to restrain lending or ensure better risk management in Irish financial institu-
tions?3 Existing research has pointed inter alia to regulatory and supervisory failure as one
of several simultaneous causal factors in explaining the Irish financial crisis (see for example
O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 2013). Some research has even suggested that regulatory capture
2https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/
3These could have included more intrusive supervision with a willingness to use sanctions to ensure
compliance and the imposition of tougher requirements on credit institutions (for example direct controls on
lending, increased capital requirements or sectoral limits) (see Honohan, 2010).
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existed (Taylor, 2012). However, less scholarship has focused on the underlying reasons for
such failures. Whilst attempting to answer this seemingly basic question this paper lends
itself to the broader debate on bank regulation and the renewed scholarship on capture the-
ory and rent-seeking (Pagliari, 2012, Carpenter and Moss, 2013b). It hopes to contribute
to the understanding of the causes of the Irish financial crisis, by focusing on some of the
political dynamics of financial services policy and regulatory governance.4 This paper thus
provides an alternative narrative as to the causes of the Irish financial crisis and presents a
theoretically informed assessment of the impact of policymaking on regulatory and financial
sector governance in Ireland.
At first sight, it appears that capture was both strong and pervasive. Evidence from
supervisory practice in Ireland in the years preceding the crisis and successful lobbying by
industry to limit the application of key governance structures, appear consistent with some
of the conditions necessary to identify capture. However a more complex picture emerges
when analysed in the context of the politics of financial services policy. This paper argues
that the primacy placed by the Irish government on the promotion of financial services led
to the establishment of an inadequate framework to preserve financial stability. This is
evident from the design of the supervisory framework, its objectives and intense lobbying
that took place when the Irish Financial Services and Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) was
being established (1998-2003). Finally, this paper argues that the establishment of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the European Central Bank (ECB) should help prevent
some of the problems identified in this paper in the future.
The paper will first discuss the relevant literature on the politics of financial regulation.
4Regulation refers to the establishment of rules, whereas supervision refers to the oversight of financial
firms’ behaviour (licensing, supervision stricto sensu, sanctioning, and crisis management) (Lastra, 2003).
The main tasks of a regulator are to define and implement the regulatory framework, whereas the main task
of the supervisor is to enforce this framework and enforce sanctions in the case of non-compliance (Quintyn,
2007, 7, footnote 4). However, for the purposes of this paper, the terms ‘regulator’ and ‘supervisor’ are
used interchangeably because the Irish Financial Services and Regulatory Authority, which also acted as
supervisor, was commonly referred to as the Irish ‘Financial Regulator’.
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It then presents the research design for the paper. Following this it provides a brief overview
of financial regulation and supervision in Ireland (1970-2008). Thereafter it assesses capture
of Irish supervision and examines the politics of regulation and supervisory reform in Ireland.
Finally the alternative approaches to the subject are discussed.
2.2 The political economy of financial regulation
The literature on the political economy of financial development emphasises the impact
political institutions have on financial structure (Haber and Perotti, 2008, La Porta et al.,
1997, Beck, 2011). Political economy theories of governance assume that “markets and
their structures are basically contestable, that power, preference, and institutional variables
interact to produce outcomes, and that the state and the market are both embedded in
the broader political economy or social whole” (Underhill, 2006). This allows us to better
explain governance structures, their formation and subsequent outcomes. The confidential
nature of banking supervision means that the supervisory function is typically highly invisible
(Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). This invisibility makes it vulnerable to interference from (i)
supervised institutions or (ii) politicians (Das, Quintyn and Chenard, 2004, Barth, Caprio
and Levine, 2006, Pagliari, 2012, Kane, 1977).
Banks or special interests may seek to use the governance structure to promote their
own interests. Stigler (1971) argues that as a rule regulation is captured by the industry -
its operation is designed for the benefit of the regulated. Stigler’s (1971) seminal positive
economic analysis of regulation proposes that whereas self-interested politicians supply the
regulation, producers and consumers compete for rents. “Who will receive the benefits and
burdens of regulation, what form regulation will take, and the effects of regulation upon the
allocation of resources” are of central concern (Stigler, 1971, Stigler and Friedland, 1962, 3).
Due to collective action problems and because producers have a greater interest in barriers
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to entry, they are inevitably more successful. This approach was expanded to a more general
theory of regulation by Peltzman (1976), who shows that in equilibrium a rational political
regulator will be utility maximising. Extensions, to account for a variety of influences of
interest groups (Posner, 1974) and more complex competition and efficiency between interest
groups (Becker, 1983), were developed to better understand the equilibrium structure . For
example, Becker (1983, 395) explains how the political equilibrium is determined by “the
efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their
influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight costs of takes and
subsidies”.
Tullock (1967) first introduced the concept of ’rent-seeking’.5 Rents can be defined as “a
return in excess of the resource owner’s opportunity cost” (Tollison, 1982, 575). Rent-seeking
is allocatively unnecessary and hence efficiency reducing as “individual efforts to maximise
value generate social waste rather than social surplus” (Congleton, Hillman and Konrad,
2008, 56).
A useful structural model to think about incentives is a three-tier hierarchical model in
which there is a political principal (the government), a regulator and an agent (the firm),
and whereby asymmetric information is the source of regulatory discretion which facilitates
capture (Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Tirole, 1993). A firm has the incentive to induce the
regulator into not telling the government when the firm is inefficient, which reduces general
welfare (see Dal Bó, 2006). Whilst such models of regulatory capture represent stylised
extremes, they allow us to frame the “complex motivations” underlying regulatory policies
and policy-making (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, 65).
Theory suggests capture is more likely when regulation is highly complex and exacerbates
the information asymmetries between regulators and the regulated (Laffont and Tirole, 1991).
5However the phrase was coined by Krueger (1974). This public choice approach focuses more on the role
of political institutions and attempts to influence government in the competition for artificially contrived
transfers (Tollison, 1982, 576).
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The Irish financial crisis provides an interesting case study because the failures in supervision
contrast sharply with those of other countries faced with similar risks (Regling and Watson,
2010, 6). Unlike the US or UK markets, financial institutions did not, in the main, sell
complex structured financial products. Rather it was “an old-fashioned, plain-vanilla case of
excess, in which banks made big loans to questionable borrowers, and taxpayers ended up
holding the bag” (Krugman, 2010).
Although financial systems in most advanced economies have been liberalised, govern-
ments play a more involved role in the financial sector than other sectors of the economy.
This is because of the critical role the financial system plays for economic growth and de-
velopment. The objective of a stable financial system however may not always align with
short-term political objectives. Slow growth often generates demand for change, by the
public or the media, and politicians may attempt to use the financial system to achieve
such change (Green, 2012). Directing credit to preferred ends often spares the government
the political risk of raising taxes or lowering expenditure (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006,
41). “Politicians are more likely to be re-elected if they prolong a boom rather than burst
a bubble. Booms often lead to greater access to goods such as housing and the financing
of large infrastructure, something politicians do not want to stop.” (Persaud et al., 2009,
4). Furthermore, once in a crisis, bank closures are typically unpopular and politicians may
pressure supervisors to exercise forbearance or organise a bail-out to avoid short-term costs
(Quintyn and Taylor, 2002, 12).
Political interference in the regulatory process is referred to as the ‘governance nexus’.6
This captures the interlinkages between different layers of governance: public sector gov-
ernance, regulatory governance, financial sector governance, and ultimately the impact on
financial stability and the performance of the economy through distortions in the allocation
6This is different to the concept of ‘State capture’, whereby firms make “illicit and non-transparent private
payments to public officials in order to influence the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees, by state institutions”
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000, 6-7).
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of capital. Governments ultimately decide on regulatory policy. They design the legislative
framework, institutional structure, and the scope for action of regulators and supervisors.
“As banks become more important for the overall success of the economy, controlling them
through regulation [becomes] more important for the overall success and political survival
of governments” (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, 41). However, “as long as interference in
the regulatory process—or directly in the financial system—is not costly for the politicians,
regulatory governance cannot be effective” (Das, Quintyn and Chenard, 2004). A badly
designed regulatory framework can undermine financial sector governance (Quintyn, 2007,
16).
There is a significant body of evidence that a lack of independence and political inter-
ference contribute to deepening crises. For example, in the (1997-98) East Asian crisis, “in
some cases supervisors were aware of the severity of the problems in some financial insti-
tutions or sub-sectors, but political pressure inhibited them from tackling these problems”
(Quintyn and Taylor, 2002, 6, footnote 8). This lack of regulatory and supervisory autonomy
made them susceptible to political and industry pressure, leading supervisors in Korea and
Thailand, in particular, to frequently waive prescribed limits (Lindgren et al., 1999, 14-15).
Similarly, during the Japanese crisis in the 1990s, “the lack of independence of the financial
supervision function within the ministry of finance and the inability of the regulators to take
steps quickly to address and forestall problems in the financial system is widely believed to
have contributed toward the financial sector weakness” (Aikins, 2009, 28). Woo and Kanaya
(2000) explain that at the root of the Japanese crisis was an inappropriate adjustment of the
regulatory framework, issues with corporate governance and regulatory forebearance. Kane
(1989, 1992) documents the role and influence of lobbyists in the Savings and Loan (S&L)
crisis in the U.S., in limiting the application of key regulations, and in their own resolution.
He explains how the system created perverse incentives for both regulatory agencies and U.S.
Congress to ignore emerging problems and postpone solutions - “Congressional pressure for
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forbearance can be compared to a western marshal having to worry about his gun backfiring
or being shot in the back by an alleged colleague in the midst of a gunfight” (Kane, 1989,
97). Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004) provide further empirical support for the impact
of regulatory governance on financial stability. Using a multivariate cross-sectional analysis
they find better regulatory governance framework tends to strengthen and enhance financial
system soundness. To be able to ensure a stable financial system, regulators must have
the appropriate incentive structure and governance arrangements (Quintyn, 2007, 53). The
political salience of financial regulation therefore must be a central feature of any political
economy analysis of financial regulation (Baker, 2010).
Other possible alternative theories or approaches which may explain the inaction of the
Irish supervisor include bureaucratic capacity and historical institutionalism. Variations
in the regulatory environment may be explained by the bureaucratic capacity of regulatory
and supervisory institutions (Satyanath, 2006, 18). Some regulatory institutions with ‘higher
capacity’ and more numerous staff may be better able to implement policy than others. Al-
ternatively, historical institutionalism explains the effects of institutions over time, whereby
“past lines of policy condition subsequent policy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 9). Increasing
returns and positive feedback mechanisms reinforce existing institutions – through ‘path de-
pendence’ (Pierson, 2000a). Such processes however can lead to unintended consequences
or inefficiencies. In this case, previous institutional choices may have constrained the ability
of the new regulatory authority to act. Finally, the approaches to capture, outlined above,
all assume rational actors. However, non-rational forms of influence, such as cognitive and
behavioural biases, can also induce action that may favour the regulated industry (Needham,
2009, Kwak, 2013). These will also be discussed.
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2.3 Research design
Empirically the identification of capture is difficult and thus evidence on the causes and
consequences is scarce and has not been systematic (Dal Bó, 2006, Posner, 1974). This
could be because outcomes are probabilistic and bad outcomes do not necessarily mean bad
policy (Kwak, 2013). Legislatures, for example, may adopt policies because they are the
‘right policies’, which happen to be supported by powerful interest groups (Baxter, 2010). It
could also be that the task assigned to the regulatory agency is simply too difficult (Barth,
Caprio and Levine, 2006, 33).
Carpenter and Moss (2013a) systematic evaluation of the methodological and empirical
problems of detecting and measuring capture provides a useful guide for this research design.
They define capture as “the result or process by which regulation (in law or application) is,
at least partially by intent and action of the industry regulated, consistently or repeatedly
directed away from a defensible model of the public interest and towards the interests of the
regulated industry” (Carpenter and Moss, 2013a, 5). They propose three conditions that are
necessary and jointly sufficient for a full diagnosis of capture:
1. to posit a defensible model of public interest
2. to show action and intent by the regulated industry
3. to demonstrate that ultimate policy is shifted away from the public interest towards
industry interest
Carpenter and Moss (2013a) differentiate between distinct, but related dimensions of cap-
ture; strong and weak forms of capture, and pervasive and limited capture, thus highlighting
that capture is neither absolute nor uni-dimensional, rather it varies in both degree and kind,
across regulation and agencies. They calculate these relative to the net benefit of the reg-
ulation, thus capture can, for example, be pervasive but weak in form. They note however
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that credible evidence of strong and/or pervasive capture is difficult to find, and suspect
that cases of both are quite rare (Carpenter and Moss, 2013b, 5). Finally, they differentiate
between anti-competitive capture whereby incumbent firms are protected through new reg-
ulation, or deregulatory capture whereby firms seek to avoid regulation (for evidence, see for
example, Djankov et al., 2002).
For the purposes of this research, this paper analyses primary evidence, such as debates
in the Oireachtas; (Dáil Éireann - House of Deputies and Seanad Éireann – Senate), com-
mittee hearings, parliamentary questions, and primary documents published by the Public
Accounts Committee following the crisis. It also relies on the reports of the Commission of
Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland (Honohan, 2010, Regling and Watson, 2010,
Nyberg, 2011)7 and the numerous secondary evidence provided in academic and policy ana-
lyses published in recent years. Finally, the paper relies on evidence from 12 semi-structured
interviews undertaken between 2011 and 2014. These were undertaken with current and
former senior politicians in government and opposition from the major political groups in
Ireland and their advisers, former members of the Irish Financial Services and Regulatory
Authority (IFSRA) and journalists. To assess the alternative approaches described above,
this paper will also comparatively analyse the regulatory framework, both in its historical
and institutional context.
2.4 A brief history of financial regulation and supervision
in Ireland (1970 -2008)
The Irish financial system had been heavily regulated throughout the seventies and early
eighties. Restrictions on entry, capital structure, permitted activities, asset structure, issu-
7Whilst comprehensive in scope, these reports were limited by their terms of reference (for example they
did not address the influence of vested interests on policymaking or regulation) (Byrne, 2012).
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ance of liabilities, prices and interest rates applied (see Kelly and Everett, 2004). Further-
more, credit restrictions and the strict guidelines on sectoral lending limited bank activities.8
A cartel operated for clearing banks who “paid and charged a common schedule of interest
rates and levied common charges for bank services” (Davy, Kelleher and McCarthy, 1984).
By the early 1980s unemployment in Ireland stood at 17%, budget deficits exceeded 12%
GNP and output was stagnant. A perception emerged amongst politicians and the media
that the financial sector was not adequately supporting economic growth in the Irish eco-
nomy.9 This led the then government of the day to pursue two overarching objectives: (i)
to bring competition to the Irish banking sector and (ii) to ensure credit was provided on a
competitive basis.10
With respect to financial regulation, the mid-eighties onwards can be characterised as a
period of financial liberalisation. Formal guidelines for bank lending were ended in 1984 and
the issuance of indicative credit guidelines ended in 1986. New interest-rate arrangements
introduced in 1985 to ‘break-up the interest rate cartel’, were followed by the removal of
all restrictions on interest rates (see Kelly and Everett, 2004, 95).11 Effective lobbying on
the part of building societies resulted in their allowance to operate in the wholesale money
market and to undertake a variety of financial services - “underpinning the state’s willingness
8These included a liquidity standard for banks (which was introduced in 1958 and specified a minimum
level of external assets and balances relative to their domestic resources, to be held at the CBI), quantitative
limits on inflows from abroad, and anti-competitive measures including extensive licensing provisions. In
1973, for example, banks were advised not to increase private sector credit to non-productive sectors (i.e.
financial, property companies and personal sectors), in 1974 credit restrictions on banks were reinforced by
provisions for special deposits at non-commercial rates of interest, and in 1978 stricter guidelines backed by
supplementary non-interest bearing deposits were applied. Although sectoral guidelines were discontinued
in 1981 they were re-imposed in 1982 (see Kelly and Everett, 2004).
9Interview with former senior government politician.
10Interview with former senior government politician.
11Furthermore, in 1988 exchange rate controls were significantly relaxed. This was closely followed by a
removal of restrictions on purchases of medium to long term foreign securities. Restrictions on non-residents
holding Irish pound accounts and on foreign exchange borrowing by residents were lifted in 1992, with the
remaining exchange rate controls removed in 1993. Reserve requirements were steadily reduced during the
nineties and the secondary liquidity ratio (which required the holding of government securities) was abolished
in 1994. The primary liquidity ratio was reduced to 6 per cent in 1992, to 4 per cent in 1993, to 3 per cent
in 1994 and to the common Eurosystem level 2 per cent in 1999 (see Kelly and Everett, 2004).
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to introduce this legislation was a desire to enhance the flow of funds to the mortgage market”
(Murphy, 1995, 149). Increased competition in mortgage and retail money markets however
undermined traditional lending practices.12 This financial liberalisation occurred in the
context of the establishment of the European Monetary System and agreement on the Single
European Act which led to the adoption in 1988 of Directive (88/361/EEC) implementing
Article 67 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, designed to give the single
market its full financial dimension.
Kelly and Everett (2004) explain how the dismantling of credit, capital and interest rates
controls both at European and domestic levels however led to a structural change in the Irish
financial sector. By the mid-1990s mortgage intermediaries began to exert significant control
over the first time buyer’s market, as the market segment became increasingly attractive for
lenders and central for customer acquisition and lending (Nyberg, 2011, 21).13 The entry of
foreign banks into the Irish mortgage market in the late 1990s led to further competition for
market share. On the supply side, financial liberalisation created the conditions for strong
private sector credit growth. On the demand side, the advent of the euro led to significantly
lower interest rates (Kelly and Everett, 2004). This also facilitated the entry of new entrants
into the Irish market, notably Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in 1999 (Nyberg, 2011).
Turning to supervision, the 1971 Central Bank Act conferred a licensing and supervisory
role on the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI)14 although balance of payments problems in
the 50’s and again in the 60’s had led to a deepening influence of the CBI in the control
of domestic lending prior to this (McGowan, 1989, Hein, 1967). The 1989 Central Bank
Act provided for the extension of the bank’s licensing and supervisory powers in respect of
12For example a savings criterion whereby prospective borrowers had been required to invest 10% of the
value of the loan one year before it was granted, was removed. This resulted in faster loan approval (see
Murphy, 1995, 150).
13By 2005, at the peak of the market, mortgage intermediaries were a significant force in the market and
accounted for about 45% of new residential mortgage loans (Nyberg, 2011, 21, footnote 27).
14The 1942 Central Bank Act had conferred specific powers on the CBI prior to this.
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banking business and the supervision by the Central Bank of certain institutions in the Irish
Financial Services Centre (IFSC), futures and options exchanges and money brokers.
By 1998, the CBI was responsible for the direct supervision of most financial institutions.
This amounted to 877 institutions, 175 of which were IFSC companies (McDowell, 1999,
chapter 2). The Irish authorities however did not have a glorious record in supervising and
regulating financial institutions. Indeed, “one of the most striking features in the [banking]
scandals of the last 30 years is the failure of the banking police, the CBI and later the Irish
Financial Services and Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), to patrol the industry adequately”
(Carswell, 2011, xi). The Irish Trust Bank affair in 1976 led to the exchequer having to
compensate borrowers to the tune of £1.8 million (Honohan, 2010, 130). PMPA an insurance
company collapsed in 1983, requiring the preparation of emergency legislation to appoint
an administrator (Houses of the Oireachtas, 1983). This was shortly followed by the near
collapse of Allied Irish Bank (AIB) in 1985 when it revealed indeterminate losses in its
subsidiary, the Insurance Corporation of Ireland (ICI). In the mid-1990’s, a government
inquiry found that the Central Bank did little to prevent the widespread use of off-shore bank
accounts. They found that the Central Bank had a “particularly close and inappropriate”
relationship with the regulated entities and “was perhaps too mindful of the concerns of
the banks and too attentive to their pleas and lobbying” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2001).
Scandals in 1996 and again in 1998 highlighted concerns about the adequacy of the framework
for consumer protection (Westrup, 2002, 1).
In the wake of these failures in supervision “a picture had emerged in the public domain
that Irish banks were hopelessly supervised and that the Central Bank had gone to sleep on
the job”.15 The scandals also exposed a deeper institutional flaw- a “disturbing, dramatic
and disastrous breakdown in public accountability..... and an equally dramatic breakdown
in the system of parliamentary scrutiny” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2001). This led to the
15Interview with former senior government politician.
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broad political push for institutional reform of the regulatory supervisory architecture.
In 2003, a new authority was established which created a single Financial Regulator
called the Irish Financial Services and Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) as a ‘constituent part’
of the newly named Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI), but
operating independently, with powers for prudential supervision and consumer protection.16
The crisis however exposed systemic flaws in both financial regulation and supervision,
not least in the information it gave to the government in 2008 when it was putting in place its
crisis containment strategy. The Financial Regulator advised the government that the finan-
cial sector was merely suffering from a short term liquidity crisis.17 This led the government
to put in place a blanket guarantee of all liabilities of the banking system, amounting to e365
billion, or almost 2.5 times GNP (Honohan, 2010, 19), ultimately forcing the State out of
the sovereign markets and into an EU/IMF programme of economic adjustment. “Decisions
were made on the erroneous assumption that all banks would remain solvent” (Nyberg, 2011,
ix).
The reports into the crisis concluded that the Financial Regulator practiced a regulat-
ory approach that was excessively deferential and accommodating, insufficiently challenging
and not persistent enough, under-resourced and unwilling to swim against the tide of pub-
lic opinion and ‘rock the boat’ (Honohan, 2010, 16). Risks associated with their funding
strategies, concentration risk and speculative lending were ‘in plain sight’ (Nyberg, 2011)).
Furthermore, corporate governance in the credit institutions was not sufficient. Procedures
and processes were either not implemented or did not exist in Anglo Irish Bank and Irish
Nationwide (INBS) respectively (Nyberg, 2011, iv-vii). It was clear that supervisors at one
16Whilst it was the role of the Central Bank to monitor systemic risk (in the financial system as a whole),
this paper deals specifically with the micro-prudential functions of the Financial Regulator.
17For example, on 26/09/2008, following a presentation by the auditor Price Waterhouse Coopers on
Anglo’s situation, the Financial Regulator Pat Neary concluded that “there is no evidence to suggest that
Anglo is insolvent, it is simply unable to continue on the current basis from a liquidity point of view” (Houses
of the Oireachtas, 2008e).
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level or another were aware of most of the risks in the financial system (Regling and Wat-
son, 2010, 37). However “when prudential sector concentration ratios were exceeded, the
[Financial Regulator] did nothing to demand any limitation in risk exposure despite being
fully informed” (Nyberg, 2011, viii). Some have suggested its actions may be consistent with
‘regulatory capture’ (Honohan, 2010, Taylor, 2012). However little, if any, analysis of this
or the politics surrounding the regulatory and supervisory framework has been undertaken.
2.5 Capture of Irish financial supervision?
Supervisors depend heavily on regulated entities for information on performance, compliance,
disclosure, data, documentation, products and operations. The confidentiality of this rela-
tionship between the supervisor and regulated entities can however produce deviations from
legislative intent (‘agency slack’) (Walter, 2012, 102). Supervisors must have close contact
with banks. However close contact through on-site and off-site inspections and consultation
with industry (in rule-making, for example) means that banks have numerous opportunities
to present their views and interact with the supervisor and regulator (Hardy, 2006, 4). This
can lead to capture of supervisors or regulators.
The Irish Financial Regulator was committed to a ‘principles-based’ approach to regu-
lation (O’Reilly, 2004a). In seeking to fulfil their objectives, the supervisor did not seek to
“interfere unnecessarily in commercial decisions taken by regulated institutions”, rather they
placed a large responsibility with the management of the institution.18 The supervisors’
“primary concerns concentrate[d] on the authorisation of entities and individuals” (O’Reilly,
2004a). In this context the supervisor interpreted its role as focusing on processes and regu-
lation relied heavily on ensuring adequate governance structures and systems were in place
(Honohan, 2010, 44).
18One senior government politician of the day of the day stated that “rather than light-touch regulation,
it was no regulation”.
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Two specific examples show how the actions of the supervisor appear to be consistent with
two of the necessary conditions to identify capture outlined in the research design above – to
show action and intent by the regulated industry, and to demonstrate that ultimate policy
is shifted towards industry interest. These include: (i) the case of Directors’ Compliance
requirements and (ii) the case of the Corporate Governance Code.
In response to an inquiry into misbehaviour of banks in facilitating tax evasion,19 a
provision was inserted into the Central Bank Act concerning compliance statements to the
Financial Regulator.20 This provided the Financial Regulator with the discretionary power
to seek such statements. The Financial Regulator took a decision in November 2004 to pro-
ceed with the new Directors’ Compliance requirements. In November 2005, it was decided
to publish a public consultation paper on the issue. However this did not happen. Instead
an informal pre-consultation process took place with Industry and Consumer Panels and
industry representative bodies. Honohan (2010, 50) explains that following strong resistance
and lobbying from the industry, the Department of Finance requested the Financial Regu-
lator not to proceed with a consultation. Subsequently, following concerns expressed by the
Minister for Finance regarding the impact this would have on competitiveness, the Financial
Regulator agreed not to implement the provision. A similar example took place with respect
to a second key element of the governance framework, the Corporate Governance Code.
Following an informal pre-consultation exercise with the 12 credit institutions in September
2005 it was decided to delay issuing the formal consultation paper and subsequently no paper
was presented. In line with the theory outlined above, rent-seeking behaviour is therefore
clearly visible.
Two further types of ‘deviation from the public interest’ in the post rule-making, or imple-
mentation phase, may also constitute further evidence of capture: (i) formal non-compliance-
19The so-called DIRT inquiry refers to the investigation into the use of non-resident accounts as a means
of evading Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT).
20All evidence from this paragraph is taken from Honohan (2010, chapter 4).
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when actors openly resist implementation of the agreed rules that approximate the public
interest and (ii) ‘mock’ compliance- whereby actors engage in formal compliance, but their
behaviour negates their intent (Walter, 2012). In the Irish case, implementation was also
a major issue (Regling and Watson, 2010, 37). The supervisor had a reluctance to apply
powers in relation to micro-prudential functions and its preferred approach to enforcement
was to seek “voluntary compliance with legislation, codes and rules” and an enforcement
strategy that relied on ‘moral suasion’ (Honohan, 2010, 43). This led to a pattern of incon-
clusive engagement and lack of decisive follow-through. In one case, the regulator identified
weaknesses requiring corrective action. However a protracted and somewhat inconclusive
correspondence extended over many years with the identified problems not being corrected
before the crisis (see Honohan, 2010, 75). In general “it would have been known within
the Financial Regulator that intrusive demands from line staff could be and were set aside,
after direct representations were made to senior regulators” (Honohan, 2010, 5). In fact, no
penalties for breach of prudential regulations were ever imposed on a bank before 2008.
These cases show that both action and intent by the industry was clearly evident.
Secondly, they show how ultimate policy is shifted towards industry interest. As per the
research design outlined above however, these two conditions must be assessed against the
final necessary condition - a defensible model of public interest.
Carpenter and Moss (2013a) outline four possible defensible models for an empirical
analysis of capture: (i) to stipulate the ‘public interest’ on the basis of accepted theory
or broad empirical evidence (ii) to suggest that the long-run judgements of democratically
elected public officials or aggregated public opinion for the ‘public interest’ is superior to
that of any other actor (iii) to take a technocratic or scientific approach or (iv) when the
‘public interest’ is not known, to look for capture procedurally by (a) trying to identify the
special interests involved, and (b) examine those institutions and outcomes that would seem
consistent with capture. Because there is no theory or scientific approach that is broadly
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accepted, the next section will therefore evaluate the case of capture against the long-run
judgements of democratically elected public officials.
2.6 ‘In the public interest’? The politics of financial reg-
ulation in Ireland
What were the long-run judgements of democratically elected public officials in Ireland? To
assess this we must look at government objectives, the institutional architecture for regu-
lation and supervision and supervisory mandate. As mentioned above two key government
objectives in the 1980s were to bring competition to the Irish banking sector and ensure
credit was provided on a competitive basis. Despite significant success in attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the 1980s, policy-makers recognised the need to re-orientate policy
away from capital intensive industries towards the services sector (Burnham, 2003, O’Gráda,
1997). This upgrade in the nature of investment occurred in the wake of highly publicised
plant closures, corporate restructurings and emerging competition (Murphy, 1998).
The policy shift led to a determined effort to establish a favourable environment for fin-
ancial services in Ireland and laid the foundation for the development of the Irish Financial
Services Centre (IFSC) in 1987. The IFSC was “a purpose built tax and regulatory envir-
onment for financial institutions” which aimed to attract investment from global financial
services organisations (O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 2013, 8). A particular attraction was the
preferential corporation tax rate of 10% given on the trading income accruing to institutions
conducting international financial services activities. Establishing a favourable regulatory
regime was also a key priority of government in this respect.
The IFSC was a widely successful initiative and by the year 2000 had in excess of 500
companies engaged in a range of financial services including banking, treasury management,
custodial services, insurance, leasing and back-office support (Forfas, 2000, 30, footnote 14).
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Employment from the IFSC in 2000 amounted to almost 8,500 people and funds managed
exceeded $150 billion (ibid). By 2008 estimates suggest wholesale finance had reached 7.4%
of GDP and Ireland commanded 5.3% of wholesale financial services in the EU (London
Economics, 2009). Indeed today (2014), even after the crisis, estimates suggest the IFSC
directly employs 32,700 people and contributes approximately e2.1bn to the Irish Exchequer
(IFSC-Ireland).
In Ireland, the legislature was traditionally slow to react to changes in financial regula-
tion. Therefore to facilitate the governments’ objectives - of providing a favourable regulatory
environment for financial services - the IFSC Clearing House Group was established to as-
sist in the growth and development of the IFSC under the auspices of the Department of
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). This consisted of representatives of Government depart-
ments, relevant State agencies and members of the IFSC.21 This was a forum “for the public
and private sectors to work together to identify the supports which might be needed to as-
sist in the long-term development of the international financial services industry in Ireland
and any constraints which might act as a barrier”.22 The government made a commitment
to fast-track regulatory alterations and improvements, whilst ensuring that they were up
to international standards. “They looked at obstacles across government departments and
ensured a ‘friendly environment’ for new products”.23
As described in the theory section, a central aspect of private- interest theory is rent-
seeking behaviour of interest groups to manipulate government (Stigler, 1971, Krueger, 1974).
21In 1998, the IFSC Clearing House Group members included; Paddy Teahon, Department of the Taoiseach
(Chair), Michael Buckley, Allied Irish Banks, Ron Bolger, KPMG, Peter Coyne, Dublin Docklands Develop-
ment Authority, Garrett Murphy, Central Bank of Ireland, Torlach Denihan, FSIA, David Doyle, Department
of Finance, Brian Goggin, Bank of Ireland, Paul Haran, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment,
Kurt Hochheuser, Commerzbank, Kieran McGowan, IDA Ireland, Sam Mollinaro, Bear Stearns, Donagh
Morgan, Department of the Taoiseach, Frank Mullen, Office of the Revenue Commissioners, John Shaw, De-
partment of the Taoiseach (Secretary to Group), John Sievwright, Merrill Lynch, Michael Tutty, Department
of Finance (Houses of the Oireachtas, 1998b).
22Interview with senior government politician.
23Interview with former senior government politician.
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Large firms can overcome collective action problems and concentrate resources to obtain
special advantages. A number of papers have analysed the dynamics of this relationship
with respect to finance. Tressel, Igan and Mishra (2009) analyse the relationship between
lobbying by financial institutions and mortgage lending in the US prior to the crisis. They
find that faster relative growth by lobbying lenders is associated with higher ex-post default
rates. Kroszner and Strahan (1998) find interest group factors can explain the timing of
branch de-regulation and congressional voting in the US. Whilst this group clearly afforded
the participants the opportunity for further rent-seeking behaviour, it appears to have been
largely a government-led initiative. This institutionalised forum for lobbying does however
demonstrate the closeness of the relationship between the office of the Taoiseach and the
regulated entities, and highlights the political salience of financial regulation in Ireland.
Turning to the regulatory architecture, the establishment of the Irish Financial Services
and Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) in 2003 was the subject of much political debate. In
1998 a parliamentary committee produced a damning report on financial supervision in
Ireland. They concluded “that no structure or body existed that could, with confidence,
assure the Committee, or indeed the general public, that the commercial banking sector or
other financial institutions were properly supervised and/or accountable”, that legislation
and regulations were inadequate to supervise the commercial banking sector effectively and
that the Department of Finance had inadequate or insufficient powers and resources to
regulate financial institutions on a day to day basis (Houses of the Oireachtas, 1998a).24
24The responsibility for financial regulation was fragmented and distributed across multiple institutions.
The Department of Finance was responsible for the development of most of the financial services legislation
carried out by the CBI. The Department of the Environment was responsible for the legislative framework for
building societies, whilst the Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment was responsible for insurance
companies and insurance intermediaries and undertakings in collective investment schemes (UCITS). UCITS
had been a key driver for the IFSC’s early success (Scally, 2010). The Department of Enterprise Trade and
Employment also maintained the legislative framework for the Office of the Director of Consumer Affairs
(ODCA) and worked closely with that Office in developing policy. The ODCA had considerable powers
with regard to consumer relations with the financial services sector. This complex structure however lacked
credibility and many issues were left unregulated.
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Whilst the CBI had been empowered to supervise banking institutions, they had been largely
unable to prevent such malpractices. Therefore the committee proposed the establishment
of a single, independent, regulatory authority, given supervisory powers in relation to all
commercial bodies which handled funds or financial transactions in Ireland. The reform
of financial services regulation in the United Kingdom in 1997 and the establishment of
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) also give direct context to this shift. In October
1998, the Irish Government agreed in principle to the establishment of a single regulatory
authority and established an Implementation Advisory Group to advise the Government on
the role, functions, organisational structure, funding, resources and staffing of the authority,
as well as the legislative changes necessary for its establishment (McDowell, 1999, chapter 1).
The group recommended a ‘completely new, independent, organisation outside the Central
Bank’, with clear statutory responsibility for implementation of prudential regulation and
supervision of financial services and consumer protection.
This paper does not seek to assess the merits or otherwise of the establishment of a
single regulatory authority. The debate around the establishment of the IFSRA however
does allow us to identify the special interests involved. Following the proposal for a single
regulatory authority, intense lobbying occurred to leave regulatory and supervisory functions
with the Central Bank, rather than establish a new independent authority.25 A minority of
the Advisory Group proposed an alternative structure whereby a parallel separate division
would be set up, responsible for the implementation of the functions of the Central Bank
concerning all the prudential and consumer regulation, but within the CBI. One of the
minority of the Advisory Group who opposed the new structure represented the Department
of the Taoiseach.26 One of the advantages highlighted for the ‘alternative approach’ was
that “there [was] very considerable support among the entities currently regulated by the
25Interview with former senior government politician.
26Mr Dermot McCarthy was then, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Taoiseach. His opposition is
highlighted in footnote 46 of the paper version of the report (McDowell, 1999).
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Central Bank for it to become the new regulator” (McDowell, 1999, appendix II). It was not
until 2003 that the legislation was agreed and the prudential functions remained within the
newly named Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) . What
eventually emerged in the legislation was a twin- pillar structure within the Central Bank.
The institutional design was complex. However despite the new institutional structure, “the
general approach of the [Financial Regulator] did not mark a change from that of the [Central
Bank]. . . rather the approach of the [Financial Regulator] was in essence a continuation of
custom and practice of the [Central Bank]” (Honohan, 2010, 43). This again shows how
the political salience of financial regulation impacted the establishment of the institutional
architecture for regulation and supervision. One of the main arguments for maintaining the
status quo was a continuation of past practice. One senior politician interviewed for this
paper highlighted that “the job of the Financial Regulator was to not get in the way of the
IFSC”.
Looking at the regulatory approach and mandate in more detail, the Financial Regulator
was committed to a principles-based approach to financial regulation and supervision.27
Indeed it was one of the strategic goals of the regulator (IFSRA, 2006).“The underlying
idea was that the prudential regulator would not be prescriptive in terms of product design,
pricing and the specific risk decisions adopted by a firm, as long as the firm had a robust
governance structure, together with reliable oversight and control systems, especially systems
for managing risks” (Honohan, 2010, 43). This was a clear element of ensuring a ‘favourable
regulatory environment’ for financial services. This approach was ‘inherited’ from the Central
Bank (Honohan, 2010, 43) and supported by industry (O’Reilly, 2004b).28 Furthermore, such
27Whilst a principles-based approach was in line with accepted ‘theory’ at the time, at the time, it cannot
supplant a model of the public interest in this research design, given that rules versus principles represents
somewhat of a false dichotomy (see Honohan, 2010, 48).
28Globally, during the 80’s, an epistemic consensus had emerged around the ‘efficient market hypothesis’.
This assumes that markets were ‘informationally-efficient’ and that asset prices would reflect underlying
fundamentals (Fama, 1970). This became the intellectual underpinning of financial market deregulation
across the world and spurred banks to lobby for less stringent restrictions. Under this ideological approach,
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was the importance of financial services in Ireland however that the ‘promotion of financial
services’ was one of the statutory objectives of the newly established authority, although
this was explicitly subject to the objective of preserving the stability of the State’s financial
system.29 Nonetheless, it is again a clear indication of the political salience of financial
regulation.
Whilst in principle the IFSC and local retail banks represented two very different banking
systems, it was accepted that they should be treated equally on the grounds of competition.
Regulatory sector credit limits were not adhered to prior to the establishment of the Financial
Regulator initially for IFSC banks and when these limits were subsequently exceeded by large
margins in certain institutions prior to the crisis, with the tacit approval of the Financial
Regulator, it was accepted that they could not be applied to banks operating in the domestic
market (Nyberg, 2011, 64). Secondly, banks in Ireland chose strategies (on the assumption
of continued strong property demand and increased values) to retain market share in the
presence of strong foreign and domestic competition leading to higher growth, reported
profits and bank valuations and “it appears that concerns about a loss of market share by
Irish banks to potentially less regulated foreign competitors may have inhibited forceful
action by the [Financial Regulator]” (Nyberg, 2011, 21,65).
Often, robust regulation and intrusive supervision are required, to ensure the preserva-
tion of financial stability. This put the Financial Regulator in a compromising position “as
the possible adverse effects on discouraging inward investment in the IFSC were more imme-
diate and real than what were perceived as more distant concerns about financial stability.”
(Honohan, 2010, 109).
financial market innovation was viewed as market-perfecting and therefore assumed to be welfare-enhancing.
The distributional consequences were left out of the picture (Thirkell-White, 2009, 701).
29Article 5(b) of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority Of Ireland Act 2003 states that one
of the functions of the Bank was to “to promote the development within the State of the financial services
industry (but in such a way as not to affect the objective of the Bank in contributing to the stability of the
State’s financial system)”.
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2.7 Discussion of the alternatives
Consistent with capture theory the examples of the implementation of Directors’ Compliance
requirements and the implementation of the Corporate Governance Code show, as per the
research design, both action and intent by the regulated industry and demonstrate that ulti-
mately policy was shifted towards industry interest. It was however only following concerns
expressed by the then Minister for Finance regarding the impact this would have on com-
petitiveness, that the former were withdrawn. One senior government politician noted that
“light touch was a pretty fundamental philosophy of the Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrat
(PD) government”.30 The then Minister for Finance from an ideological perspective preferred
“minimum regulation”.31 Another interviewee highlighted that “government policy was easy
regulation, without a shadow of a doubt, even if this was not spelled out”.32
A broader analysis of regulation and supervision in the context of the politics of financial
services policy suggests that the Irish case better aligns with the ‘governance nexus’. Weak-
nesses in the governance structures of financial institutions can result from a badly designed
regulatory framework. This can result from government policy or political interference in
the regulatory process. Analysing the Irish case, key government objectives in the 1980s
were to bring competition to the Irish banking sector and to ensure credit was provided
on a competitive basis. In a bid to attract financial services to Ireland, they established a
favourable tax and regulatory environment for financial institutions. On the legislative side,
part of this involved a commitment to fast-track regulatory alterations and improvements;
on the institutional side, it involved institutionalising a light touch regulatory and supervis-
ory approach. This included a role for the Financial Regulator to promote financial services
in Ireland. This institutional architecture, regulatory framework and supervisory approach
30Interview with former senior government politician.
31Interview with Journalist.
32Interview with former senior government politician.
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can in turn explain why supervisors were reluctant to take action against Irish financial
institutions, or correct the governance problems identified in credit institutions.
This analysis aligns with the conclusions of the preliminary report into the regulatory
and financial stability policy prior to the crisis (Honohan, 2010, 107-110). It highlights
three key concerns of the Financial Regulator that militated against more decisive action
or intervention. Firstly, there was a worry that stronger regulatory action would adversely
affect the competitiveness of regulated credit institutions against those operating either on a
consolidated or subsidiary basis.33 Secondly, there was concern that more robust regulation
might make Ireland less attractive for international financial investment. A third concern was
that more aggressive use of some of the instruments discussed above could have been criticised
as running contrary to the spirit of principles-based regulation. These can all be directly
attributed to government objectives and the dichotomy between promoting financial services
and preserving financial stability. One senior politician noted that “because relationships
were so close, the thinking was that what was good for the banking system was good for
Ireland.....eventually the regulator became more concerned with protecting the reputation
of the system, than regulatory misdemeanours”. The outcomes in the Irish case, although
sometimes consistent with capture, can possibly be better characterised as ‘domestic bias’.
As this paper has shown, bias in this case was toward government objectives.
Alternative approaches also may have some explanatory power in explaining the (in)action
of the Financial Regulator. Firstly, in relation to ‘bureaucratic capacity’, agency slack can
result from systematic under-resourcing of the regulatory agency (e.g. the SEC or the Office
of Thrift Supervision in the U.S.), or discretionary non-enforcement (e.g. Japan in the mid-
1990s or Korea in 2001) (Walter, 2012, Satyanath, 2006). In Ireland however, the resources
of the Financial Regulator were broadly comparable with EU and global counterparts. A
33The ‘home-country principle’ in EU law gives primacy to the ‘home’ country legislative and regulatory
framework when a bank conducts activity in other EU Member States (see Hertig, 2000).
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comparison of the costs of regulation of credit institutions in 2005 (per emillion of assets)
shows that whereas Ireland spent e14, the UK spent e10, France e12, Germany e7, Hong
Kong e26, Singapore e28 and the US e177 (C&AG, 2007, 65). In terms of staff, Ireland was
comparatively was ‘resource intensive’. Numbers increased from 299 to 334 between 2004
and 2009. By 2007 63% were engaged in prudential supervision and 23% in consumer pro-
tection (EIU, 2011, 85-87), although only a limited number of people, with a considerable
asymmetry in expertise and seniority, were allocated to supervise the leading institutions
(Honohan, 2010, 75).34 Nyberg (2011, 63, footnote 99) notes however, that there was no
evidence that the Financial Regulator requested authorisation for a substantial increase in
staff for its banking supervision department.
Secondly, a historical institutionalist analysis may also have some explanatory power.
Historical institutionalists emphasise how institutions structure behaviour (Hall and Taylor,
1996). Path dependence is a central element of historical institutionalism. It suggests that
initial institutional decisions become self-reinforcing over time and “social adaptations to
existing institutions drastically increases the cost of exit from existing arrangements” (Pier-
son, 2000a,b, 492). Institutional designers may not act instrumentally, rather institutional
arrangements may be adopted because they are perceived to be appropriate, designers may
have short time horizons, and institutional choices may have significant unanticipated con-
sequences (ibid). Indeed the above analysis has shown that the new supervisory approach
did not mark a change from past practice in the general approach (Honohan, 2010, 43). Loc-
ating the IFSRA as a constituent part of the CBI may have been inadequate to establish a
new regulatory culture, particularly given the previously identified ‘close and inappropriate
relationship’ between the CBI and regulated entities (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2001). Such
an approach however, cannot fully account for the politics surrounding the broad policy
response (political, legislative, and institutional) between 1998 and 2003.
34Another interviewee highlighted that the Financial Regulator simply did not understand risk.
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Thirdly, non-rational forms of influence such as cognitive and behavioural biases may
also induce action that may favour the regulated industry. Needham (2009, 2333-2354),
for example, suggests that “confirmation bias, overconfidence, groupthink, bounded search
and status quo bias”, hold significant explanatory power in understanding why the Federal
Reserve refrained from exercising effective oversight of financial services in the sub-prime
mortgage market and refused to conduct a top-down review of entire lending entities. Sim-
ilarly, Buiter (2008, 498) argues that because the Federal Reserve (Fed) is a Financial Reg-
ulator and supervisor, “cognitive regulatory capture of the Fed by Wall Street resulted in
excess sensitivity of the Fed not just to asset prices... but also to the concerns and fears of
Wall Street more generally”. Choi and Pritchard (2003, 83)) assess behavioural biases in the
context of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and explain how regulators are
vulnerable to behavioural contagion, may suffer from over-confidence and process informa-
tion with only bounded rationality, or may misapply heuristics. Regulators are more likely
to adopt positions of those that they perceive as ‘in their group’, in their social networks, or
whom they perceive to be of higher status in social, economic, intellectual, or other terms
(Kwak, 2013, 11). Kwak (2013) outlines two plausible explanations for this. The first is
deference to people with higher status (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Secondly, people
may want to obtain higher status or confirm their belief that they have that higher status.
Similar dynamics appear to have some explanatory power in understanding the reasons for
supervisory culture in Ireland. Honohan (2010, 60) notes that “the reluctance to take decis-
ive action can also be characterised as displaying both deference and diffidence to regulated
entities” and “may have contributed to a reluctance to second-guess bankers in any aggressive
manner” (Honohan, 2010, 9).
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2.8 Conclusion
Regulatory and supervisory failure have been widely attributed as being one of several sim-
ultaneous forces which allowed the build-up of significant imbalances in the financial system
ultimately leading to the recent financial crisis in Ireland. This paper assesses the case of
capture of Irish financial supervision and regulation and finds that whilst some examples
appear consistent with rent-seeking behaviour and the conditions necessary to identify cap-
ture, a more complex picture emerges when analysed in its political context. Whilst in
principle the Irish architecture for regulation and supervision appeared robust, in practice,
the primacy placed by successive Irish governments on the attraction of financial services to
Ireland and an active policy to encourage greater competition in the Irish financial sector
led to the establishment of a regulatory framework and supervisory approach that was weak
and inadequate. Combined with the simultaneous macroeconomic, financial and bandwagon
effects well documented elsewhere, as well as the speculative mania in the property market,
this paper argues that politics prior to the crisis in Ireland played a significant contributing
role in fostering such a permissive banking environment.
A number of problems have been highlighted in this paper. Firstly, from a policy perspect-
ive, domestic bias and susceptibility to this bias was clearly an issue. A clearer mandate and
more independent institution could have helped overcome this. Independence here does not
imply legal independence, rather independence from time-inconsistent government object-
ives. Secondly, whilst a competitive and attractive financial services sector is a valuable asset
to any economy, it must be accompanied by a robust regulatory and supervisory framework.
It is the responsibility of political ‘principals’ to ensure a clear legislative and institutional
architecture is in place where supervisors are confident in applying powers (for example using
sanctions to ensure compliance) and where necessary are fully capable of imposing tougher
requirements on credit institutions. Thirdly, a principle-based approach to financial regula-
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tion, as implemented by the IFSRA, was clearly inadequate to safeguard financial stability
in the Irish case. Therefore, a more intrusive approach to supervision is clearly warranted,
where supervisors have a better understanding of the business models and associated risks
and challenge the strategy and governance of banks in a credible way. Finally this paper
highlights some of the clear externalities from cross-border banking in the EU.
This study represents only one single case. Therefore the external validity may be limited.
However it does show, in detail, how an advanced economy with seemingly well developed
institutions can become susceptible to domestic bias. This does not however appear to be
an isolated case. Recent research from the European System Risk Board (2014) suggests
that spurred by European financial integration, this may be a European phenomenon. “As
the protection afforded by national boundaries diminished, politicians felt that they had to
facilitate domestic banks’ quest for size, so as to be able to fend off foreign competitors (often
on the basis of economies-of-scale arguments) and lower the contestability of their control”
(Véron (2013) in European Systemic Risk Board, 2014).
For the future, the establishment of the SSM in the ECB represents a landmark shift for
supervision in Ireland and the EU in this regard. The ECB will take over the supervision of
approximately 130 ‘significant’ credit institutions in November 2014. This will include the
three largest institutions in Ireland.35 Locating the supervisor in a supra-national institution
should make it much less susceptible to bias from local domestic interests. This is because
the new supervisory architecture has a European, rather than national, mandate and is
a constituent part of a legally independent supranational institution. Furthermore, the
ECB is politically independent of any Member State and “as European supervisor it has no
incentives related to national champions and its mandate is fully aligned with its European
35Article 6 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
specifies that ‘the ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation in respect of the three
most significant credit institutions in each of the participating Member States, unless justified by particular
circumstances.’
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financial stability objective (Draghi, 2013). Third, the creation of a harmonised supervisory
manual,36 which will apply to all banks, should help to ensure best practice supervision
across all participating Member States.
36This will cover on-site and off-site inspections, procedures, processes, risk assessments, model validation
and methodology for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP).
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Chapter 3
Information and Financial Crisis Policy
Christopher Gandrud and Mícheál O’Keeffe
Abstract1: The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises
varies considerably across countries and crises and has important consequences
for the fiscal cost of the intervention, the solvency of banks and the real eco-
nomy. In this paper we aim to understand why policymakers choose the level
of intervention they do to contain threats to their financial system. In particu-
lar, we want to understand why policymakers may end up choosing sub-optimal
policies that lead to outcomes that they do not want. We focus on the fact that
to be able to choose an optimal response, policymakers must rely on information
from bureaucrats and other actors about the health of the banking system. How-
ever, information providers may have different policy preferences. To understand
the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we
develop a ‘signalling game’ of financial crisis containment. We use comparative
statics and a case study of the recent Irish bailout to demonstrate the implications
of the model, which highlights the important role that information asymmetries
play in affecting policy responses to financial crises.
1The authors are listed in alphabetical order. Thank you to participants at the 2012 Mid-west Political
Science Association Annual Conference, seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Waseda
University, as well as Klaus Brösamle, Sahil Deo, Andy Eggers, Charles Goodhart, Mark Hallerberg, Simon
Hix, Philip Lane, Suhjin Lee, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and Shanker Satyanath for their helpful comments.
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3.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the need for widespread government intervention
to stabilise the financial system. Tools such as direct recapitalisation, widespread liquidity
support, as well as asset and liability guarantees have been used to contain systemic threats
to many countries’ financial systems. However, chosen containment policy levels varied
considerably across countries and crises (see chapters 4 and 5), with important consequences
for financial system solvency, the direct fiscal costs of crisis responses and the subsequent
impact on the real economy. Governments face a trade-off in financial crisis containment.
To contain a crisis they must announce a policy response that will restore confidence to
the financial system. At the same time, such measures expose governments to significant
possible fiscal costs which may threaten the solvency of the state itself. This was dramatically
demonstrated by the decision of the Irish government in 2008 to provide a blanket guarantee
of bank liabilities.
The Irish case is particularly thought-provoking. Despite the size of the response, which
included guarantees that amounted to e365 billion, or almost 2.5 times GNP (Honohan, 2010,
19), decision-makers believed that it would end up costing very little, as the guarantees were
not likely to be redeemed. Many believed that the financial sector was merely suffering a
short-term liquidity crisis rather than a fundamental problem of insolvency. This sentiment
was expressed by the Minister for Finance, who shortly after the first round of banking
system support was announced, commented that it was “the cheapest bailout in the world
so far”.2 However by Spring 2011, the bill had reached e70 billion, leading the Central Bank
Governor to note that it had ended up being one of the costliest crises in history.3 Irish
policymakers seemed to have chosen exactly the containment level that they did not want.
2Brian Lenihan (Former Irish Minister for Finance, 2008- 2011) to the Leinster Society of Chartered
Accountants lunch in Dublin, October 23rd, 2008.
3Patrick Honohan, Central Bank Governor, March 31st, 2011.
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The recent Irish example motivates us to create a general way of understanding banking
crisis policy-making that allows us to understand how decision-makers may end up choosing
crisis containment policies that lead to non-preferred outcomes.
There has been growing attention given to the political economy of public responses to
banking crises (see Alesina and Drazen, 1991, Keefer, 2007, Pepinsky, 2014, Rodrik, 1999, Ro-
sas, 2006, 2009, Satyanath, 2006, Homar and van Wijnbergen, 2013). These works have tried
to understand why governments respond to widespread bank insolvencies or the possibility
of widespread insolvencies that are the hallmark of financial crises (Laeven and Valencia,
2012a, Sundararajan and Baliño, 1991) by focusing on, for example, differences between
democracies and non-democracies, institutional weaknesses in emerging economies, or the
number of veto players within democracies. However, these approaches lack explanations for
cases like Ireland’s recent bailout, as it is an advanced democracy with a developed economy
and (at least before the crisis) well-regarded public and private financial institutions. One
factor that has been largely been ignored in previous work, but which may be crucial, is the
role of information asymmetries.
To fill this gap in the literature we draw on the seminal model by Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) to develop a signalling game, where the actor who
makes the containment policy decision relies on information from their financial bureaucrats
and other banking system actors. Information-poor decision-makers primarily rely on these
actors for information about the proportion of non-performing loans (NPL) in their banking
systems and the recovery value of these loans in the aftermath of shocks. These are important
indicators of how much a given policy response is likely to cost. Our model predicts that if
information providers have different preferences than decision-makers they are likely to give
vague or even uninformative messages, which harms the decision-maker’s ability to choose
policy responses they prefer. The model also predicts situations where the decision-maker
will receive accurate information, i.e. when decision-makers and information-providers have
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closely aligned preferences.
Before beginning, it is important to emphasise the external validity of the environment
we are modelling, especially for drawing conclusions to more sophisticated financial mar-
kets. Previous work has largely assumed that decision-makers in wealthier and especially
democratic countries, are not as reliant on domestic public bureaucracies and banks them-
selves for information about banks’ health, as are policy-makers in less wealthy and less
democratic countries (e.g. Satyanath, 2006). It is assumed that bureaucratic actors in more
advanced markets are more transparent and that non-bureaucratic actors, including a free
financial press and robust auditors, serve as independent sources of information. However,
these may not be reasonable assumptions. Financial bureaucracies, particularly in Europe,
have tended not to be very transparent. Gandrud and Hallerberg (forthcoming) document
that only about one third of EU Member States regularly released marginally detailed su-
pervisory data on banks. In the data that is released, it is difficult or impossible to get a
real-time and accurate impression of the full extent of non-performing loans. This limits the
independent information that the press and decision-makers can access. In some countries,
such as Germany, confidentiality laws even prohibited law-makers from accessing bank-level
supervisory information. Only after the 2007-2009 crisis have law-makers gained some ac-
cess to this information, although still within the confines of a special investigation. Though
in general, non-governmental actors are important sources of information, their ability to
provide accurate information about quantities such as NPL’s during the start of a crisis has
been limited.
Sikka (2009) shows that banks across Europe and the United States received clean bills
of health from external auditors, often within a few months of their collapse in the 2007-2009
crisis. Looking at Ireland specifically, all banks received unqualified ‘clean bills of health’
prior to the crisis, even though some had to be rescued within six months (Nyberg, 2011,
52). Despite problems of credit quality, the sustainability of lending practices and adequacy
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of internal procedures building up over several years in Irish banks, “auditors . . . did not feel
that commenting on the implications of such business model problems fell within their proper
remit” (if they saw them at all), as they were not related to general operational problems
and loan documentation (Nyberg, 2011, vi).
International or supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund,
the European Commission or the European Central Bank institutions may release their
own information to governments and closely scrutinise domestic bureaucracies’ information.
However, these actors have generally played a major role after a crisis has started. Often they
are brought in because a government’s initial crisis response (what we are primarily trying
to explain) ended up being unsustainable. It is also reasonable to assume that non-domestic
bureaucratic actors are strategically motivated and may have incentives to use information
asymmetries to their advantage. Our model and its implications could easily be extended to
situations where these actors do play important roles as information providers.
Assuming that perfect information or few information asymmetries exist between fin-
ancial bureaucrats and decision-makers is therefore unreasonable. We thus need to better
understand how these asymmetries and biases affect policy choices.
We start the paper with a brief definition of banking crisis containment policymaking and
a discussion of the previous literature on the political economy of banking crisis containment
policies, to which our paper directly contributes. We then begin to develop our signalling
model by setting up the game, including the actors and their preferences. Following this,
we describe the signalling game with one decision-maker and one signaller and then develop
the game to include more than one signaller. To illustrate the implications of our model we
present comparative statics and apply our approach, to understand the recent bailout of the
Irish financial system.
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3.2 Defining banking crisis containment policymaking
When a country has widespread bank insolvencies it is traditionally said to be in a banking
crisis (Sundararajan and Baliño, 1991). We can add to this definition, banking systems
with significant signs of distress that indicate systemic insolvency problems in the very near
future (see Laeven and Valencia, 2012a). “Because bank balance sheets are tightly integrated
and bank capital is highly leveraged, the failure of a single insolvent bank may threaten to
upset the entire banking system and have effects on the real economy” (Rosas, 2009, 6). If
bank failures have potentially large and widespread negative externalities it is reasonable
to assume that most actors–(policymakers, bankers, the public)–greatly prefer mitigating
the impact of these crises with government intervention to in-action. There are many ways
for policymakers to respond to crises (Detragiache and Ho, 2010, Laeven and Valencia,
2008a, Rosas, 2009). These policies can be categorised by their use during two broad phases
beginning with containment and followed by resolution (Honohan and Laeven, 2005). In this
paper we focus exclusively on crisis containment policymaking.
A shock to the banking system from economic (or political) developments, can trigger a
liquidity crisis which threatens otherwise solvent banks (Frydl and Quintyn, 2006). In order
to contain the crisis and avoid widespread insolvencies, policymakers can choose policies
such as liability and asset guarantees, liquidity support and recapitalisation, to help prevent
banks from failing. However, policymakers face a trade-off between providing support and
exposing taxpayers to the possibility of considerable losses. Policymakers must therefore
choose the degree of policy intervention they want to use to contain the crisis. A higher level
of intervention may stabilise the system, but may be very costly to taxpayers, as bank losses
are taken on by the government. A lower level of intervention may not effectively contain a
crisis, leading to contagion, the unnecessary destruction of asset values, and possibly lead to
54
recession.4
3.3 Previous explanations of banking crisis containment
Before developing our signalling game for explaining how decision-makers choose crisis con-
tainment policies, we briefly discuss some of the major previous approaches in the political
economy literature. Our argument builds on this literature. Nonetheless, as we will show em-
pirically in our case study, each is substantively incomplete for explaining events, as many
of them unrealistically assume that policy-makers, especially in advanced countries, have
complete information.
Crony capitalism is possibly the most straight-forward political economy approach to
understanding why countries choose high levels of bank support to contain crises. Bankers
prefer public to private losses as public losses in banking crises are wealth transfers to them.
This preference leads them to push for high public guarantees to forestall insolvency, i.e.
they gamble for resurrection (Downs and Rocke, 1994). Politicians with cronyistic ties to
bankers are more likely to use bailouts at the expense of diffuse public interests such as
taxpayers (Rosas, 2006). The crony capitalism theory expects decision-makers with close
ties to the banking sector to pursue policies that maintain the solvency of banks even at
substantial public expense.
Another major stream in the literature focuses on veto players effects. However, opinion
about how the number and polarisation of a country’s veto players affects policy choices
during banking crises ranges considerably. On the one hand, Alesina and Drazen (1991)
argue that as the number of veto players increases, we are less likely to expect them all to
agree on a new policy. Therefore crisis responses in general will be slow and inadequate.
Conversely, Rodrik (1999) suggests that having many veto players, if organised to manage
4High and low are relative terms based on the underlying problem. We discuss this formally below.
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conflicts, will result in more appropriate and quickly implemented crisis management policies.
Keefer (2007) argues that the number of veto players has no effect on crisis responses, but
that competitive elections encourage better crisis responses for the general public since they
weaken policymakers’ ties to banking interests and align them more closely with taxpayers.
Similarly, Rosas (2009) argues that actors in democratic, rather than authoritarian, countries
are more likely to use public cost-reducing crisis responses, since electoral incentives push
them to favour limiting public losses. Countries with competitive elections, regardless of
the number of veto players, could be more likely to choose crisis response policies that limit
public costs.
Choices may also be constrained or shaped by bureaucratic capacity (for a discussion
of this type of argument see Satyanath, 2006, 18). Bureaucratic institutions do not have
equal capacity across all countries. Higher capacity regulators, ministries of finance, and
central bank officials with expertise are better able to implement complex policies, such
as orchestrating sustainable bank mergers.5 For the same reasons, bureaucrats with lower
capacities might be restricted in the policies that they can plausibly enact. Policymakers
may take this into account when choosing policy responses. Furthermore, high capacity
bureaucracies may be able to obtain better quality information about the true health of the
banking sector (Abonyi, 2005). How might bureaucratic capacity help us predict containment
policy choices? We would expect that if a bureaucracy had better information and could
more accurately monitor banking activity, that the country would accurately target support
at solvent, though illiquid institutions, and thus would be less likely to issue costly crisis
containment support.
Through conditions on loans that countries in financial crises desperately need, interna-
tional institutions may force countries to adopt certain policies (Vreeland, 2003). Receiving
support from international institutions can result in policies closer to the preferences of these
5Higher capacity implies relatively numerous and highly-qualified staff with plentiful resources.
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institutions.
Satyanath (2006), examined how information asymmetries could affect developing coun-
tries’ financial regulatory choices. However, he explicitly assumed that information asym-
metries were not an important component of decision-making in more advanced financial
centres.
3.4 Signalling game setup
We directly try to understand how information asymmetries affect the containment policy
level that is chosen even in more sophisticated financial markets. To do this we build on
seminal analysis by Crawford and Sobel (1982)6 and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), and recent
application by Satyanath (2006) to develop a signalling game where the actor who makes the
containment policy decision relies on information from more information rich actors such as
their financial bureaucrats and banking officials. We demonstrate the empirical usefulness
of this approach in later sections.
The Players We model banking crisis policymaking as the result of a game between two
sets of actors. One set makes the containment policy decision. We call her the prime
minister (PM). Before making her decision she needs to receive information sent by one or
more signallers who are information-rich. In the single signaller version of the game, we
denote the information provider as the financial regulator (FR). In the two signaller version,
we add a player called the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Information senders and receivers in
any given situation may be different. As illustrated in the Irish case below, officials at banks
were also important signallers.
6Crawford and Sobel (1982) consider a more general specification of preferences and state distributions to
make welfare comparisons. For simplicity this paper considers a uniform quadratic model. Our application
also draws on explanations by Gibbons (1992) and Levin (2002).
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Field of Play: To demonstrate why a decision-maker must rely on signals from financial
bureaucrats for a containment policy decision, we first model how a shock would generate
changes to the proportion of NPL’s for a bank. This can be characterised in terms of assets
(A), liabilities (L) and capital (C) and is given by the identity A = L+ C.
We consider a portfolio of assets which have two broad types: performing P and non-
performing N . These can be loans to households or firms, for example. The value of assets
that are performing is denoted AP whereas non-performing assets are denoted AN . Firms
or mortgage-holders may fall behind on their payments or default on their loans creating
γ proportion of non-performing assets. Non-performing assets always have a real value less
than their book value.7
Banks play a fundamental role in the transformation of short-term deposits into long-
term loans. However, this creates an asset-liability maturity mismatch. Banks rely on both
traditional retail deposits and wholesale funding on the liabilities side to finance their assets.
Deposits may be withdrawn and wholesale funding may not be rolled over. As such, the
structure of the banking system makes it vulnerable to liquidity risk. Finally banks hold
capital which will often take the form of hybrid claims such as subordinated debt or preferred
equity instruments which are considered as a buffer against losses that protect depositors.
Building on Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1999), we characterise the net worth of a bank as:
θ = γAN + (1− γ)AP − (L− C). (3.1)
When C ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ A ≥ L the bank is solvent. This is where the weighted average pay-off
from performing and non-performing assets exceeds the value of liabilities issued to fund the
assets. However when (C) becomes negative the banking system is deemed insolvent.
Banks’ asset portfolios are sensitive to macro-financial vulnerabilities. A shock to an
7Non-performing assets may be liquidated and the bank will obtain j with probability β. Otherwise the
assets will have a continuation value with a realised return pi. Formally: AN = βj + (1− β)pi.
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economy can cause asset price declines and disruptions to the supply of credit generating
non-performing loans (Nkusu, 2011). To capture this, we assume that the shock i changes
the proportion of non-performing loans by µi, where µi ≥ 1. Therefore, following a shock
the expected proportion of NPLs is given by:
γi = µiγ. (3.2)
For the time being, we’ll assume that γi is from a uniform distribution between [0, 1] with
mean γ¯i and variance σ2γi . θi represents the net worth of a bank as a result of shock i:
θi = γiAN + (1− γi)AP − (L− C). (3.3)
Information Banks are assumed to have private information about the quality of their loan
portfolio. This can be accessed by signallers. However the PM does not know the proportion
of non-performing assets (γi) following the shock, so she does not know the recovery (r)
value of assets in the crisis Ari = γiAN +(1−γi)AP . This is primarily because of the opacity
of loan valuations during a crisis. She does however know the distribution of Ar. This is
somewhat of a simplifying assumption, as NPLs can to a certain degree be endogenous to
the degree of intervention (discussed further below).
Containment Policy Choices Government’s have a range of containment policy choices
to restore confidence in the financial system. These can include liability or asset guarantees
(e.g. supporting the value of certain assets held by banks), as well as liquidity assistance
and re-capitalisation which ensures their solvency. In this paper we very broadly call all of
these measures containment policies. For simplicity, we assume that the PM is indifferent
between the different types of containment policies.
Therefore, we conceptualise containment policies g as being from a unidimensional space
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where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. We choose to further conceptualise g as a proportion of the pre-shock
book value of assets of a bank A, and denote this g = g
A
.
Whereas direct recapitalisation directly supports the solvency of a bank, asset relief
directly addresses the issue of uncertainty regarding the quality of bank balance sheets.
Secondly, it contributes to help revive confidence in the sector, to the extent that asset
impairment increases amid a deteriorating situation in the real economy (European Com-
mission, 2009e, 2). In the latter case the return to the state can be endogenous to the level
of intervention (see Pesola, 2005).
Government intervention on the asset side of the balance sheet can come in many forms
for example asset purchases, insurance, swaps, guarantees or hybrid models (see European
Commission, 2009e). Just like retail depositors, investors in debt are prone to “run” which
can “simultaneously drive down security prices and build up liquidity premiums, regardless of
the fundamental values for the assets that back the securities”, (see Hancock and Passmore,
2010, 2). Government intervention on the asset side can help restore financial stability, for
example by putting in place an ex-ante price guarantee which facilitates the creation of an
environment in which asset prices can be credibly expected to remain above the crash levels
that trigger sudden stops (Mendoza and Durdu, 2004, 3). The correct valuation of assets
is therefore critical to ensure the return to the state. This can be complex, and deeper
levels of intervention such as the creation of a good bank or nationalisation can be used
as alternatives which further eliminate uncertainty about the proper value of assets (see
European Commission, 2009c).
Both theoretical and empirical research has shown that credit default risk is related not
only to idiosyncratic factors but also to systematic factors such as macroeconomic develop-
ments (see for example Merton, 1974, Bonfim, 2009, Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005). Allen
and Saunders (2002) provide a useful overview of cyclical effects of credit risk measurement.
They note that “firm interdependence (such as industry effects) can produce correlated PDs.
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In addition, cyclical effects in asset valuations and shifts in regime (due to structural, reg-
ulatory, or economic factors) impact PD” (Allen and Saunders, 2002, 10). An unexpected
macroeconomic shock can cause an increased number of bankruptcies and hence NPLs (Pes-
ola, 2005). The recovery value here therefore can be endogenous to the level of intervention.
Choosing to focus on containment policies as a proportion of assets is not necessary.8
However, it is substantively meaningful for actors who care about containment costs. As-
suming a best case scenario where containment costs can be recuperated up to the recovery
value of a banks assets,9 if support is equal to the recovery value of those assets the support
will be ‘costless’.10
For a shock i we can express the assets’ recovery value Ari in terms of the assets’ pre-
shock book value A with αi, where αi = AriA . Therefore a costless containment policy g for
a shock i would be one where g − αi = 0.
PM’s Preferences If the PM has ‘moderate’ preferences, in that she wants to ensure
that the guarantee has no direct costs to the taxpayer, she would choose a guarantee gk
that equals the recovery value of the loans in the system αi. This choice may calm the
liquidity crisis and maintain banking system solvency, while ensuring that the state could
recuperate the containment policy costs. It is not necessary to assume that the PM prefers
gk−αi = 0. She may be more concerned about financial system stability or protecting banks
from losses and want some gk > αi. Or she may be worried about the potential losses from
the guarantees or that the moral hazard containment policies could create and prefer some
gk < αi. Regardless, our information-poor PM does not know the recovery value of banking
system assets. Because of this, she cannot choose the containment level that most matches
8For example, we could think of them as a proportion of the banking system’s total balance sheet value
θ or indeed of liabilities.
9They would effectively be collateral either ex-ante or ex-post.
10This of course assumes that there are no costs associated with acquiring, administering and selling the
assets, as well as the costs of extending the support. However, including these costs would not fundamentally
change our model.
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her preferences without more information.
Signaller Preferences To learn the recovery value of the banking system’s assets she must
rely on signals from the other players who have their own containment policy preferences.
It may be the case that the signallers’ preferences are perfectly aligned with the PM’s. Of
course such a close alignment of preferences may not always be the case. In crony capitalist
and other models of crisis containment policymaking, banking industry actors are often
assumed to want high levels of support to forestall insolvency (Rosas, 2006, 2009). Public
sector signallers may have cronyistic ties with the banking industry or be ‘captured’ by the
industry. Capture may involve the regulator perceiving the interests of the banks to be the
same as that of the state (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006). They may therefore prefer
policies that ensure the continuation of financial institutions rather than prioritising the
recovery value of bank assets to protect taxpayers. Even in countries with seemingly ‘strong’
institutions, an independent central bank governor, for example, may have a preference for
financial stability over low costs to the state and as such prefer large containment policies
(Honohan and Laeven, 2005). On the other hand, other bureaucrats involved in the game,
Departments of Finance for example, may be more concerned with fiscal costs and/or moral
hazard problems. They would therefore prefer that the state minimise its containment
policies so that they are less directly exposed to banking system losses and the possibility
of socialising losses. Though many banks, especially troubled banks, may want a high
containment level, preferences in the banking system may actually be heterogenous. Healthy
banks, that believe they could weather a crisis, may prefer a lower containment level. They
could believe that accepting public assistance would undermine market confidence in them,
or that failures at weaker banks could be an opportunity to consolidate their presence in
the market. This is all to say that signaller’s containment policy preferences can be very
heterogenous and certainly need not be the same as the decision-maker’s.
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Sequence of Play The game has the following sequence of play:
• In t0, there is a shock to the banking system i that creates a new proportion of non-
performing assets. Hence, αi is created.
• In t1, the sender observes αi and sends a message mα about the level of non-performing
assets αi to the PM. In games with more than one signaller, each sends their own
message.
• In t2, the PM receives mα, updates her prior knowledge about α and decides gk, the
containment policy level.
• In t3, the outcome xk = gk − αi is realised.
3.5 Model 1: The single signaller game
We will now consider the utilities and equilibrium strategies of the actors in a version of the
game with one signaller.
Utilities Because the PM requires information from the FR to make her preferred con-
tainment policy choice, the PM’s pay-off depends on the message mi sent by the FR and an
unknown state of the world. The PM’s payoff can be thus characterised by:
UPM (g, α) = − (g − α)2 . (3.4)
The payoff of the FR is:
UFR (g, α, b) = − (g − (α− b))2 (3.5)
where b ≥ 0. The b parameter captures the distance between the PM’s and the FR’s ideal
containment policy points, denoted xPM and xFR. As we will see, this distance influences
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the bias in the information that the FR gives to the PM. If b = 0, then their preferences are
perfectly aligned and as has been well established in the signalling literature (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982), the FR’s message will be completely accurate.
Equilibrium Consider that the FR can choose to send two messages mLα and mHα where
mLα < mHα. The signal is costless. Let g (m) denote the action taken by the PM in
response to the message sent by the FR. If α is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with mean
α¯, in equilibrium the FR will use a threshold strategy, whereby the FR will choose mLα when
α ∈ [0, α∗) and mHα when α ∈ (α∗, 1). α∗ represents the threshold value of α at which the
FR is indifferent between mLα and mHα. Therefore, the payoffs for the FR are characterised
as:
mLα : (g(mLα)− (α− b))2
mHα : (g(mHα)− (α− b))2
. (3.6)
The benefit for the FR of sending message mHα over mLα is increasing in α and can be
characterised as:
∆g = −(g(mLα)− (α− b))2 + (g(mHα)− (α− b))2. (3.7)
After receiving the message from the types in [0, α∗), the PM will believe that the FR’s
type message is uniformly distributed on α ∈ [0, α∗) and type (α, 1) is uniformly distributed
on α ∈ (α∗, 1). Therefore, the PM’s equilibrium strategy will be:
g(mLα) =
α∗
2
and g(mHα) =
α∗ + 1
2
. (3.8)
For all types in [0, α∗), for the FR to prefer sending mLα to mHα, it must be that all types
in [0, α∗) prefer g(mLα) = α
∗
2
over g(mHα) = α
∗+1
2
. Also all types in (α∗, 1) must prefer
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g(mHα) =
α∗+1
2
over g(mLα) = α
∗
2
. Given that α∗ characterises the type that is indifferent,
we solve for the partially pooling equilibrium by using the fact that when the utilities of the
FR and PM are equal as:
α∗ + b− α
∗
2
=
α∗ + 1
2
− (α∗ + b). (3.9)
simplifying to the formula α∗ = 1
2
− 2b. Given α = [0, 1], α∗ must be positive. A two-step
equilibrium only exists if |b| < 1
4
. Thus when the value of |b| ≥ 1
4
, the FR does not distinguish
between high and low recovery values and the signal becomes completely uninformative. A
pooling equilibrium called a “babbling equilibrium” exists where the FR does not even make
a crude distinction between types, whereby he chooses randomly over one interval [0, 1] and
uses each message m ∈M, regardless of αi and no information is transmitted. Therefore, if
the FR always reports the same message, the PM’s optimal strategy is to simply ignore the
message and assign a uniform belief to all values α ∈ [0, 1]. Her optimal strategy when she
is unable to update her prior is to set g = α¯, i.e. 0.5. Therefore, central to the argument
presented here is the distance between the preferences of the financial regulator and the
prime minister.
It may be more realistic to consider the equilibrium in the one signaller game when the
FR makes very fine distinctions between different levels of α. Crawford and Sobel (1982)
show that in the n-step equilibrium, the number of intervals is a function of the preference
parameter and largest integer given by the quadratic formula:
1
2
1 +
√√√√1 + ( 2|b|
) . (3.10)
Therefore, as b approaches zero, more communication occurs and only if preferences are
perfectly aligned and an infinite number of intervals exist, does full communication occur
(Gibbons, 1992). However, when |b| > 0, signals become vague and uninformative. When
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|b| > 1
4
, the FR randomises over the interval and the PM simply ignores the messages.
Therefore, as Crawford and Sobel (1982) show, all equilibria are partition equilibria where
the FR can introduce noise in his signal, by not distinguishing as finely between information
states. The FR does this to a larger degree the further his preferences are from the PM.
In this application we see how slight differences in preferences can lead the PM to mis-
calculate the containment level and could lead either to a non-preferred socialisation of bank
losses or a low containment level.
3.6 Model 2: The game with two signallers
We now extend the game to include two signallers that we refer to as the FR and MoF for
convenience.
Utilities Following Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), the PM, FR and MoF’s preferences can
be characterised as quadratic utility functions, whereby xMoF and xFR are the ideal outcomes
for the MoF and FR respectively and xPM is the optimal outcome for the PM. All players
maximise their expected utilities and their utility functions are given by:
UMoF = − (xMoF − x)2 UPM = − (xPM − x)2 UFR = − (xFR − x)2 . (3.11)
We assume that the MoF always has a preference for a lower containment level than the
FR, except when they have the same ideal points. This is merely for notational convenience.
Similar to the single signaller game, at t1 the signallers (MoF and FR) observe the shock,
infer accurately αi and send messages m1α and m2α from a set of feasible messages M =
{mj1α, . . . , mjnα}. At t2 the PM observes m1α and m2α but not αi and updates her prior.
She selects a guarantee gk. The outcome xk is realised at time t3: xk = gk − αi.
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Equilibrium The equilibrium concept here is Perfect Bayesian. A Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium is a set of strategies g∗k(m1α, m2α), m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk), m∗2α(αi, m1α, gk), and posterior
beliefs h∗(αi; m1α, m2α), such that four conditions are met. The FR’s signalling strategy
must maximise his expected utility given the PM’s optimal choice of gk and the MoF’s op-
timal signalling strategy. The MoFs signalling strategy must maximise his expected utility
given the PM’s optimal choice of gk and the FR’s optimal signalling strategy. The PM’s
choice of gk must maximise her expected utility given her posterior belief about the value of
α. The PM’s posterior belief must be consistent with the optimal strategies of the senders as
per Bayes’ rule. Building on Satyanath (2006, 43), as well as Crawford and Sobel (1982) and
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following
characteristics:
1. When αi takes values outside of the range α¯ + 2xMoF to α¯ + 2xFR, the two signallers
send the true value of αi to the PM. The PM then chooses gk = αi, with the outcome
xk = 0.
2. When αi takes values between α¯+2xMoF and α¯+2xFR, the two senders send conflicting
messages of the value of αi. The PM then chooses gk = α¯, with the outcome xk = α¯−αi
.
See the Appendix I for the proof.
3.7 Comparative statics
We now turn to examining the two signaller model’s equilibrium in comparative statics
with various levels of signaller polarisation. Comparative statics give us an idea of when
accurate communication between the signallers and the PM breaks down, i.e. signals become
uninformative. The further away the signallers’ ideal points are from the PM’s, the more
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often that the PM will make non-preferred containment policy choices. Figure 3.1 (at the end
of this paper) shows the guarantee choices and outcomes made under the two signaller game
from four scenarios, using 1,000 random draws of α from a uniform continuous distribution
with the range [0.65, 0.95] and mean of 0.8.11 In other words, the realisation value of the
banking system assets following a shock, ranges between 65 and 95 percent of the book
value of the pre-shock assets. This is a more realistic range of values than [0, 1], although it
represents a situation that is on average more dire than the Irish case discussed below.
The first row of plots shows how costly the containment policy is. In all of the scenarios,
we assume that the PM is moderate and so most prefers g−α = 0. The first scenario (shown
in the left-most column) is one where the signallers ideal points are somewhat close to the
PM’s (the MoF’s is -0.05 and the FR’s is 0.05). One third of the values of α are outside of the
range [α¯ + 2xMoF , α¯ + 2xFR], i.e. [0.7, 0.9]. When this is the case, both signallers signal αi
and the PM chooses gk = αi. This is represented in the top-left most square by the 45 degree
containment policy decision lines below 0.65 and above 0.85. The PM’s pay-off is 0 and the
signaller’s pay-offs are both -0.0025. Only when 0.7 < αi < 0.9 do signallers send conflicting
messages. In these cases the PM chooses gk = α¯ = 0.8. The PM’s payoff is less than 0 in
all cases except when αi = 0.8, with decreasing utility the further away αi falls from α¯. She
chooses a lower containment policy than she ideally wants when α¯ + 2xMoF ≤ αi < α¯. She
chooses a higher level than she would like when α¯ < αi ≤ α¯ + 2xFR.
The right-most column of Figure 3.1 shows a situation where signallers have very polarised
preferences and as a result are completely uninformative. The MoF’s ideal point is -0.15,
while the FR’s is 0.15. So the range [α¯+ 2xMoF , α¯+ 2xFR] is greater than the range of α’s
distribution. So the FR and MoF only send conflicting signals and the PM always chooses
a containment policy at α¯. This leads to only one situation where the PM chooses her ideal
11Figure 3.1 can be reproduced using the Python and R scripts available at https://github.com/
christophergandrud/GuaranteeGame.
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policy, when αi = α¯. Clearly, having signallers with containment policy preferences further
away from the PM’s, leads to less preferred policies for the PM.
The two centre columns show asymmetric signaller preferences around the PM’s ideal
point. In the second column is a situation where xMoF = −0.05 and xFR = 0.15. In this case
the FR and MoF send uninformative signals for all values of α > 0.7. The reverse preference
arrangement is shown in the third column with the reverse results, i.e. informative signals
are sent at all values of α > 0.9.
3.8 Case study: containment policy decisions in Ireland
To further demonstrate the plausibility and usefulness of our signalling model, we apply it to
understand the Irish Government’s 2008 crisis containment policymaking. We first make a
prediction about the chosen containment level based on our signalling game and the under-
lying health of the Irish banking system at the time. The prediction indicates that the Prime
Minister would choose a higher containment level than his ideal preference when preferences
diverge. We then show how the case closely matches the predictions. Actors with divergent
preferences were actively engaged in a signalling game in the run up to the Government’s
containment decision. We find evidence, using primary and secondary documentation, that
the signallers can be placed into two groups. One group, primarily civil service staff at the
Department of Finance (DoF), expressed concern about the potential costs of State interven-
tion given the size of the problem and were reportedly against a full guarantee. Conversely,
the Financial Regulator did not appear concerned with potential problems in the banks,
instead preferred to restore financial stability and so did not communicate that the recov-
ery value of bank assets was relatively low. Bank officials also signalled that the recovery
value would be high as part of a push for a full guarantee. The two groups therefore sent
conflicting signals. We further demonstrate the plausibility of our argument by comparing
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it to major alternatives from the political economy literature, many of which assume perfect
information in this type of case.
Predictions We will predict what containment policy level that the Irish Prime Minister
would choose, assuming he relied on information from two signallers, one with a preference
for a high level and one for a low level. Assuming that the Prime Minister has a preference
for a ‘costless’ containment in that gk − αi = 0. We further assume that actors with a high
containment preference, for example troubled banks with high proportions of non-performing
loans, would like gk−αi = 0.05. Because very troubled banks’ individual balance sheets had
more non-performing loans, that are likely to have a lower recovery value than the banking
system average, they need the overall level of banking system support to be larger, in order
to prevent insolvency. gk − αi = 0.05 is likely to actually be an under-estimated preference
for the most troubled banks. For example, Anglo Irish Bank had an NPL ratio of just under
15 percent in 2010, rising to almost 35 in 2012 (Fitch Ratings, 2013). We assume that other
actors have a preference for a smaller containment policy, such that gk −αi = −0.05. As we
will see, these preferences are more than far enough apart to lead to uninformative signals
in the Irish case.
To understand this we will look at the last assumption we need to make: the range of the
uniform distribution of the recovery value of Irish banking system assets. To determine the
range, let’s first consider the likely non-performing loans range. In the seven years before
the crisis, Ireland had a mean NPL ratio of 0.86 percent without much variation. We assume
that this is the lowest end of the distribution. It would be a situation where the crisis was
entirely a short-term liquidity crisis, where the realisation value of the banking system assets
did not change. By 2012 the ratio increased to 18.7 percent (World Bank, 2013).12 We
assume that 19 is the maximum NPL ratio, as it is larger than the NPL ratios in almost
12Indicator number: FB.AST.NPER.ZS.
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every other Eurozone country in 2012- including Greece, Spain and Portugal. Secondly, we
assume that the recovery value of non-performing assets is 50 percent.13 So the range of
the distribution of recovery values expressed as a proportion of the pre-crisis book value of
assets is 0.905 to 0.9957, with a mean of 0.9537.
In a two signaller game, where one signaller wanted a containment policy of only about
gk − αi = 0.025 or more and the other wanted about gk − αi = −0.025 or less, all signals
would be uninformative, as the signallers would send different values. The Prime Minister
would then choose a policy of gk = 0.9537 regardless of the true recovery value of the assets
(see the right-most column in Figure 3.1 for a similar situation). Because the true recovery
value in the Irish case happened to be at the minimum possible value, the Prime Minister
would end up choosing a containment level much higher than what he wanted.
How well does the model’s prediction fit the sequence of events in the 2008 Irish banking
crisis containment case?
The Events Multiple national and international shocks from 2007 through 2008 consider-
ably undermined policymakers’ understanding of the Irish banking system’s health. Starting
in March 2007, the Irish house price index began to decline for the first time in five years.
The emergence of the sub-prime mortgage crises in the United States in mid-2007 resulted
in a tightening of the market for short-term wholesale funding in August 2007. Hedge-funds
in the United States began to short Irish banks in Summer 2007 and the collapse of Bear
Stearns investment bank in March 2008 created a global credit-crunch with major ripple
effects for the Irish banking system. Irish banks found it increasingly difficult to rollover the
debt that they used to make property-based loans and Anglo Irish Bank’s share price fell by
13The overall discount that the Irish National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) applied when it ac-
quired assets from five banks, including the most troubled ones, was 58 percent from when it became
operational, more than one year after the containment policy choice, into January 2010 (European Com-
mission, 2011b, 14). We assume that the assets NAMA acquired were not the most troubled, so we further
discount the recovery percentage to 50 percent.
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18% over one week, due to concerns over property exposure.
On September 20th, the Irish Government began its response to the crisis by increasing
the deposit guarantee scheme limit. It was initially raised from e20,000 to e100,000.14
However, these moves had little effect on slowing corporate deposit withdrawals.15 By the
end of September, a number of key Irish banks, such as Anglo Irish Bank, were finding it very
difficult to roll over the wholesale funds that they had borrowed and did not have adequate
collateral to refinance with the European Central Bank.
On 30th September 2008, the Government announced a guarantee of all deposits (re-
tail, commercial, institutional, and interbank), covered bonds, senior debt and dated sub-
ordinated debt (lower tier II), at the six main Irish banks (Irish Department of Finance,
2008).16 This amounted to e365 billion or 2.5 times Gross National Product (Honohan,
2010, 19). The figure is fairly close to the total value of banking system assets as, for ex-
ample, when measured against just domestic credit to the private sector, which was almost
2.4 times Irish GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2013).17 This does not include, for instance, the
banks’ significant operations in the United Kingdom and United States. In hindsight, we
have seen that “although international pressures contributed to the timing, intensity and
depth of the Irish banking crisis, the essential characteristics of the problem were domestic
and classic” (Honohan, 2010, 22). However, in Autumn 2008 the real nature of the problem
was less clear to policymakers and they had to rely on other actors for information.
A full account of the events surrounding the decision to issue such a 2008 guarantee
has not yet emerged. We can however piece together the preferences and signals of the
main actors from the independent reports, transcripts of the committee hearings, released
14The previous guarantee only covered 90 percent of an account under e20,000. The later guarantee
covered 100 percent of the first e100,000.
15See data from the Central Bank of Ireland (2011).
16The guarantee covered Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life and Permanent, Educational
Building Society, Anglo Irish Bank, and Irish Nationwide Building Society.
17Indicator number: FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS.
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documents on the crisis and telephone recordings. The Irish PM from May 2008 was Mr.
Brian Cowen. He became Prime Minister after serving as the MoF from 2004 until 2008. In
political debates, many accusations of cronyism were levelled at the political party of which
he was a member, Fianna Fáil, and the PM. Although it is impossible to fully rule out the
possibility that decision-makers were not crony capitalists, we found no substantive evidence
that the PM or MoF had a preference for insolvent institutions to continue operating. Rather,
it appears that the government were relying heavily on signals from Department of Finance
civil servants, the FR, the Central Bank18 and the banks themselves, to make a policy decision
that would contain the crisis at a low cost to taxpayers, thus warranting the approach in
this paper.
The Department of Finance civil service staff in general, appear to have had a preference
for a lower containment level and sent a signal that the recovery value of assets might be
relatively low. In 2008, they gave a policy presentation stating that “open-ended/legally-
binding State guarantees which would expose the Exchequer to the risk of very significant
costs are not regarded as part of the tool-kit for successful crisis management and resolution”
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008a, empahsis in the origninal). This position was qualified
in the full scoping paper that the presentation was based on. It defined what were likely
to be situations with a high “risk of very significant costs”. It noted that solvent, but
illiquid institutions, should be treated differently from illiquid and insolvent institutions.
The former would likely be given guarantees early, to avoid failure and avoid contagion
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008c).19 Insolvent institutions, assuming that they were not
systemically important, were not seen as eligible for guarantees. Overall, this suggests that
the Department of Finance had a somewhat low containment level preference. At a meeting
18The officials at the Central Bank of Ireland however, largely concurred with the FR’s view (Nyberg,
2011, 79).
19The document cites the Northern Rock experience, where a ’bank run’ was precipitated by the Bank of
England, giving the bank liquidity assistance. This quickly undermined confidence in the bank. The run
ended when the UK Government guaranteed 100 percent of its deposits.
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with all of the major policymakers and information providers on the 25 September 2008, just
days before the decision to issue the guarantee, civil service officials from the Department of
Finance expressed great concern with the potential cost of the guarantee. They noted that
the “Government would need a good idea of the potential loss exposures within Anglo [Irish
Bank] and INBS [Irish Nationwide Building Society]–on some assumptions INBS could be
e2 billion after capital and Anglo could be e8.5 billion” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008e).
Capital in Anglo Irish Bank at the time was claimed to be e7.1 billion (see Houses of the
Oireachtas, 2008d) and they were therefore warning of potentially large exposures to the
State and large losses in the banks. Nyberg (2011, 81) indicates that the Department of
Finance civil servants may have had a preference for the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank
with costs imposed on creditors. While McWilliams notes that officials in the Department
of Finance “were dead set against a full guarantee” (2009, 25).
Conversely, the Financial Regulator appears to have had a preference for a higher con-
tainment level and sent signals–conflicting with the DoF civil service staff’s–that the assets’
recovery value was in fact high. Their information came primarily from un-obtrusive eval-
uations of bank’s own positions. Private bank officials had a clear preference for a higher
containment level. Honohan (2010, 124) notes that Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank
pushed for an immediate general guarantee (including sub-ordinated debt) and the nation-
alisation of Anglo Irish Bank (and possibly INBS) at a meeting with the PM and MoF on
September 29. Anglo Irish Bank made a presentation to the Department of Finance on the
18 September 2008 forecasting pre-tax profits of e1.4 billion for 2008 and e1.1 billion for
2009.
It has been shown that the Financial Regulator had very little independent knowledge
of the underlying exposures of the banks in Ireland. This is because the Financial Regulator
had a deferential approach to financial institutions, whereby there was an acceptance that the
system was working (Honohan, 2010, 9). This led them to have an unintrusive supervisory
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model which placed a large amount of trust in the banks themselves and focused on processes
and verification rather than attempting independent assessments (Honohan, 2010, 8). Leaked
internal recordings of telephone conversations between Anglo Irish Bank employees made in
September 2008 are particularly informative in this regard.20 In one conversation between
the head of retail banking Peter Fitzgerald and the head of the capital markets division
John Bowe, they discuss a meeting John Bowe had with the Financial Regulator.21 In this
conversation John Bowe claims that, when asked how much Anglo Irish Bank needed and if
it would be enough, he told the officials that Anglo Irish Bank required e7 billion in funding.
He told Peter Fitzgerald that this was in fact significantly lower than the actual amount of
financing that the bank needs and that he had picked the e7 billion estimate “out of [his]
arse”.
At that same meeting on the 25 September 2008, where the DoF staff warned of potential
losses, the Financial Regulator stressed that “there is no evidence to suggest that Anglo is
insolvent . . . it is simply unable to continue on the current basis from a liquidity point of
view” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008e).22 A post-crisis commission investigating the banking
crisis in Ireland, states that discussions surrounding the long-term risks of the guarantee were
discarded and that the FR “supported the assessments of the major banks, the attention of
the Ministers became concentrated on how to avoid the short term risk of insufficient funding
in the morning” (Nyberg, 2011, 79). This suggests the FR was a key actor pushing for a
broad guarantee, partially by providing information that the banks’ assets recovery value
20The recordings are available from the Irish Independent (http://www.independent.ie/business/
irish/inside-anglo-the-secret-recordings-29366837.html), accessed Summer 2013.
21The head of the central bank was also present.
22This position was reaffirmed by Merrill Lynch, who were hired to provide options to decision-makers at
the time. On 29 September 2008–the day before the full guarantees were made, a report issued by them
stressed that
“at present, liquidity concerns aside; all of the Irish banks are profitable and well capitalised.
However, liquidity for some could run out in days rather than weeks.” (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2008b, 2)
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was high. Although some have argued that a consensus had emerged amongst all officials,
that no Irish bank should be allowed to fail (Honohan, 2010, 119), we have evidence of clear
divergent preferences in terms of the signals provided and the preferred level of containment
support needed among the financial bureaucrats and banks.
DoF civil service staff, the Financial Regulator and bank officials had divergent prefer-
ences and sent conflicting signals to the Prime Minister. With conflicting information, the
PM chose a higher containment policy level than what he ideally had wanted. Our model
also aligns with the findings of the Report of the Commission of Investigation into the bank-
ing sector in Ireland, which concludes that “the discussions for alternative measures before
and on September 29, 2008, were conducted on the basis of very deficient information . . . If
more relevant information on and analysis of the underlying position of some of the banks
had been available, discussions and policy recommendations may have been very different”
(Nyberg, 2011, 93).
The Alternatives How well does the Irish narrative fit the signalling argument relative
to alternative explanations? Were Irish decision-makers simply crony capitalists? The doc-
uments we have found do not indicate that the PM had high guarantee preferences or that
he wanted insolvent institutions to continue operating, as would be the case if he was a
crony capitalist. The Financial Regulator, the actor primarily tasked with gathering finan-
cial sector information, appears to have had very little capacity to actually gather its own
information, relying instead on the banks’ assessments. He also had very similar preferences
to the banks regarding the guarantee. As such bureaucratic incapacity could be endogenous
to the signalling game.
It does not appear that the number of veto players influenced policy choices. The gov-
erning parliamentary coalition supported the decision to issue the guarantee. Even among
the opposition, there seems to have been a general consensus that, as a senior opposition
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politician commented: “when the government comes to you with emergency legislation, you
have a duty to support them”.23 In a sense, this situation is similar to Rodrik’s (1999) view,
that if veto players are arranged to manage conflict, then responses will be quick. Though it
may be better to describe it as a situation where coalition veto players gave up their power
in order to hasten decision-making, which was the outcome of a signalling game. Ireland had
competitive elections, but the outcomes were nonetheless very costly to the public. This is
the opposite of Keefer’s (2007) prediction.
We did not find evidence that international actors like the International Monetary Fund,
or another external actor with low guarantee preferences, were relevant information-providers
or directly involved in the decision-making process. The European Central Bank had
provided substantial liquidity to the Irish banking system leading up to the guarantee de-
cision (Honohan, 2010, 117), but does not appear to have supported the decision to issue
the guarantee (see for example European Central Bank, 2008a,b).
3.9 Conclusion
The model and findings in this paper have important implications for crisis containment
policymaking as well as financial supervision, even in countries with sophisticated financial
markets. Our model and evidence indicate that when responding to banking crises, poli-
cymakers greatly benefit from having as close to full information as possible about their
countries’ banking system. This initially seems like a trivial point, but our model and case
study have indicated that good information may be purposefully hard to come by during
crises, even in advanced democratic economies. When strategically-minded signallers’ pref-
erences diverge from decision-makers’ preferences they can have incentives to give inaccurate
information.
23From interview with a former senior government politician.
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Much of the recent research on the optimal design of financial supervisors and economic
policymaking generally has been aimed at tying the hands of strategic elected policymakers.
The typical solution, as with central banking, has been to grant regulators de facto oper-
ational independence from elected policymakers (Walter, 2008, Ch. 1). Independence may
help shield regulators from the most blatant crony capitalistic pressure that banks can ex-
ert on politicians or electoral time-inconsistency problems that elected officials may have.
However, our paper suggests that another problem needs to be considered also. Even if
elected policymakers have preferences for minimising public crisis management costs, they
can be led astray by their bureaucrats, independent or not. Independence does not ensure
that they will provide unbiased information to policymakers, because it does not ensure that
these strategic actors will have preferences that lead them to do so. Hayo and Hefeker argue
that actors’ independence does not rule them out from “pursuing a political agenda” of any
sort (2002, 123). As strategic actors, they use the tools available to them to pursue these
preferences.
Our research does not fully address how institutional design improvements could be made
to change bureaucrats’ preferences so that they are more inclined to provide accurate inform-
ation. Some research has been done on this topic, including Persson and Taballini’s (1993)
work on targets. Satyanath (2006) argues that politicians should have more discretion to ap-
point information-providing bureaucrats, and that increasing bureaucratic independence will
lead to more accurate information. Hopefully studies in this area will treat decision-makers,
financial bureaucrats and other information providers as strategic actors, potentially with
divergent preferences.
A crucial assumption of our model is that signallers infer perfectly the potential con-
sequences of a policy choice. Violations of this assumption could further exacerbate the
problem of choosing preferred containment policies. In particular, it could be difficult to
correctly infer the true distribution of the realisation values of banking system assets. It
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may be that policymakers systematically underestimated the distribution’s range, as crises
are often unusual ‘tail risk‘ events. This may skew beliefs in such a way as to lead even
decision-makers with moderate containment preferences to be systematically more likely to
choose more expensive crisis responses than they would have liked. Countries need not only
have bureaucrats with similar preferences to policymakers, but the model shows the need for
an intrusive financial supervisory policy for the banking system, with a strong bureaucratic
capacity that can accurately interpret the implications and consequences of policy decisions
within that institutional structure.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium from a two signaller game with a moderate PM and various signaller
ideal points.
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Chapter 4
The Political Economy of Financial
Crisis Policy
Mícheál O’Keeffe and Alessio Terzi
Abstract:1 Government intervention to stabilise financial systems in times of
banking crises are ultimately political decisions. This paper sheds light on how
certain political variables condition policy choices during banking crises and hence
impact fiscal outlays. We employ cross-country econometric evidence from all
crisis episodes over the period 1970-2011 to examine the impact political and
party systems have on the fiscal cost of financial sector intervention. Governments
in presidential systems are associated with lower fiscal costs of crisis management
as they are less likely to use costly bank guarantees, hence reducing the exposure
of the state to significant contingent and direct fiscal liabilities. Consistent with
these findings we find further evidence that these governments are less likely to
use bank recapitalisation and more likely to impose losses on depositors.
1The authors are listed in alphabetical order. The authors would like to thank Christopher Gandrud,
Simon Hix, and Johannes Kleibl. We would also like to thank participants at the DG-Research econometrics
workshop on 20th September 2013 and DG-International and European Relations seminar on 20th August
2014 at the European Central Bank, as well as participants at the Crisis, Institutions and Banking Union
conference at the German Finance Ministry, Berlin, on 17th June 2014 and the UACES conference, Cork,
on 2nd September 2014.
81
4.1 Introduction
The severity of the recent crises has led to significant analysis of the policies, costs and effect-
iveness of financial crisis intervention. Such research is warranted given the scale of public
support. In the EU, for example, the contingent taxpayer support to stabilise financial insti-
tutions has amounted to 40% of GDP (e5.1 trillion ) to date (European Commission, 2014a).
Measures to contain and resolve crises require political decisions. This paper provides a sys-
tematic analysis of some of the political dynamics of financial crisis management. Specifically,
we analyse the impact political and party systems have on the fiscal cost of financial sector
intervention. It thus aims to contribute to the growing literature on the public responses to
banking crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2012a), as well as draw the relevant policy implications
by giving some political, institutional and strategic context to our understanding of financial
sector intervention in times of crisis.
Using a data set of 147 systemic banking crises from 1970-2011, our empirical findings
suggest that the fiscal costs of financial sector intervention are systematically associated with
political economy factors. In particular we show how the institutional setting may condition
the policy choice and mix in financial crises. Our empirical evidence also shows the channel
by which these variables may interact by examining the policies different governments use
in their strategies to manage financial crises.
We start the paper by first outlining the policy choices available to governments when
managing systemic financial crises. We then review the literature on the political economy
of crisis management and present our hypotheses. Following this, we present our data and
research design for our analysis. We then discuss our results, after which we analyse the
likelihood distinct types of governments adopt different tools in their crisis management
strategy.
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4.2 Policy choice and financial crisis policy
Financial crises have many causes. A collapse in asset prices can lead to contagion between
credit institutions which affects funding, forcing banks to shed assets. This may depress
prices further, causing a loss spiral (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). A sudden loss in creditor con-
fidence can lead to deposit runs and widespread disruption to the payments system. Rising
losses, higher haircuts and rapid de-leveraging can cause widespread panic. Such dynamics
may require government intervention to stabilise financial markets and restore confidence in
the financial system. Although no two crises are the same, financial crisis management can
broadly be broken down into two stylised phases, containment and resolution (Honohan and
Laeven, 2005). During the containment phase governments have a range of policy tools avail-
able. These have included inter alia liquidity support, deposit freezes and asset or liability
guarantees. Once markets have stabilised, governments must move swiftly to the resolution
phase and take a number of steps to re-establish debtor-creditor relationships, deal with
debt overhangs or undercapitalisation (see Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2004). Policies
here can include attaching conditionality to public support, early action on impaired assets
(e.g. through asset management companies), strengthening resolution regimes to ensure
swift resolution, reform of insolvency regimes to establish fast-track procedures, as well as
the liquidation or sometimes nationalisation of credit institutions (Claessens et al., 2011).
These are often combined in a different sequence and policy mix (Laeven and Valencia, 2010,
2012a, 2008b, Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2004).
How governments deal with crisis containment and resolution has varied significantly
(see Figure 4.1). Swift restructuring following the Swedish crisis, for example, facilitated
“economic adjustment and productivity growth, while in Japan the ‘zombification’ of banks
contributed to a decade of stagflation during which productivity hardly improved” (Darvas,
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2013). Some suggest that “the more aggressive the government is in
83
Figure 4.1: Variance in government response to banking crises (1970-2011)
(a) Frequency of crisis response tools (b) Variation in the fiscal cost of crisis policy
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012a)
designing a rescue plan, the easier it is to force more restructuring in the financial sector,
and the better the chances of leaving the surviving system stronger and less dependent on
the taxpayer”(Geithner, 2014). However previous research has found that the use of accom-
modative policies adds significantly to the fiscal cost of crisis management (Honohan and
Klingebiel, 2003, Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005). These policy tools are often used
in the containment phase to stem the panic from depositor runs, creditor runs (e.g short-
term unsecured lending), or margin runs (for collateralised funding markets), in response to
a negative shock. Strategies that commit more fiscal resources, however, often lead to worse
post-crisis economic performance and delayed recovery (Detragiache and Ho, 2010). This
suggests that no trade-off appears to exist between the commitment of large fiscal resources
and speedy crisis recovery. “Policies that are bad for fiscal soundness result in lower output
growth and delayed recovery” (Detragiache and Ho, 2010, 17). However the domestic polit-
ical environment may condition the policy choices available to governments when managing
financial crises. Therefore, political economy factors, or cross-national differences in political
variables should be evident in the policy choice and hence fiscal costs of crisis management.
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4.3 The political economy of financial crisis policy: the-
ory
The political economy of finance literature highlights the impact political institutions have
on the development of the financial system (Haber and Perotti, 2008, La Porta et al., 1997,
Beck and Levine, 2008). Much of the research on banking crises from the fields of economics
and finance however does not take political variables into account. Furthermore, political
economy and political science have much to understand about banking crises. There is a
broad literature on the economic effects of constitutions for policymaking and performance
(see Persson and Tabellini, 2005, for an overview). From a political economy perspective,
institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, 3). Institutional approaches cap-
ture the ways in which institutions mediate domestic pressures through the distribution of
veto players in the political system, or try to understand how different political regimes se-
lect, structure and constrain decision-making. Formal rules translate preferences into policy
outcomes and restrain incumbents from acting opportunistically (North and Weingast, 1989).
Banking crises can result in recession, leading to lower investment, lower incomes and
higher unemployment. Therefore, how governments choose to intervene in banking crises
is quite important for the economic and fiscal cost, as well as the duration and subsequent
recovery from the crisis. Containing a crisis can help prevent disorderly de-leveraging and
allow time for balance sheet repair. However the use of certain policies to contain crises can
also expose the state to significant contingent or direct liabilities. This was dramatically
demonstrated by the 2008 decision by the Irish government to guarantee nearly all of the
liabilities of the banking system. This ultimately forced them out of the bond markets and
into an EU/IMF programme of adjustment. Intervention to contain a crisis, and restructure
and resolve financial institutions, means allocating the costs of a crisis to certain groups
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in society. Such decisions can lead to distributional conflicts. Distributional conflicts and
concerns about the consequences of macroeconomic policy can lead to powerful incentives to
deviate from the most economically efficient outcomes (see Walter, 2013, 227). For example
a government may step in to guarantee liabilities in a bank or the banking system if they
are concerned about capital outflows. However, depending on the location of creditors and
the scope of government support, political cleavages can emerge – between domestic debtors
and creditors and often more controversially between domestic debtors and foreign creditors
(Pepinsky, 2014, 10-13). Moreover, taxpayer support to the financial sector can present an
opportunity cost for governments. This can result from an increased cost of borrowing if
direct or contingent support results in the state paying higher interest rates on government
debt, or a reduction in the provision of public goods from fiscal austerity due to taxpayer sup-
port to financial institutions. Finally, intervention may create perverse incentives, aggravate
moral hazard and even delay recovery.
Previous empirical research suggests democratic regimes differ from autocratic states in
their propensity towards bailouts (Rosas, 2006). That politicians are less likely to engage
in bailouts under democratic regimes suggests that electoral accountability is an important
determinant of crisis response. Chwieroth andWalter (2010) find financial crises are generally
associated with higher rates of political turnover. However, Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and
Rosas (2014) examining the patterns of incumbent survival following banking crises, find that
although “democratic governments with several veto players are systematically less secure
in their tenure than democratic governments with fewer veto players, both in the presence
and in the absence of banking crises”, no differences in survival times of incumbents under
banking crises are evident. In explaining this result they propose that although multiple veto
players may limit ‘clarity of responsibility’, they may also constrain the ability of governments
to enact policies in response to a banking crises. Such constraints are the subject of this
paper. The success of financial sector intervention also depends heavily on effective legal,
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regulatory and political institutions. Better institutional development (including the quality
of institutions, less corruption and efficient judicial systems) are also associated with faster
economic recovery (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005).
Veto players
A veto player is an individual or collective of actors that have to agree for a policy to change
Tsebelis (1995). Tsebelis (1995) seminal analysis explains how every political system has a
configuration of veto players either specified in a country’s constitution - ‘institutional veto
players’, or by the political system - ‘partisan veto players’. From a theoretical perspective
a number of models explore why crises and veto players are associated with inaction, delay
and sub-optimal outcomes (see Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998, Drazen, 2000, Drazen and
Easterly, 2001, for an overview). Drazen and Grilli (1993, 2) suggest “crises may be necessary
to induce significant reform because of distributional implications of large policy changes.
Drastic but necessary policy changes are resisted [however] because economic participants
believe someone else can be forced to bear the burden of change”. Alesina and Drazen
(1991) use a ‘war of attrition’ model to explain how conflict over the known costs (although
information is asymmetric) of macroeconomic stabilisation leads to delays.2 Only when one
group concedes is the policy adopted. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model how uncertainty
regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform can lead to a bias against efficiency
enhancing reforms (and towards the status quo) when winners and losers cannot be identified
ex ante. Laban and Sturzenegger (1994, 273), who model the status quo bias in a dynamic
context, conclude that “only an extreme crisis ... may trigger the necessary political consensus
for reform”.
2“In the basic war of attrition model from biology, two animals are fighting over a prize. Fighting is costly,
and the fight ends when one animal drops out, with the other gaining the prize” (Alesina and Drazen, 1991,
9)
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MacIntyre (2001) proposes that an intermediate concentration of veto players is optimal
in a crisis. He deduces, from his analysis of the response to the Asian financial crisis, that
an U-shaped relationship between policy stability and rigidity exists. A smaller number of
veto players can lead to a risk of policy volatility, uncertainty and a lack of credibility in the
government’s response. The larger the number of veto players, the greater the risk of policy
rigidity. This can lead governments to be unable to deal with mounting vulnerabilities.
Angkinand and Willett (2008) provide some empirical evidence to support this proposition,
with regard to the magnitude of output loss for crises in emerging market economies. When
controlling for competitive elections, Keefer (2007) however, finds no relationship between
veto players and outcomes.
We also test for the impact of veto players in our analysis below. Theory suggests a
larger number of veto players will lead to policy rigidity. If policy rigidity occurs due to a
larger number of veto players, such governments may not be able to agree on policies which
fiscally expose the state when managing financial crises, thus limiting the fiscal burden on
the state.
Hypothesis 1: A larger number of veto players are associated with lower fiscal costs of
financial crisis management
Veto players theory is an attempt to overcome long classified systems of government,
but given the limited evidence to date, we also explore other political factors which may
condition policy choice in financial crisis management. In the political economy literature two
particular features that have attracted considerable attention are (i) the form of government
and (ii) electoral rules. “Politicians make policy choices, but their specific electoral incentives
and powers to propose, amend, veto and enact economic policies hinge on the rules for
election, legislation, and execution” (Persson and Tabellini, 2005, 11). The next section will
discuss these in turn.
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Constitutional Rules: Parliamentary vs. Presidential
In modern democracies, two broad forms of government exist: (i) parliamentary systems;
and (ii) presidential systems.3 These forms of government define the constitutional rela-
tionship between the executive and the legislature and are distinct based on the unifica-
tion or separation of powers. How both types of institutions shape decision-making and
economic outcomes has received much attention in both comparative politics and political
economy literatures. Put simplistically, presidential regimes have a stronger separation of
powers whereas parliamentary regimes are associated with a greater concentration of powers
(Persson and Tabellini, 2005).
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) model this relationship and show that the separ-
ation of powers under presidential systems improves the accountability of elected officials.
The “separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies ... helps to prevent the
abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work
by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both
bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the
voters’ advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps
the voters elicit information” (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 1163).
Lijphart (1999, 117) explains this by outlining three key differences between presidential
and parliamentary forms of government: (i) in parliamentary systems the head of government
is dependent on the confidence of the legislature, whereas in a presidential system the head
of government (president) is normally elected for a prescribed period and normally cannot be
forced to resign through a vote of no confidence; (ii) presidents are popularly elected directly
or by a college, whereas prime ministers are selected by legislatures; and (iii) parliamentary
3Hybrid systems also exist. For example, the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001, 2012)
also include a category ’assembly elected President’. However given the similarity in the classification criteria
(based on Shugart and Carey (1992)) and the low number of observations, for the purpose of this analysis,
we include these in parliamentary systems and limit the categories to parliamentary and presidential.
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systems have a collegial cabinet whereas presidential systems effectively have a one-person
executive. These crucial features of different forms of government mean that in presidential
systems voters can keep more direct control of the executive and it is more accountable.
In parliamentary systems the executive is only indirectly accountable to the voters, and is
directly accountable to the legislature (see Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 1167-192).
Finally, in parliamentary regimes, both the policy initiative and agenda setting roles rely
on the support of the parliament (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000, 1125). Maintaining
this power of agenda setting induces ‘legislative cohesion’ in parliamentary systems which
further concentrates power (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998, Huber, 1996).
These dynamics mean the different forms of government are associated with very different
policy outcomes. In presidential systems for example, the capacity for change decreases
(Tsebelis, 1995). Presidential systems are associated with less rents for politicians (Persson
and Tabellini, 1999, Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). “Separation of powers in the
congressional regime produces a smaller government, with less waste and less redistribution
but also inefficiently low spending on public goods. Intuitively, separation of powers enables
the voters to discipline the politicians, and this reduces waste and moderates the tax burden
. . . legislative cohesion in the parliamentary regime, on the other hand, leads to a larger
government, with more taxation and more waste, but also more spending on public goods
and redistribution benefiting a broader group of voters. Intuitively, there is now more scope
for collusion among politicians, which increases waste and taxation. But policy aims to
please a majority group of voters, which increases public-good provision, calls for a more
equal redistribution, and makes the majority support a high level of taxation” (Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 2000, 1126). In line with this literature, with respect to financial crisis
management, Detragiache and Ho (2010) have found that parliamentary systems are more
likely to engage in policies that put more fiscal resources at risk.4
4Using a sample of 40 crisis episodes, Detragiache and Ho (2010, 7) construct a policy response index
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Electoral Rules: Single-Party vs. Coalition Government
Electoral rules shape the number of parties, government formation and hence policy choice.
This has been well established in the political science literature (see for example Taagepera
and Shugart, 1989). The first key political factor which influences this is the electoral for-
mula which translates votes into seats. The two basic classes of electoral formula that are
usually considered are: (i) plurality rule, associated with ’winner take all’ systems; and (ii)
proportional representation, whereby the number of seats (and spoils of office) are, to variant
degrees, proportionally allocated according to vote share (see Cox, 1990). Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (2007, 1) model how a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of
coalition governments are induced under proportional electoral systems than under plurality
rule. Proportional systems, via coalition governments therefore can constrain policy choice.
The second key political factor which influences this is the district magnitude which is the
number of seats to be filled in a district (Cox, 1990). “One polar case is that all legislators
are elected in a single district. Larger districts diffuse electoral competition, inducing parties
to seek support from broad coalitions in the populations. Smaller districts steer electoral
competition towards narrower geographical constituencies”(Persson and Tabellini, 2005, 22).
Single-party and coalition governments differ in respect to the size of public spending
due to an ‘electoral common pool problem’ because voters can differentiate between parties
in a coalition but not between factions of a single-party at the polls (see Persson, Roland
and Tabellini, 2007). Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) show that “the indirect effects of
electoral rules — on the number of parties and the type of government — are essential to the
finding that majoritarian elections lead to less public spending than proportional elections.”
A significant body of empirical research confirms this (see for example Bräuninger, 2005,
Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, Rickard, 2012). The difference in the number of parties also impact
(whereby policies that shift the burden of the crisis from bank stakeholders to the government receive a
score of one, while policies that do not commit public funds receive a score of minus one) and instrument
the political system to measure the effect on output growth and crisis duration.
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policy through the accountability channel. “A single party in government is accountable for
all of its policy decisions since it must promote the collective interest of a broad support
base if it wants to keep its majority ... [p]articipants in multiparty coalition governments,
by contrast, are held primarily responsible for only a subset of policy decisions: those in the
policy areas in which they have the biggest stake. This difference in electoral accountability
... results in systematic differences in policy decisions” (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006, 251).
Putting the constitutional rules and electoral rules together for the purposes of this
research, we derive four broad categories of government: (i) single-party parliamentary sys-
tems; (ii) multiparty parliamentary systems; (iii) single-party presidential systems; and (iv)
multiparty presidential systems. So what could we expect for financial crisis management?
Presidential systems are more accountable to the electorate than parliamentary systems due
to the separation of powers. This is because even “presidents in multiparty systems who do
not have to seek majority party support in congress have a far less incentive to seek and main-
tain lasting coalitions in congress than do parliamentary executives” (Shugart and Carey,
1992, 33). In financial crisis management, we can deduce that presidential governments are
less likely to put fiscal resources at risk, thus resulting in lower losses to the state.
Similarly, because single-party governments are accountable for all policy decisions, multi-
party governments may be more likely to strike less efficient decisions in financial crisis
management. This, for example, could include providing a guarantee on assets or liabilities
which does not immediately draw on fiscal resources of the state, but could end up very
costly later on. Multi-party coalitions also have multiple interests to serve so could use other
fiscally costly policies such as bank recapitalisation or spare creditors and depositors losses
- both resulting in higher cumulative fiscal costs from managing a banking crisis.
Hypothesis 2: Presidential systems with single-party government are associated with less
fiscal costs from financial crisis management when compared with other forms of government.
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What other political factors could affect the fiscal costs of crisis man-
agement?
Electioneering incentives may also play a role in the policy choices in the management of
financial crises and thus impact fiscal costs. Nordhaus (1975) presents a simple adaptive-
expectations model of inter-temporal choice between economic objectives, which captures
well the incentive for opportunistic politicians to manipulate policy. Elections induce a
‘political business cycle’. His model predicts that office seeking politicians will maximise the
probability of re-election by stimulating the economy in advance of an election. Similarly,
Tufte (1980) proposes that politicians will manipulate policies such as transfer payments or
tax cuts prior to an election, as voters reward good economic performance.
A second field of political economy general equilibrium models include rational expecta-
tions and predict smaller less regular cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988, Rogoff, 1990). Persson
and Tabellini (1990) argue that following an exogenous macroeconomic shock, voters retro-
spectively rationally evaluate the incumbents’ performance in managing stabilisation, given
control of policies and privileged information. Better performance leads to a higher probabil-
ity of re-election. Whilst empirical evidence for office-seeking electoral cycles is inconsistent,
that incumbents benefit from favourable macroeconomic conditions has unequivocal sup-
port (Franzese Jr, 2002). We therefore also test for the impact that electoral cycles have in
financial crisis management.
Finally partisanship may impact financial crisis policy. Constructivists have shown how
discursive practices can generate a narrative structure for policy formation and could shape
containment or resolution strategies. “Successful discursive attacks on Asian model practices,
coupled with the severe economic effects of the crisis, generated a normative environment
for policy formation, that severely constrained resistance to the radical restructuring of the
institutional and legal framework of the Korean economy than would otherwise have been
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expected” (Hall, 2003, 95). Constructivist approaches to political economy do not accept
that beliefs are reducible to a priori interests, rather for example, treat party leaders as
“ideational entrepreneurs who actively modify agents’ beliefs about what their interests are”
(Blyth, 2003, 698). Crises and responses only make sense in terms of the way ideas are
used to diagnose the problem and reduce uncertainty (Blyth, 2002, 253). Therefore, the
political prominence of certain societal groups may be translated into policy preferences
through political parties which ideologically represent them (Stasavage, 2007). This may in
turn condition the policy response. Broz (2013), for example, argues that a partisan-policy
financial cycle exists whereby right wing (pro-market) governments preside over financial
booms, while left-wing governments are left to govern over the crash. Without deriving
specific hypotheses, we also test for the impact partisanship may have on financial crisis
management.
The following section will explain in detail our data and method of investigation
4.4 Data and research design
Econometric analysis to examine the relationships between political institutions, financial
crisis management, and economic outcomes is limited by the number of crises and the avail-
ability of detailed policy and outcome data. The recent financial crisis however has led to
an increased number of observations, particularly among advanced economies. This larger
sample size allows us to more accurately estimate the interplay between political-economy
factors and the fiscal cost of financial crisis management. In order to test the hypotheses
above, we make use of the updated Systemic Banking Crises database constructed by Laeven
and Valencia (2012a, 2010, 2008a). This database contains detailed information on all sys-
temic banking crises from 1970-2011 - totalling 147 episodes. We merged this dataset with
the World Bank database of political institutions 2012 (Beck et al., 2001, 2012), which
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is a balanced panel dataset comprising several institutional and political variables for 178
countries over the period 1975-2012.
Laeven and Valencia provide data on several variables describing the various banking
crises. Of particular interest to our research question are the fiscal costs associated with a
particular crisis episode. Laeven and Valencia define fiscal costs as gross fiscal outlay directed
to the restructuring of the financial sector. However, they exclude liquidity assistance from
the treasury but this is included in the measure for liquidity support. The focus on gross,
rather than net, fiscal costs in our analysis is due to the fact that the former better captures
the ‘intensity of the intervention’ (Laeven and Valencia, 2012a, 5). The depth of the crisis
will likely affect both the policy decisions and the fiscal costs. In order to correct for this
aspect, we produced a measure of the crisis depth, defined as the gap between real GDP
growth at year t-1 (before the crisis) and the local minimum growth rate during the crisis
period.
We use our event-based dataset to test whether political characteristics have an impact
on the gross fiscal outlay resulting from a banking crisis. Following previous literature we
first look at veto players as a raw variable. To do this we take three measures of veto
players. Firstly, we use the checks and balances variable Checks and balances (DPI) taken
from the World Bank database of political institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001, 2012). This
is measured on a scale from 1-7 and takes into account the number of veto players and the
effectiveness of electoral competitiveness in the political system. A higher value indicates
more checks and balances (see appendix III for full description). Secondly, we use an index
provided by Henisz (2002) which assigns a score based on effective veto points Political
constraints index. It also uses a simple spatial model of political interaction to derive the
extent to which any one political actor, or their replacement, is constrained in their choice of
future policies. Finally, following Keefer (2007), we take the residual of the regression of the
checks and balances variable on competitive elections Checks residual to isolate the effect of
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veto players. This is because the checks and balances variable captures both the extent to
which countries have competitive elections and the number of veto players (see Keefer, 2007,
22).
To capture whether the country has a competitive political system, we use the Legislative
Index of Electoral Competitiveness LIEC provided in Beck et al. (2001, 2012). This is a scale
from 1-7 (see appendix III for full construction). On the basis of this scale, and following
Beck et al. (2001, 2012), we take democracies as LIEC >4. We then look at the categories
of political system defined in section 4.2 above. Taking single-party parliamentary systems
as a baseline, we create dummy variables for Presidential system - single-party, Presidential
system- multi-party, and Parliamentary system- multi-party. To explore possible effects
of other political variables, we measure the Years to the next election and examining the
role of partisanship, our variable Government orientation refers to the governing parties
ideological orientation with respect to economic policy. Left captures parties that are defined
as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Centrist parties cover those that,
for example, advocate strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context. Whereas
right captures those defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Political
variables, which we use from the World Bank database of political institutions (Beck et al.,
2001, 2012), are taken at time t, the first crisis year. This might seem somewhat reductive,
as crises protract for several years, with variables such as government partisanship changing
throughout. However, because accommodative policies associated with large fiscal costs (such
as asset or liability guarantees for example) are usually employed during the containment
phase (see discussion above), we think that this is not an unreasonable assumption.
We control for a range of macroeconomic and political variables. Liquidity support cap-
tures in percentage points the increase in central bank claims on financial institutions over
deposits and foreign liabilities. Monetary expansion is computed as the change in the mon-
etary base between its peak during the crisis and its level one year prior to the crisis as a
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percentage of GDP. Credit is a measure of domestic credit as a share of GDP, averaged over
three pre-crisis years, and, in line with the literature, here used as a proxy for the size of
the financial sector. Credit boom is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if there was a credit
boom before the crisis, as defined by Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2012)). We also control
for GDP per capita, and whether the country is a member of the OECD. Banking crises
often do not happen in isolation. We therefore control for a Concurrent currency crisis and
Concurrent sovereign debt crisis (see appendix V for a full list and construction of variables
used).
Aside from determining which political characteristics are associated with higher fiscal
costs, as a second step, we exploit the data to try and determine the channel through
which this effect takes place. In this regard, the Laeven and Valencia database provides
detailed information on many of the policies employed during a crisis for a subset of 65
episodes. Bank guarantee, for example, indicates whether or not the authorities introduced
a blanket guarantee on deposits (and possibly other liabilities). Depositor losses tells us
whether the country imposed losses on depositors when managing their crisis. Similarly,
Bank recapitalisation further tells us if the governments in question recapitalised their banks
as part of their strategy for financial crisis management.
Before turning to the results of our quantitative analysis, we assembled some descriptive
statistics of our institutional variables. Table 4.1 below details the number of observations,
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, for the set of selected political variables
which fed into our quantitative exercise. It shows that although single-party presidential
systems represent a majority of crisis episodes (44.8%), our sample is not excessively skewed,
and this will be particularly important for our econometric analysis below. 37 governments
are characterised as left-wing, 35 as right-wing and 17 as centrist. Non-OECD members
represented a majority, with 117 observations, against 29 OECD-member banking crises. In
general, looking at the time distribution of the financial crises we see that they present an
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unprecedented spike in 2008. A large number of the OCED members form part of the latest
2008 financial crisis.
Table 4.1: Institutional characteristics - descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Checks and balances 139 2.697 0.890 1 7
Political constraints index 147 0.250 0.230 0 0.7069
Years to next election 139 1.916 1.611 0 7
Snap election 142 0.309 0.620 0 3
Government orientation 89 2.022 0.904 1 3
Legislative Index of Electoral Competition 142 5.306 2.177 1 7
Presidential-single-party 147 0.448 0.499 0 1
Presidential-multiparty 147 0.170 0.376 0 1
Parliamentary-multiparty 147 0.156 0.364 0 1
This analysis however is necessarily limited by the data. Firstly, turning to crisis duration,
we highlight a major limitation of the Laeven and Valencia database. Whilst a systemic
banking crisis is deemed over whenever the conditions are no longer fulfilled (detailed in
Appendix II), a crisis is also considered terminated after 5 years, regardless of economic or
financial circumstances. This is depicted in Table 4.2 below, with a spike in the 5-year crises.
Whereas fiscal costs may protract further over time, the most severe contractions in GDP
tend to be experienced in the early years of a crisis. Therefore we expect this to be less of a
problem and not to directly encroach on the robustness of our analysis.
Table 4.2: Frequency distribution of crisis duration
Crisis Duration Frequency
1 38
2 16
3 19
4 10
5 64
Secondly, and connected to the first point, the crisis is still on-going in some of the
countries in our sample. However, our unit of analysis is gross (rather than net) fiscal
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cost to capture the ‘intensity of the intervention’ associated with political economy factors.
Therefore it should reasonably estimate the impact political economy factors have on gross
fiscal costs for on-going crises. Thirdly, fiscal cost is but one measure of the ‘costs of crises’.
Our analysis does not capture the output a country loses from a crisis, or indeed the social
cost associated with the crisis or the fiscal intervention. These may be more effectively
captured using other metrics. Furthermore, whilst our results show relationships between
certain political variables and gross fiscal costs, our analysis does not attempt to estimate the
effectiveness of the fiscal intervention on economic performance or crisis duration. Despite
these limitations, the Laeven and Valencia dataset provides the best comparable data for
the fiscal costs of crisis management.
4.5 Empirical evidence
Table 4.3 shows the results of our basic analysis of the effect that veto players have on
the gross fiscal cost of financial sector intervention in times of crisis. In line with previous
empirical findings (Keefer, 2007, Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas, 2014), we do not find
any evidence for an effect of veto players on the fiscal costs of crisis management. Therefore,
using these raw metrics for checks and balances, no effect on the government response is
visible from the data. To better understand how political institutions may impact fiscal
costs, we must therefore analyse other political variables.
The main regression results for this paper are given in Table 4.4 . This shows the impact
variant political systems, derived above, have on the gross fiscal costs of financial crisis
management. We find significant evidence to suggest that both single-party and multiparty
presidential systems are associated with lower gross fiscal costs. Given no effect was found
for the impact of veto players, this suggests that a deeper comparative analysis of the form of
government is necessary to capture how political institutions impact policy choice following
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shocks. In line with hypothesis 2, this suggests that the separation of powers leads to less
fiscal resources being put at risk, and hence less fiscal costs. Given governments in these
systems can be held more easily to account by voters, they may be less likely to use policies
which expose the state when managing financial banking crises.
This effect holds when controlling for GDP per capita, liquidity support from the central
bank, and size of the financial sector. The coefficients are stable across a number of specific-
ations. The results should also be consistent across banking crises as we also control for the
the severity of the crisis. Furthermore, all regression specifications are run using standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. These results also confirm similar findings which
look at the broad impact of political systems on economic performance and crisis duration
(Detragiache and Ho, 2010). It is worth recalling that we are not suggesting presidential
systems are ‘better’ at managing financial crises. Our analysis does not examine the ef-
fectiveness of the intervention which may be better analysed through other metrics such as
output loss or crisis duration. We do however show robust results to suggest that political
institutions condition policy choice in response to shocks.
Models (4)-(12) use only democracies. This is important as the political economy vari-
ables and underlying accountability theory we have outlined can only fully play out in a
democratic context. We find no robust evidence for a political-business cycle - the signi-
ficance of Years to the next election in Model (2) is the result of an outlier (Chile 1982).
Excluding this data point no evidence was found. Furthermore, we find no evidence that
partisanship affects the fiscal costs of financial sector intervention.
This section has looked at the impact select political variables have on the fiscal costs of
crisis management. Finding that certain political characteristics are associated with higher
fiscal costs is interesting, but identifying the channel through which this happens bridges
an important gap in the literature for our understanding of the political economy of crisis
management. To explore our hypotheses and results in more detail we will now look at the
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channels by which this might occur. This next section will therefore look at the likelihood
that variant governments use policies for crisis management which put public resources at
risk.
4.6 Policies for financial crisis management
To identify the channels by which political variables impact fiscal costs, we deploy a two-stage
approach. In the first stage we identify the impact of specific policies for crisis management
(bank guarantees, losses imposed on depositors, and bank recapitalisations) have on fiscal
costs. In the second stage, we run a number of regressions to see whether certain political
systems are more conducive to adopting specific policies when managing financial crises.
The use of any particular policy to manage crises entails a trade-off for the governments.
Certain tools are useful to avoid contagion, stem depositor withdrawals or contain capital
flight, cleanse balance sheets of non-performing loans (NPLs), or stimulate credit flow to
business. However they each expose the state to direct fiscal costs which they may or may
not recoup later, or to contingent liabilities which may be called upon. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.2 which shows the variance in fiscal costs associated with the use of two different
policies for crisis management.
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Figure 4.2: Variance in fiscal costs associated with bank guarantees and bank recapitalisa-
tions
(a) Bank guarantees (b) Bank recapitalisations
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012a)
Blanket guarantees, if credible, can help restore depositor confidence. However they may
increase fiscal costs if called upon, or indirectly by exacerbating the risky behaviour of banks
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008b, 15). Using public money to recapitalise a bank can facilitate
lending to the real economy. Homar and van Wijnbergen (2013), for example, find that bank
recapitalisations substantially reduce crisis duration. However if a recapitalised bank turns
out to be insolvent, the state may end up losing its investment. Finally, imposing losses
on depositors, whilst politically unpopular, often spares the state from having to bailout
a bank. However depositor losses could also lead to further deposit withdrawals without
capital controls.
Table 4.5 shows the results for the impact different crisis management policies have on
the fiscal costs of financial crisis management. Reasonably robust results show that the
use of bank guarantees and bank recapitalisations are significantly associated with higher
fiscal costs. This is in line with previous empirical work on the subject (Honohan and
Klingebiel, 2003, Laeven and Valencia, 2012b). This data is binary in nature and therefore
very imprecise. Nonetheless it is encouraging that we found robust evidence to support our
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empirical analysis above. We did not find any significant evidence for an effect of depositor
losses on fiscal costs. This could be because only 13 cases in our dataset imposed losses on
depositors and half of these losses were considered minor to moderate (Laeven and Valencia,
2008a, see table 8).
Table 4.5: The impact of different policies on the fiscal costs of crisis management
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank guarantee 7.512** 7.562** 8.055* 10.01*
(3.048) (3.103) (4.522) (5.183)
Depositor losses 2.387 1.490 1.597 0.796
(4.190) (4.859) (4.842) (5.100)
Bank recapitalisation 7.489* 5.237* 5.279* 5.808*
(4.147) (2.929) (2.963) (2.879)
Drop in GDP 0.197 0.132 0.134 0.0556
(0.315) (0.340) (0.346) (0.338)
Credit -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit boom 4.033 3.808 3.273
(4.014) (4.825) (4.591)
NPL 0.339** 0.329** 0.298**
(0.136) (0.142) (0.141)
Concurrent currency crisis 12.10*** 6.128 6.035 6.753
(3.823) (5.221) (5.139) (5.509)
Concurrent sovereign debt crisis -5.746 -5.028 -5.199 -5.916
(6.520) (7.583) (7.862) (7.628)
GDP per capita -0.027
(0.136)
OECD -4.311
(5.761)
Constant -5.726 -8.286** -7.811 -6.577
(5.107) (3.827) (4.670) (4.691)
Observations 59 53 53 53
R-squared 0.292 0.411 0.412 0.424
Democracies only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
Further exploring whether our political economy factors are associated with the use of
these policies, Table 4.6 shows the results for a linear probability model for bank guarantees.
It shows that presidential systems (both single-party and multiparty) are less likely to use
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public guarantees when managing financial crises. These findings contribute to explaining
the results found in Table 4.4 above, which show that presidential systems are associated
with less fiscal costs of crisis management. We also test for alternative specifications (Probit
and Logit models) and our main results hold, suggesting the significance of our results does
not rest on the choice of econometric model. Our results are also robust to a battery of
macroeconomic controls including Credit boom and GDP per capita.
Table 4.7: Linear probability model for depositor losses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM Probit Logit
Presidential system-single-party 0.0337 0.0264 0.129 0.0557 0.0546 0.548 1.414
(0.144) (0.143) (0.141) (0.117) (0.128) (0.970) (2.516)
Presidential system-multiparty 0.346** 0.327* 0.409** 0.413** 0.417** 1.755* 3.448
(0.173) (0.172) (0.191) (0.197) (0.191) (1.045) (2.830)
Parliamentary system-multiparty -0.053 -0.045 0.079 0.075 0.125 0.895 1.929
(0.124) (0.128) (0.120) (0.129) (0.120) (1.013) (2.883)
Drop in GDP -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.017 -0.034
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.043) (0.078)
Credit 2.970 4.230 -2.980 -0.002 -0.003
(5.180) (5.35e0) (6.280) (0.003) (0.008)
Concurrent currency crisis 0.105 0.086 0.033 0.103 0.129
(0.126) (0.137) (0.127) (0.544) (1.030)
Credit boom -0.075 -0.089
(0.097) (0.096)
NPL 0.008* 0.008 0.009** 0.050*** 0.089**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) (0.036)
Snap election 0.031 -0.271 -0.441
(0.078) (0.477) (1.072)
Constant 0.154 0.233* -0.101 -0.0444 -0.0781 -2.646** -4.939*
(0.103) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.109) (1.053) (2.701)
Observations 63 63 55 53 56 59 59
R-squared 0.134 0.158 0.364 0.381 0.392
Democracies only NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the results of linear probability models for depositor losses
and bank recapitalisations respectively. Here, consistent with our main regression results in
Table 4.4 and the subsequent analysis on the use of guarantees, presidential systems with
multi-party governments are more likely to impose losses on depositors and less likely to use
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bank recapitalisations in the crisis management strategy.
The results of our econometric investigation show that political factors indeed condition
policy choice and hence impact the fiscal costs of financial crisis management. Our analysis
suggests that this is not due to the difference in the number of veto players in the political
system, but rather to other elements such as the fact that in presidential systems, the
executive is directly accountable to voters. This enhanced accountability to the electorate
is clearly visible in both the policies that different governments use, and the fiscal costs
associated with banking crises.
4.7 Conclusion
There is significant variance in how different countries deal with banking crises. Both theory
and experience have led to ambiguous recommendations regarding ‘optimal’ policy responses
because crises involve many coordination problems and are aggravated by institutional weak-
nesses (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005). Empirical research has largely focused on
the ‘effectiveness’ of specific policy tools with respect to their effect on output, or dura-
tion of crises (see for example Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003, Homar and van Wijnbergen,
2013). However, intervention in financial crises requires political decisions. Whilst seemingly
obvious, we know very little about how politics conditions policy choice in banking crises.
Cross-country econometric analysis of how domestic institutions mediate pressures in times
of crises, or shape policy responses, can help decipher the constraints which decision-makers
are under when designing strategies and responding to crises.
In this paper we attempted to quantitatively estimate the impact that select political
variables have on policy choice and hence the fiscal costs of banking crises. We find that
both single-party and multi-party governments in presidential systems are associated with
lower fiscal costs of crisis management. Looking at crisis containment strategies, we further
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show that these governments are are less likely to use guarantees which would expose the
state to significant contingent and direct fiscal liabilities and less likely to use bank recapit-
alisations in their crisis management strategy. Not using these tools in their banking crisis
management strategy limits the state’s fiscal exposure. Finally we show presidential systems
with multiparty governments are more likely to impose losses on depositors.
Our results raise many questions for future research. The limitations outlined in section
4.4 clearly show the need for better data to enhance our understanding of the links between
systemic financial crisis and political variables. More in-depth analysis of the link between
policy choice and fiscal cost resulting from a crisis, as well as the channels through which
our findings occur, could interesting to explore.
Nonetheless, our empirical results have important implications for the understanding
of financial crisis policy-making. Decision-making during financial crisis occurs under a
lot of uncertainty and it is clear that financial crises upset old political economy equilibria.
Therefore, a greater understanding of the impact that institutions and politics have on policy
choices may allow us to better understand and predict decision-making in times of financial
stress.
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Chapter 5
Reform of the Framework for Financial
Crisis Management in the EU
Abstract1: The financial crisis dramatically exposed the weaknesses of the
frameworks for crisis management across the EU. In response, the co-legislator
has agreed to establish a harmonised set of policy tools, legislative powers and
institutional framework for crisis prevention, early intervention and bank resol-
ution, as well as a Single Resolution Mechanism for euro area Member States
and others wishing to join the banking union. This paper analyses the economic
rationale for reform of the framework for crisis management and the politics sur-
rounding the policy response. It explains how the limitations of coordination and
unprecedented public support for the financial sector led to the push for greater
harmonisation. However, the distributional consequences of financial sector sup-
port and the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism led to a push
to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and agreement on the
Single Resolution Mechanism. It analyses the negotiations on the financing struc-
ture for resolution, decision-making procedures and crisis management tools and
emphasises how the power of certain Member States and distributive conflict,
with regard to legacy issues, shaped the new architecture. It also highlights the
important role the European Parliament played in the negotiations, as well as
the different conceptions the negotiators had regarding the role of the State in
crisis management.
1I would like to thank Simon Hix for his helpful comments.
111
5.1 Introduction
The shift toward regulatory governance in the EU resulted from greater ‘negative integration’
in the single financial market for financial services.2 The financial and sovereign debt crisis,
however, running against the economic externality of financial risk and uncertainty, demon-
strated that financial markets were capable of rapid fragmentation, with sharp increases
in liquidity and credit risk and led to a consensus around the need for financial stability.3
Widespread public support to banks and weak coordination in crisis management changed
the political economy equilibrium, requiring a ‘positive’ policy response with a more activist
role for EU agencies. The banking union emerged as a direct response to the crisis.
Whilst historical institutionalist processes may explain the dynamics leading to the new
architecture for the supervision of credit institutions in the euro area – the Single Supervis-
ory Mechanism (SSM) (see for example McPhilemy, 2014), such an approach cannot explain
agreement on the second pillar of banking union, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM),
or the new legislative framework on which it is based. This paper analyses the emergence
of the legislative framework, policy tools and the new institutional architecture for bank
resolution from a political economy perspective. This encompasses the provisions provided
for in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the SRM Regulation, the In-
tergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the related
tools provided for in the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD), and the European
2‘Negative integration’ refers to the removal of barriers, whereas ‘positive integration’ refers to the estab-
lishment of common rules (Scharpf, 1996).
3Financial stability can be characterised as, “maintaining the smooth functioning of the financial system
and maintaining the system’s ability to facilitate and support the efficient functioning and performance of
the economy; and having in place the mechanisms to prevent financial problems from becoming systemic or
from threatening the stability of the financial and economic system, but without undermining the economy’s
ability to sustain growth and perform its other functions” (Schinasi, 2005, 100).
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Stability Mechanism’s Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (ESM-DRI).
The paper will first give an overview of the political economy approaches to financial
market reform and the politics of financial integration. It then explains how heterogeneous
frameworks for crisis management in the EU and the widespread public support led to the
push for reform and the BRRD. It also highlights how the distributional consequences of
financial sector support and the establishment of the SSM led to agreement on the SRM.
Following this, it analyses the politics surrounding the adoption of the new financing struc-
ture, decision-making procedures and crisis management tools. Thereafter it explains how
agreement on the BRRD and SRM facilitated agreement on other key instruments in the
new architecture for crisis management in the EU.
5.2 Crises, reform, and the politics of financial integra-
tion
Political economy approaches to reform rely on the assumption of the unity of the economic
and political domains to explain the emergence and outcomes of different regimes (Rodrik,
1996, Drazen, 2000, Williamson, 1994, Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 2006). This approach
is useful in the analysis of the incentive structures for various forms of regulation given
certain preferences. “Rather than take regulations as a given, the political economy approach
attempts to provide a positive analysis of how and why regulations evolve as they do and what
forces lead to their durability as well as potential for change” (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001,
233). Organisational development and much of the institutional literature often relies on a
punctuated equilibrium model which distinguishes between long periods of stability followed
by an exogenous shock and revolutionary institutional upheaval (Gersick, 1991). However,
the contention that reform follows a crisis is somewhat tautological and virtually unfalsifiable
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(Rodrik, 1996). Therefore, to explain the emergence of new governance structures, we must
look at the particular dynamics of reforms following a crisis.
For the purposes of this analysis, this paper will assess the European case against a
framework of analysis outlined by Kroszner (1998, 1999). Studying banking and regulatory
reform in emerging markets, he explains four reasons why crises upset the old political
economy equilibrium and hence lead to reform. Firstly, crises can affect the bureaucratic
incentives for regulatory change. Crises can expose weaknesses in the framework for crisis
management which give regulators and politicians an incentive to reform. Secondly, the
implicit subsidy the financial sector receives from the State becomes clearly evident when
large amounts of public money are committed by governments in response to financial crises.
This more explicit accounting reveals the costs of policies and serves as an educational role
for the public, leading to old regimes becoming unsustainable. Thirdly, governments often
take large stakes in financial institutions or commit State resources in the form of contingent
liabilities to stabilise the financial sector. Governments may have to raise taxes and sell bonds
in order to pay for the bail-out. The distributional consequences associated with bailouts
upset the relative position of competing interests leading to reform. Finally, crises change
the relative costs and benefits of regulation, leading to the likelihood of ambitious reforms
being accepted. This is particularly important in the euro- area context, where the crisis has
led to deeper integration and the delegation of competences for financial supervision (the
SSM), a strengthening of the fiscal and macroeconomic framework (with the so-called ‘six-
pack’, ‘two-pack’ and ‘fiscal compact’), as well as the establishment of the of the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM).
In the EU, the politics of financial integration has received much attention in the literat-
ure. The shaping of regulatory and supervisory space has always involved conflicts of interests
between Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and not least mar-
ket participants. Underhill (1997) for example, emphasises the inter-governmental character
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of integration during the seventies, eighties and nineties and highlights the three-way role of
the negotiations between the mostly northern European ‘universal banking countries’ led by
Germany, the ‘Roman-law’ countries headed by France and finally the UK, with its ’Com-
mon Law’ system. Similarly, Story and Walter (1997) argue a ‘battle of the systems’ took
place for hegemonic influence over the European financial area. This, they argue, is due
to different responses by governments to the internationalisation of business and banking
and the configuration of their domestic financial systems. Quaglia (2010) suggests that this
competition has its roots in different ‘belief systems’ of financial regulation. These ideational
approaches, she argues, emerged from a tension between a ‘market-making’ principle-based
approach from a northern coalition (UK, Ireland and Scandinavian Member States) and a
‘market-shaping’ rule-based approach from a southern coalition (France, Belgium and the
Mediterranean Member States), with Germany in between. The outcomes came down to
the bargaining power of the members. Other explanations have emphasised the role of the
private sector. Mügge (2006), for example, argues that emerging preferences among firms
for harmonisation led to the drive for a transnationalisation of policymaking.
More recent contributions on the crisis response have focused on the expansion of the insti-
tutional architecture for financial supervision, often explained using the framework of histor-
ical institutionalism. McPhilemy (2014), for example, explains that change in the regulatory
and supervisory policy space has occurred incrementally, with supranationalisation of differ-
ent phases occurring at different times from the introduction of the Single Market, through
the Lamfalussy framework which relaunched the financial market integration with the Fin-
ancial Services Action Plan, to the establishment of the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESA) following the de Larosiere proposals, and culminating in the Banking Union. “Open-
ended cycles of agenda-setting, regulatory reform and behavioural change” underpinned the
transformation and integration of financial regulation and supervision (McPhilemy, 2014,
1486-1487). Other recent contributions focus on the intergovernmental character of the ne-
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gotiations around the broad move towards banking union (Howarth and Quaglia, 2013).
Building on Howarth and Quaglia (2014), who analyse how national preference formation
shaped the dominant position of Germany in the SRM negotiations, and following Hennessy
(2014) who analyses the framework for supervision, this paper emphasises how the power of
Member States and distributive conflict with regard to legacy issues shaped the new frame-
work for crisis management. It also highlights the important role the European Parliament
played in the negotiations for the new framework, as well as the different conceptions re-
garding the role of the State in crisis management. It does this by analysing in detail the
comparative positions each negotiating party took on each of the key pieces of legislation
with respect to the original proposals and eventual outcome. It also draws on the many
press releases, documents from public institutions released during the negotiations and press
articles which document the positions of the various parties, as well as other academic and
policy research on the subject. It therefore aims to contribute to development of positive
analysis of policymaking in political science and political economy and to understand the
patterns of institutional design and regulatory policy in the EU.
5.3 Crisis management in the EU and the political eco-
nomy of reform
This section will assess in more detail the reform of the architecture for crisis management
in the EU, as against the framework proposed by Kroszner (1998, 1999).4
4Kroszner (1998) focuses primarily on private sector interests. However, this paper focuses more on the
economic rationale and politics surrounding the public policy response. Nonetheless, the framework is useful
in analysing why crises are associated with reform and the particular dynamics of reform following financial
crises.
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5.3.1 Bureaucratic incentives and the limits of coordination
One of the key factors which leads to reform of banking regulation following a crisis is bureau-
cratic incentives for regulatory change (Kroszner, 1998). In the EU, responsibilities through-
out the crisis for crisis-prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution remained within
the remit of national authorities. However, national regimes for crisis management were very
different. The legal powers for crisis management and resolution varied significantly across
Member States. In most Member States, only standard corporate insolvency proceedings
were available to banks in trouble. These did not however take into account the special role
credit institutions play in an economy. In other Member States, powers were derived from
specific resolution or insolvency regimes. Given the diverse legal powers, the objectives and
mandates for crisis management were different. “Corporate insolvency laws typically have
two principal objectives: a fair and predictable treatment of creditors and the maximisation
of assets available to satisfy creditors’ claims. By contrast, in a specific regime for bank
insolvency, public policy objectives such as financial stability, the continuity of services and
the integrity of the payments systems, may take priority” (European Commission, 2009b, 9).
Domestic authorities in charge of crisis management also varied significantly across Mem-
ber States and included supervisors, central banks, government ministers, courts, insolvency
officials and even deposit guarantee schemes (European Commission, 2009b, 8). Different
authorities may have heterogenous preferences in crisis management. Central banks, for
example, may have a preference for financial stability in crises (Honohan and Laeven, 2005).
On the other hand, officials in departments of finance may be more concerned with the fiscal
costs of crisis containment or resolution (see chapter 3).
In this context Member States responded very differently to crisis situations, whereby
some authorities preferred a more graduated approach to crisis management while others were
geared towards rapid intervention (European Commission, 2009b, 9). Furthermore, the crisis
management tools at the disposal of each authority varied significantly and the threshold
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conditions to use such tools were not harmonised which further hampered coordination
efforts. Finally, most Member States lacked any form of private sector financing arrangements
for banks when they got into trouble. Where Member States had such regimes, they were
lacking adequate funding mechanisms (European Central Bank, 2011b).5
At the European level, co-operation in crises between national supervisors, Central Banks
and Ministries of Finance, was framed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cross-
border Financial Stability.6 Cross-Border Stability Groups (CBSGs) were a central element
of the MoU. However, these were designed to be established on a voluntary basis and to
be applicable only where a ‘common interest’ existed, i.e only relevant parties that shared
specific financial stability concerns, such as cross-border financial groups would consider
establishing them. They were also designed to be fully flexible, whereby the institutional
and operational set-up was left to the relevant parties. Furthermore, they were to act as
a ‘complementing nature’, supporting existing crisis management groups (Domestic Stand-
ing Groups), rather than a new supranational layer of governance and hence did not have
any decision-making powers. Interactions were mostly based on ad hoc operational contacts
rather than structured arrangements, particularly given the non-binding nature of the instru-
ment. The MoU (and CBSGs) therefore failed to provide an effective basis for co-operation
leading to sub-optimal coordination and resolution (European Commission, 2012).
The institutional framework for cross-border crisis management also led to a misalign-
ment of incentives, given the cross-border nature of banking groups. Subsidiaries were the
main form of cross-border banking model in the EU holding e4 trillion in assets (European
5Germany for example had established an ex-ante funded resolution fund. Similarly in Denmark a State-
owned Financial Stability Company with a guarantee from the DGS existed. In the Netherlands the DGS
was permitted to finance deposit transfers, whereas in the UK the DGS (ex-post financed) was permitted to
financing resolution (see European Central Bank, 2011b, 88)
6 These were signed in 2003, 2005 and 2008 and were in line with international guidelines for Cross-border
Cooperation on Crisis Management (see Kudrna (2012)).
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Commission, 2009b, 11). The incentive structure for Member States was to act to minimise
damage to their own economic and financial systems and to protect national stakeholders.
This led authorities to ring-fence national assets of cross-border groups and apply resolution
tools at the level of each entity rather than at the group level.7 Member State authorit-
ies aimed to maximise assets available to the creditors of national entities, protect national
DGS and limit the exposure of taxpayers in each individual Member State (see European
Commission, 2009b).
This resulted in negative spill-overs in the form of contagion, confidence, and competitive
distortions following the collapse of Fortis and Dexia and the collapse of the Icelandic banking
sector, which had entered the EU market through branches and subsidiaries in the UK, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany (see Stolz and Wedow, 2010, Kudrna, 2012, European
Central Bank, 2011a). Therefore clear bureaucratic incentives for reform of the framework
for crisis management existed.
In response to these challenges and in the absence of any specific mandate in the Treaties
for the authorities to act in a coordinated way to manage financial crises, in June 2009, the
ECOFIN Council called on the Commission to bring forward proposals for a comprehensive
‘cross-border framework to strengthen the EU financial crisis management systems’ (Council
of the European Union, 2009). Crisis management however, was to remain a national based
competence with a harmonised framework and enhanced coordination mechanisms.8
7This was reinforced by the many legal barriers to the transfer of collateral and other assets within
cross-border banking groups from both EU and national law (see European Central Bank (2010, Annex) )
8New European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were established in January 2011 to replace the former
supervisory committees. There was originally disagreement amongst the ECOFIN regarding the role these
would play. Whereas in June 2009 the Commission was invited to ‘explore how the ESA’s could coordinate
supervisors in crisis situations’ (namely the exchange of information and facilitation of cooperation), they
always had to fully respect the responsibilities of national authorities in preserving financial stability and in
crisis management in relation to potential fiscal consequences (Council of the European Union, 2009).
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5.3.2 Public support to the financial sector
The second key factor which upsets the political economy equilibrium leading to reform is the
educational role the enormous costs of financial crises create (Kroszner, 1998, Kane, 1996).
Failures of banks “may heighten the public’s awareness of the costs of regulation and may
make it more difficult, that is more costly in terms of votes, to maintain the old regulatory
regime” (Kroszner, 1998, 23). Given the pre-crisis framework in the EU described above, it
is perhaps un-surprising that Member States used large amounts of public money to bail out
their banks. However, the scale of public support was unprecedented.
Figure 5.1: 2009, 2012 guarantees and liquidity support in the EU (%GDP)
(a) 2009 outstanding guarantees and liquidity support
(% GDP)
(b) 2012 outstanding guarantees and liquidity support
(% GDP)
Source: European Commission (2014b)
Figure 5.1 shows the use of guarantees and other forms of liquidity support to banks
across the EU. In 2009 Member States provided the equivalent of 7.68% of EU GDP (e905.8
billion) in support to the financial sector. This represented a peak year. It gradually reduced
to 4.1% of EU GDP (e534.48 billion) by 2012. Ireland stands out beyond any other Member
State in terms of the relative support it provided to the financial sector following the far
reaching 2008 decision to guarantee all liabilities and deposits.
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Figure 5.2: 2008-2012 recapitalisation and asset relief (% GDP)
Source: European Commission (2014b)
Beyond liquidity and guarantees Member States also directly supported credit institu-
tions. Credit ratings downgrades and losses on credit portfolios put pressure on the capital
positions of banks and uncertainty about the value of some assets resulted in a reluctance
to lend in the interbank market (Stolz and Wedow, 2010, 29-32). Therefore governments
complemented guarantees with direct equity injections to bolster the capital positions of
banks, asset insurance to facilitate lending and asset removal schemes (i.e. bad banks) to
‘cleanse’ balance sheets. Figure 5.2 shows that between 2008 and 2012, Member States
provided capital support in the form of recapitalisation amounting to 4.6% of EU GDP. This
was composed of e413.2 billion in recapitalisation measures and e178.71 billion asset relief
measures. Figures 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show both the significant divergence of interests and
national policies concerning the use of public funds in response to the crisis. These dynamics
severely hampered the preservation of financial stability in the EU as a whole (De Larosière,
2009, Turner, 2009).
In many cases such support led to the effective nationalisation of banks. This changed the
political economy equilibrium leading to a push for further reform of the framework for crisis
management to limit the exposure of governments in resolution cases. Ireland, for example,
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spent the equivalent of 38.38% of its GDP (e62.78 billion) re-capitalising its banks over the
period (2008-2012), in particular putting e32 billion into Anglo Irish Bank. Other Member
States also heavily supported their banks with capital and asset relief measures. Germany
(e144.4 billion) “even organised a shareholder squeeze-out to take full control of Hypo Real
Estate, after having granted more than e100 billion in guarantees to the bank” (Stolz and
Wedow, 2010, 30). Recapitalisation and asset relief measures in the United Kingdom (UK)
amounted to e122.8 billion, in particular with Royal Bank of Scotland costing the State e46
billion. Also Spain (e88.14 billion) injected e22 billion of capital into Bankia (European
Commission, 2014b).
These dynamics led to the inclusion, in the proposals for reform, of ex-ante financed bank
resolution funds to limit the exposure of the taxpayer to failing institutions. In their May
2010 communication on bank resolution funds, the Commission highlighted that “political
support is growing for the so-called ‘polluter pays’ principle...so that those responsible for
causing it will pay for the costs of any possible future financial crisis” (European Commission,
2010a, 3). The widespread public support also prompted the reformed framework to include
a bail-in tool to write-down classes of debt of a failing bank and to ensure that creditors
bear losses in resolution (European Commission, 2010b, 2011a). Therefore, in line with the
Kroszner’s (1998) framework, the widespread public support clearly changed the political
economy equilibrium leading the reforms to focus on measures which limited the exposure
of the State to banks in resolution.
Following multiple conferences, consultations and communications, the Commission came
forward with their proposal in June 2012. The BRRD proposed improved and harmonised
preventative, early intervention and resolution tools (with harmonised triggers for interven-
tion), clearly defined authorities and a legislative framework, to allow financial institutions
to fail in an orderly manner. The clear objectives for resolution were to safeguard both
the financial stability in individual Member States and in the EU as a whole and to limit
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economic disruption. It also included the proposal for a bail-in tool and establishment of
national resolution funds where burden-sharing by shareholders and creditors would not be
sufficient.
5.3.3 Distributional consequences of financial support
The third key factor which upsets the political economy equilibrium is that crises rarely affect
all parties similarly and hence have significant distributional consequences (Kroszner, 1998,
Pepinsky, 2014, Walter, 2013). “Powerful groups or coalitions may fragment as their interests
diverge during economic trouble and new constituencies may be created” (Kroszner, 1998,
22). The unprecedented support to the financial sector in the EU had significant distribu-
tional consequences for many Member States, particularly when it mutated into a sovereign
debt crisis in 2010. This manifested itself through the so-called ‘bank-sovereign nexus’ and
most dramatically for Member States who were forced into an IMF/EU programme of ad-
justment as a result of being unable to tap bond markets, given the scope of their financial
sector support.
Since the start of the financial crisis, concerns about the strength of financial institutions
had been affecting the sovereign ratings of certain Member States. Nearly all banks in
the EU had reduced their domestic exposures prior to this. However as a consequence of
the crisis, banks resumed purchases creating a home-bias in domestic holdings of sovereign
bonds (Angelini, Grande and Panetta, 2014). The relationship between banks and sovereigns
is captured in Figure 5.3 and shows a strong correlation between bank credit default swops
(CDS) and sovereign CDS, when, for example, compared to the U.S, for example.
Ailing balance sheets of stressed banks who were reliant on short-term inter-bank finan-
cing increased the burden faced by governments. The subsequent large direct and contingent
financial support provided to banks was financed through an increase in government debt.
This, in turn, was mostly purchased by domestic banks. The support however, weighed on
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Figure 5.3: 2010-2013 correlation between bank and sovereign CDS in the euro area and the
US
(a) Euro area (b) US
Source: Thomson Reuters and ECB calculations. Latest observation: Q4 /2013.
Notes: Sovereign CDS euro area average calculated as country CDS weighted by ECB capital
key. Banks CDS euro area average is calculated taking the largest bank of each available
country and aggregating using ECB capital key. Each dot represents the pair (av. sovereign
CDS, av. bank CDS) at a certain day in the respective quarter. Greece is excluded from the
sovereign CDS average. Colour-coded dots correspond to 2010Q1, 2011Q4, 2013Q2, 2013Q3
and 2013Q4 respectively.
national fiscal authorities and rising sovereign risk affected banks’ credit risk through their
exposures.
The causality ran both ways as a re-pricing of risk escalated throughout the eurozone.
Whereas Ireland and Spain had run fiscal surpluses prior to the crisis, a collapse in the
property market led to a sovereign debt crisis. However in Greece, problems with public
finances were transmitted to the banking sector, whereby sovereign downgrades in the wake
of deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions exacerbated the stress on the balance sheets
of banks given their significant domestic sovereign holdings. Furthermore, in both cases the
expectation of default led to contagion, giving uncertainty about counterparty status, further
exacerbating the tension and financial market fragmentation across the euro area.
The political economy dynamics of the bank-sovereign nexus banks are interesting. Bat-
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tistini, Pagano and Simonelli (2013) investigate the home bias of sovereign holdings and
decompose the country risk and the common risk components in sovereign spreads. They
find that domestic banks’ response to country risk was primarily a peripheral phenomenon
and suggest that this may be because of sovereign issuers exerting ‘moral suasion’ on banks
in their jurisdiction to support demand. Their analysis suggests that home bias in ‘core’
banks was a response to systemic re-denomination risk, rather than country risk factors.9
Whereas previously many Member States were opposed to deeper integration, the emer-
gence of the sovereign debt crisis spurred the reform process. Whilst the tools for burden-
sharing and resolution financing were already proposed in the BRRD, the banking union
suggested a much deeper risk-sharing framework for Member States which would allow costs
of resolution to be spread across the eurozone, thus helping to break the bank-sovereign
nexus. “The fact that the costs of any bank rescue will fall less on the sovereigns should
lift expectations of government debt sustainability, thus improving asset quality for banks
exposed to their governments” (Draghi, 2014).
In March 2013, the European Council committed to completing the banking union. They
prioritised the conclusion of the legislative process for the SSM, after which the ESM could
recapitalise banks directly. They stressed that an agreement urgently needed to be found on
the BRRD and the accompanying DGS Directive and that once the Commission submitted
a proposal for the SRM it would be made a matter of priority to be adopted within that
parliamentary cycle (European Council, 2013). On 10 July 2013, the Commission proposed
a Single Resolution Mechanism for the banking union to complement the SSM (European
Commission, 2013a). It was designed to “allow bank crises to be managed more effectively
in the banking union and to contribute to breaking the link between sovereign crises and
ailing banks” (ibid).
9‘Core’countries here include Austria, Belgium, Germany, France the Netherlands. The peripheral coun-
tries are Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
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5.3.4 The SSM and the changing costs and benefits of deeper in-
tegration
Kroszner (1998) suggests that a final driver of reform is that crises change the relative
costs and benefits of regulation. Interestingly, during the first consultation on the new
framework for crisis management in 2009, the Commission floated the (then ambitious)
idea of “a single authority to be responsible for the resolution of a particular group” or
“European Resolution Authority (ERA)” (European Commission, 2009d,a). They argued
that a harmonised framework, even with coordinated but separate entity resolution, would
“not necessarily allow the most efficient re-organisation... these concerns could only be fully
addressed by greater structural integration of a resolution framework, possibly by designating
a lead authority” (European Commission, 2009b, 13-14). However a majority of Member
States were strongly opposed to the idea and argued that “national authorities were closer
to the markets and that it would have fiscal implications with potential impacts on national
budgets” (European Commission, 2009d).
Similarly, in 2010, in their communication on bank resolution funds (for the BRRD), the
Commission argued that “in principle, pooling resources into a single pan EU resolution fund
would deliver clear benefits... [and] ... better reflect the pan- EU nature of banking markets,
in particular for cross border banking groups” (European Commission, 2010a, 6). However
they recognised that, at that time, it would be difficult to create a single resolution fund in
the absence of an integrated EU supervisory and crisis management framework. Therefore,
the shift in supervisory powers to the supranational level was pivotal in making the leap to
integration of the second pillar of banking union.
When political agreement was reached in the Council on the SSM, the political economy
equilibrium changed, with a concerted effort to ‘deepen EMU’ (European Council, 2013). In
December 2012, the European Council concluded that “in a context where bank supervision
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is effectively moved to a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism will
be required... It should safeguard financial stability and ensure an effective framework for
resolving financial institutions, while protecting taxpayers in the context of banking crises”
(European Council, 2012).
In July 2013, the Commission came forward with a proposal which provided for: (i) an
institutional framework encompassing a Single Resolution Board (SRB) which would cent-
ralise decision-making, have broad powers to analyse and define the approach for resolving a
bank, to produce efficient decisions and to contribute to minimising the costs of resolution;
(ii) a financing structure to ensure the availability of medium-term funding support while the
bank was restructured in the form of a Single Resolution Fund (SRF), and (iii) a tool-kit for
resolution, replicating much of what was provided for in the BRRD (European Commission,
2013c).
5.4 The politics of crisis management in the EU
The previous section has sought to explain how the heterogeneous powers, objectives,
authorities and tools for crisis management limited effective domestic resolution and co-
ordination in cross-border cases. It showed how this resulted in negative spillovers leading
the ECOFIN Council to request a comprehensive framework to strengthen the EU framework
for financial crisis management. It then analysed how the widespread use of public support
led to the push for deeper reform and the inclusion of ex-ante bank financed resolution funds
and a bail-in tool which would limit the exposure of taxpayers to future resolution cases.
Finally it showed how, although the ambitious proposals for a SRM and SRF were initially
floated by the Commission as early as 2009, it was only after the emergence of the sovereign
debt crisis and following agreement on the SSM that deeper integration in the second pillar of
banking union became politically feasible. The framework of analysis outlined by Kroszner
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(1998) therefore is very applicable to the European case.
Whilst bureaucratic incentives, public support, distributional consequences and changing
costs and benefits lead to reform, these dynamics also shape the policy response. This sec-
tion examines the politics of the policy response in particular, by analysing the comparative
positions both the EP and the Council took in the negotiations of three specific aspects of
the new framework, namely: (i) the financing structure for resolution, (ii) decision-making
procedures, and (iii) crisis management tools. It emphasises how distributive conflict with
regard to legacy issues and the power of certain Member States shaped the new architec-
ture. However it also highlights the important role the European Parliament played in the
negotiations. The different positions negotiators took also reveals the different conceptions
that they had regarding the role of the State in crisis management.
5.4.1 Resolution financing
A central element of the new framework for crisis management in the EU is that the banking
system would pay for the resolution of credit institutions, rather than the taxpayer. Included
in the Commission proposal for the SRM was the establishment of an ex-ante financed Single
Resolution Fund (SRF) which would be raised from levies on the banking system and amount
to 1% of covered deposits (approximately e55bn). It was proposed that this would be built
up over ten years (see European Commission (2013c, 14)). The SRF could then be used
to make loans, to guarantee the assets or the liabilities of the institution under resolution,
its subsidiaries, a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle, to purchase assets of
the institution, or contribute capital to a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle.
Furthermore, it could be used to pay compensation to shareholders or creditors if they would
have received less than under normal insolvency proceedings.
The legal basis for the SRM and hence the SRF, which is established under the SRM
Regulation, is Article 114 of the Treaty (TFEU). This however gave rise to both political and
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legal concerns in Germany in particular, which argued that levies could not be transferred
to the SRF under this legal basis (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014). Therefore the Council (on
18 December 2013) proposed a separate Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to provide for
the transfer of levies to the SRF. This provoked severe criticism from the EP (Schulz, 2014,
Giegold, 2014, European Parliament, 2014b), who argued that it infringed on the principle
of sincere co-operation (Art. 4(3) TFEU), as it opened up entirely separate negotiations (to
the SRM trilogue negotiations). They were also highly critical of the Council building an
“intergovernmental chapter into the system, especially if there are no sound legal grounds
for it” (European Parliament, 2014e).
Rather than immediately establishing a single fund, the IGA allowed the Council to
establish a hierarchy of resolution financing and a prolonged mutualisation schedule with
respect to resolution financing. Germany’s central concern was that it did not want the
SRF to end up paying for the legacy issues that Member States had incurred during the
crisis. They stated that “we do not want banks’ toxic legacy assets in individual countries
transferred to the taxpayers of other countries. Hence a gradual process of mutualisation
and continuing responsibility on the part of the member states represents a fair compromise”
(BMF, 2014).
The IGA established a compartmentalised structure for the SRF, whereby each Mem-
ber State (MS) will collect their respective contributions in a national compartment. The
national compartments will be progressively mutualised over a transitional period of eight
years as shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Mutualisation schedule for the Single Resolution Fund
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
% of compartment of MS concerned 100% 60% 40% 33.3% 26.6% 20% 13.3% 6.6%
% of all compartments available 40% 60% 66.6% 73.3% 80% 86.6% 93.3% 100%
Resolution financing will be strictly accorded to a pre-defined hierarchy and limited
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during the transition period, as outlined in the IGA. This is portrayed in Figure 5.4. In
the first step, costs will be borne by national compartments of the Member State(s) of the
institution(s) under resolution. If the financial means are not sufficient, recourse will be had
to the compartments of all participating Member States. Thereafter, any further financial
means left in the national compartment will be used. In a fourth step, extraordinary ex-post
contributions can be raised from the institutions in the Member States where the resolution
is taking place. Finally, if these financial means are still insufficient, the SRF may contract
borrowings or make temporary transfers between compartments (European Central Bank,
2014).
Figure 5.4: Hierarchy of resolution financing for the Single Resolution Fund
Source: European Central Bank, European Commission
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Although the EP was not formally involved in the negotiations, they insisted that they
could not “accept to sign up to a system which could fail its first tests because this [would]
keep taxpayers at the forefront of paying for bank risks and develops a system of privileged
and under-class banks based on national affiliation, thereby undermining the essence of the
single market” (European Parliament, 2014d). Therefore they insisted on a seat at the
negotiating table for the IGA and even reflected on whether “no deal would be better than
a very bad one” (European Parliament, 2013c). The original mutualisation schedule was to
be linear and over ten years. Table 5.1 showing how the EP ensured that the mutualisation
schedule would be 60% mutualised after two years, with equal progressive mutualisation
thereafter. They also negotiated to shorten the mutualisation schedule to eight years (see
Merler and Wolff, 2014). Furthermore, the EP text on the SRM Regulation had included that
the SRB should be able to contract a loan facility for the Fund, preferably using a “European
public instrument”, to ensure that the immediate availability of adequate financial means to
be used, whenever the amounts raised through ex-ante and ex-post contributions would not
be sufficient (European Parliament, 2014a, Art. 69a). They succeeded in including in the
final compromise that the SRB can contract financial arrangements, including where possible,
from ‘public financial arrangements’ (Article 74 SRM Regulation). Furthermore, a recital
(107) obliges the SRB and Member States to develop an enhanced borrowing capacity for
the SRF. This inclusion represented a significant success for the EP (European Parliament,
2014e).
The outcome on resolution financing shows the dominance of Member States, in particular
Germany, during the negotiation process. However, it also displays the central role the EP
played in pushing for a ‘European solution’, despite formally not being party to the IGA
negotiations (European Parliament, 2014c). It also elucidates how distributional conflict and
concern with regard to legacy issues shaped the financing structure for the new framework.
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5.4.2 Decision-making
Similar dynamics are evident from the negotiating positions that the relevant parties took
on the decision-making procedures. The SRM regulation establishes a Board (SRB) to take
decisions on resolution cases. It is composed of a Chair, four independent members and of
representatives of national resolution authorities.10 The SRB will convene in two different
compositions: executive and plenary. When deliberating on a specific resolution case, the
representatives of the relevant national resolution authorities will also be included in the
executive session.
The Commission originally proposed that in the plenary session, the SRB would only take
all decisions of a general nature,whereas in its executive session, SRB would take decisions
in respect of individual entities or banking groups. However the Council pushed for an
enhanced role for the plenary session, to ensure a stronger role for their respective Member
State representatives. Comparatively, the EP was highly critical of the complexity of the
decision-making process and argued that “decision- making on individual resolution cases
must be credible, efficient and predictable” (European Parliament, 2014d). They favoured a
lean and swift decision- making process which preserved ‘the European interest’ and would
not be ‘single only in name’ (European Parliament, 2013c).11
In the end it was agreed that the executive session will take any resolution decision up
to e5bn. The plenary session of the Board will take decisions on: (i) the necessity to raise
extraordinary ex-post contributions, (ii) borrowing between financing compartments, (iii)
10The Commission and the ECB will act as permanent observers on the SRB.
11They therefore agreed that the executive session should be entrusted with the key responsibilities whereas
the plenary would be mainly responsible for decisions regarding borrowing. However they amended the
appointment procedure by adding an approval role for themselves prior to any involvement of the Council.
Furthermore, they added a new set of principles to govern the activity of the Board. The principles are to:
(a) act independently (b) have the necessary expertise on bank restructuring and insolvency (c) be able to
deal with large banking groups (d) be able to act swiftly and impartially (e) ensure that appropriate account
is taken of national financial stability, financial stability of the European Union and the internal market,
and (f) be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council (see European Parliament, 2014a, Art.
43a).
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alternative financing means (e.g. contracting borrowings), (iv) the mutualisation of national
financing arrangements, and (v) investments. Furthermore, once the net accumulated use of
the SRF in the previous 12 months reaches a threshold of e5bn, the plenary will evaluate
the application of the resolution tools, in particular the use of the Fund, and provide guid-
ance which the executive session shall follow in subsequent decisions (see European Central
Bank, 2014). Distributional concerns, as well as the dominance of the Council, are there-
fore also clearly visible from the divergent different positions and subsequent outcome of the
negotiations on decision-making procedures for the executive and plenary.
The negotiations on decision-making procedures also prompted an inter-institutional
battle during the negotiations. Following the ‘Meroni case’, it is prohibited to assign tasks
to EU agencies, by way of secondary law, which may curtail the power of EU institutions
under the Treaties.12 The Commission’s original proposal had suggested that the Commis-
sion would decide to initiate resolution on a recommendation from the SRB. The EP agreed
that the ultimate decision-making powers for resolution should be entrusted to the Commis-
sion, as the ‘Meroni institution’. They however proposed to strengthen the role of the SRB
vis-à-vis the Commission.
However, the Council considered that it should be for the Council “to exercise effective
control over the decisions that entail discretionary powers related to the use of the resolution
tools and for the use of the Fund in a specific situation of resolution” and to “decide whether
and how the powers to write down or convert capital instruments are used” (Council of
the European Union, 2013b, recital 15a). They argued that given the impact of resolution
decisions on the financial stability of Member States and on the Union, as well as on the
fiscal sovereignty of Member States, ‘adequate’ involvement of the Council was required.
The final compromise leaves the Commission as the main ‘Meroni institution’. The
agreement provides for Council involvement in decision-making, only at the explicit request
12Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] ECR p133 .
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of the Commission. Once a resolution scheme is adopted by the Board, it will be sent to the
Commission for endorsement. Within 12 hours after adoption of a resolution scheme, the
Commission may propose to the Council to object to the scheme (on the grounds that it is
not in the ‘public interest, or, object on the basis of a material modification of the amount
of the SRF) (see European Central Bank, 2014). This represents a significant success for the
EP which feared that the excessive politicisation of decision-making would prompt inefficient
delays (European Parliament, 2013c). It also displays how the distributional concerns of the
Council shaped not only the financing structure, but also the decision-making procedures
for the framework.
5.4.3 Crisis management tools
The SRM Regulation replicates most of the tools as provided for in the BRRD which
the SRB will use in any resolution case. For example the sale of business tool allows the
authorities to sell all or part of a failing bank. The bridge institution tool allows the au-
thorities to identify the good assets or essential functions of a bank and separate to them
into a new publicly owned (bridge) bank which would then be sold to another entity. The
remaining ‘rump’ bank would then be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. The
asset separation tool allows the authorities to ‘clean’ the balance sheet of a bank by putting
the bad assets into an asset management vehicle (AMV). A number of issues arose in the
negotiations between the Council and the EP on crisis management tools. This section looks
at three such issues regarding: (i) the precautionary recapitalisation tool (ii) government
stabilisation tools, and (iii) bail-in tool.
One of the main sticking points in the six month talks, was the use of public money for
banks in a precautionary case - the precautionary recapitalisation tool, and in resolution -
government stabilisation tools (GSTs) (Barker, 2013a). These provisions were included by
the Council and EP respectively in their texts. There was agreement between the EP and
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the Council that in exceptional circumstances, for example due to a serious disturbance in
the economy or to preserve financial stability, State-backed guarantees of liquidity facilities
provided by central banks and newly issued liabilities would not trigger resolution. The
Council stressed the importance of including the possibility of public equity injections when
a bank is viable (i.e. when it complies with or is marginally below its capital requirements
(Council of the European Union, 2013b, Art. 27(2)(d)(iii) and recital 24). They argued
therefore that precautionary and temporary public recapitalisation should be possible. The
EP repeatedly expressed doubts on the rationale for that provision, which in the absence
of appropriate safeguards, they argued could be used to bailout banks, prior to triggering
resolution.13
Such an inclusion posed a challenge to legislators. “On the one hand, the expectation that
public support will be available may keep moral hazard alive among bankers... Experience
has shown that, especially when a large banking institution is concerned, national regulators
are all too willing to protect national champions and forbear their sins. On the other hand,
a generalised promise that financial support may always be preceded automatically by ac-
tivation of the bail-in instrument may be de-stabilising.” (Micossi, Bruzzone and Carmassi,
2013). Question marks were also raised as to whether such a proposal would clash with EU
State aid rules (Barker, 2014).
In the final compromise, the precautionary re-capitalisation tool was included in the final
text as foreseen by the Council. Interestingly however, the negotiating parties took reverse
positions when it came to the inclusion of GSTs. The EP included new Articles (European
Parliament, 2013b, (Art. 50(a-d)) which provided for the possibility of additional public
support for failed banks that have entered into resolution. They argued that Member States
13 See for example MEP Lamberts in (Barker, 2013a), who argued “bailout is still alive, if somewhat
contained”.
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should be able to provide guarantees for the liabilities or assets, take a credit institution under
temporary public ownership, and provide direct equity support to a bank to avoid systemic
contagion effects in the economy. These were introduced by rapporteur Hökmark , who drew
comparisons with the Swedish use of GSTs in containing and resolving the Swedish financial
crisis in the nineties.14 Certain Member States in the Council were opposed to the inclusion of
such tools, arguing that their inclusion was not compatible with protecting taxpayers money
in resolution and “the draft agreement offers too much freedom to governments wanting to
bail out banks with public money, rather than impose losses on bondholders” (Barker, 2014).
These tools however were also included in the final compromise on the BRRD.
The divergent positions on these two crisis management tools show the different per-
spectives the negotiating parties took on the role of the State in crisis management. The
Council wished to retain a strong role for the State in supporting banks before they entered
into resolution, albeit in exceptional circumstances. However once a bank entered resolution,
most Members did not wish to allow the State the use of public support in the resolution
process, preferring to rely on private sector solutions. Comparatively, the EP wished to limit
the role of the State in supporting potentially non-viable banks, but to allow a full range of
government tools to aid the resolution process.
Similar dynamics can be seen on the variant positions regarding the bail-in tool. The
bail-in tools represent one of the most important innovations in the framework for crisis
management. It enables resolution authorities to impose losses on senior creditors by writ-
ing down debt or by converting their claims into equity. In August 2013, the European
14Rapporteur Hökmark, in his presentation of the BRRD to the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs noted that “I have, in my draft report, introduced what I call “Government financial stabilisation
tools”, including the opportunity for the individual Member State to take, if so deemed necessary as a final
resort, the institution fully or partly under temporary public ownership or issuing a guarantee of the liabilities
of one or more institutions... I think it is unrealistic to assume all future crises will be resolved without a
single cent of tax-payers’ money involved. And if we anyhow go along with that assumption, reality will
prove us wrong and we will see situations where Member States will have to resort to various forms of public
intervention the day the systemic crisis occurs anyway.” (see presentation 06 November 2012, European
Parliament, 2013a).
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Commission had revised their State aid rules for financial sector support in the context of
the financial crisis. “Before granting any kind of restructuring aid, be it a recapitalisation
or impaired asset measure to a bank, all capital generating measures including the conver-
sion of junior debt should be exhausted, provided that fundamental rights are respected and
financial stability is not put at risk” (European Commission, 2013b, paragraph 19). This is
captured in the first column of Figure 5.5 which shows burden-sharing in a stylised balance
sheet under the State aid rules. However, the BRRD goes much further.
Figure 5.5: Burden sharing and bail-in under the State aid framework and BRRD/SRM
Source: European Central Bank, European Commission
Under the new framework the Council insisted on a very high threshold for bail-in before
any financial support could be given to a bank in the resolution process. This is depicted in
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the third column of Figure 5.5. Financing arrangements can only be used after a minimum
level of bail-in has been imposed on shareholders and creditors equal to 8% of total liabilities
including own funds. This can include a contribution from senior creditors. Thereafter, any
contribution of resolution funds would be limited to 5% of total liabilities. Subsequently, all
senior unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, will have to be bailed-
in before further financing arrangements could be used. The UK Independent Commission
on Banking (ICB) studied cumulative losses for a number of historical crises from 1988
onwards. A bail-in of 8% of total liabilities (including own funds), would correspond to
approximately 24% of risk-weighted assets. During the recent crisis, cumulative losses peaked
with Anglo Irish Bank, which experienced losses of 39% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
Overall, the study shows that 24% of RWAs of loss-absorbing absorbing capacity would have
been sufficient to absorb 95% of the banks in the sample (excluding the 5% which had the
largest losses) (Vickers et al., 2011). Certain Member States were insistent on the strict
application of this new rule in all cases.15
The EP by comparison, did not specify a bail-in threshold and called on the European
Banking Authority (EBA) to draft technical standards in this regard. The Council position
succeeded in the final text, again displaying their dominant position in the negotiations,
as well as their concern about the distributional consequences of resolution. The EP did
however play an important role in advancing the full application of the bail-in tool. The
Council had proposed to set the application deadline to four years, following the entry into
force of the BRRD (i.e. 2018). The EP text stressed that this introduction date should be
brought forward to 2016 to ensure that the full range of tools are available as soon as possible
and to provide certainty to markets (European Parliament, 2013b, recital 52). This time-gap
had important ramifications. If the date of entry into force was to be left until 2018, bail-in
15Austria, Germany and Finland for example, made a public declaration emphasising “that the bail-in rule
is under all circumstances fully respected and in any case, a contribution of shareholders and creditors to
the maximum extent possible is ensured” (see Council of the European Union, 2013a).
138
would only amount to junior debt in the creditor hierarchy before public money could be
used. The changes are shown in the second and third columns of Figure 5.5. Full bail-in,
including senior unsecured debt, will now be available from 1 January 2016. However the
conversion or write down of capital instruments (under the BRRD) and the conversion of
junior debt (under the State aid rules) will apply until then. This again is consistent with the
different conceptions of the role of the State in crisis management. Delaying the introduction
of the bail-in tool would have allowed the Member States to continue supporting their banks
with public money, only requiring more limited burden-sharing. The insistence of the EP in
bringing forward the application of the bail-in tool meant limiting State support to ailing
institutions and requiring full private sector participation in the resolution process at an
earlier date.
5.5 Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and ESM Dir-
ect Recapitalisation Instrument
The politics surrounding the negotiations are clearly evident from the analysis in the
previous section. It is clear how the Council dominated the negotiations on key aspects
of both the BRRD and SRM. In particular we can see how concerns about legacy issues
and distributional conflict shaped the financing structure for resolution, decision-making
procedures and crisis management tools. The analysis however also shows how the EP
played an important role in ensuring a more ‘European’ framework, in particular a faster
mutualisation schedule and time period for the build-up of the SRF, a strong executive
to take decisions in resolution cases, limited politicisation of decision-making (by limiting
the Council’s involvement) and the early introduction of the bail-in tool. Analysis of the
negotiations also highlights the different conceptions that the negotiators had regarding the
role of the State in crisis management, in particular the role the State can play in financing a
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bank in a precautionary scenario and what role governments should play in financing banks
in resolution. This section will further explain how the BRRD and SRM interact with two
other key instruments in the new architecture for crisis management in the EU, namely: (i)
deposit guarantee schemes, and (ii) the ESM’s direct recapitalisation instrument.
In June 2012 the Heads of State and Governments of the euro area agreed that “when
an effective single supervisory mechanism is established involving the ECB for banks in the
euro area, the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize
banks directly” (Euro area HoSoG, 2012). Allowing the ESM to directly recapitalise banks
was viewed as central to breaking the bank-sovereign nexus, and central to the agreement
on the SSM (European Council, 2012, 2013). On the 20 June 2013, the main features of the
instrument were agreed: the main eligibility criteria, a e60bn limit and that support would
be conditional on appropriate burden- sharing ‘according to the State aid rules and applying
the principles of the BRRD’ (Eurogroup, 2013). The agreement on the BRRD allowed the
President of the Eurogroup to broker a compromise between euro area Member States to
finalise the guideline for ESM-DRI. This included an agreement on the ‘appropriate’ burden-
sharing framework and conditions for use of the instrument (Dijsselbloem, 2014).
Firstly, it was agreed that the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument as described above
cannot be used as a precautionary instrument as defined in the BRDD (European Stability
Mechanism, 2014, 5). Secondly, it was agreed that “for a transitional period until 31 Decem-
ber 2015, a bail-in of 8% of all liabilities will be a precondition for using the instrument,
as well as the use of the resources available in the ESM Member’s national resolution fund.
From 01 January 2016, bail-in in line with the rules of the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive, will be required”. Both aspects of the compromise show that Member States wish
to use ESM-DRI as a ‘last-resort’ resolution financing instrument. Given the high threshold
required for bail-in, an institution receiving ESM-DRI will therefore have to be put into
resolution before any direct ESM support is given (European Stability Mechanism, 2014).
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Furthermore, excluding the use of the instrument in a precautionary scenario again shows
how Member States did not wish to use the new tools to deal with legacy issues in individual
Member States (Barker (2013b)).
The agreement on the BRRD also facilitated a compromise being reached on the DGS
Directive. In July 2010, the Commission had issued a comprehensive review of the DGS.
However agreement could not be found and the EP closed the first reading at its sitting of 16
February 2012, “following a long period during which the Council was unwilling to negotiate”
(European Parliament, 2012).
The agreement on the BRRD also resolved many of the issues that plagued the DGSD
negotiations such as the target level, accumulation period and the use of DGS in resol-
ution financing.16 This is because the BRRD provides for a ‘super-priority’ for deposits
in resolution. As described above the BRRD provides for a clear hierarchy of losses in
resolution. Covered deposits will have a preferential ranking above any unsecured claim.
Deposits will be subrogated to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, which covers the losses that
would otherwise have been borne by covered depositors (European Central Bank, 2011a, 40).
Furthermore, eligible deposits (deposits which exceed the coverage level, but are generally
eligible for protection from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises),
are also given preferential treatment but rank below the covered deposits (see Figure 5.5).
Therefore, deposits are only losses absorbing in resolution after subordinated and unsecured,
16 The Commission had proposed a target level, based on eligible deposits, of 1.5% and using a limited
amount of DGS funds in order to avoid a bank failure, under strict quantitative limits, to prevent jeopardising
the capacity of the DGS fund to pay out depositors and to avoid moral hazard. The Council however,
had proposed to set the target level at 0.5%, whereas the Parliament set it at 1.5% of covered deposits.
Furthermore, MEPs voted to extend the build-up period from 10 to 15 years, arguing that this “would allow
EU banks to remain internationally competitive”. The role of the DGS in resolution financing was also a
particularly salient point.
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non-preferred creditors have been bailed in, making them much less likely to be used in any
specific resolution case.
5.6 Conclusion
Together, the BRRD, SRM, IGA, DGSD and ESM-DRI form the new architecture for crisis
prevention, management and resolution in the EU going forwards. This paper has sought
to explain both the economic rationale and the politics of reform surrounding the recent
agreement on the new framework for bank resolution in the EU. It therefore hopes to con-
tribute to the development of positive analysis of policymaking in the EU by exploring the
political-economy factors that lead to and shape the reform process, as well as help research-
ers understand why the new framework for crisis management in the EU has been designed
in such a way.
This paper has shown how the limitations of coordination and unprecedented public
support to the financial sector led to the proposal and agreement on a harmonised set
of policy tools, legislative powers and institutional framework for crisis prevention, early
intervention and bank resolution across the EU. The inclusion of ex-ante financed resolution
funds and a bail-in, tool represent significant innovations in the new architecture and were
included as a direct response to coordination problems and unprecedented public support.
However it demonstrates how a deepening of a crisis can lead to the likelihood more ambitious
reforms will be adopted. In this case the distributional consequences of such significant
financial sector support led to the emergence of a bank-sovereign nexus, ultimately pushing
some countries into an EU/IMF programme of economic adjustment. This, as well as the
establishment of the SSM, led to a push to complete the EMU and agreement on the second
pillar of banking union.
The dynamics which shaped the push for reform also shaped the policy response. Also
drawing on the political science literature, this paper analysed the politics surrounding the
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negotiations on the financing structure for resolution, decision-making procedures and crisis
management tools. It showed how distributive conflict, concern over legacy issues, and the
power of certain Member States, shaped central features of the new architecture. However
it also highlights the important role the European Parliament played in the negotiations, by
ensuring a greater ‘European’ solution.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks: Contributions,
Policy Implications, & Future Research
The severity of the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis has led to renewed scholar-
ship on the causes, responses and consequences of financial crises. The four papers in this
thesis make a number of substantive empirical and theoretical contributions to the study of
financial crisis management by exploring different political economy perspectives. In doing
so, this thesis employs rigorous empirical analysis using case studies, game theoretic and
econometric tools. The new insights provided in the above papers highlight that in addition
to economic and financial analysis, a multidimensional approach which incorporates insti-
tutional processes and political behaviour is necessary to explain causes, macroeconomic
outcomes and reform following crises. This section will summarise the empirical and the-
oretical contributions of each paper, in addition to discussing some policy implications and
avenues for future research.
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6.1 Empirical contributions
Failures in financial regulation and supervision are common prior to banking crises. The
political economy literature has sought a deeper understanding as to why this occurs, by in-
corporating political preferences and institutional processes into analyses of banking crises.
The first paper (chapter 2) contributes to the study of failures in banking regulation, by ana-
lysing the development of the framework for regulation and supervision in Ireland prior to
the recent financial crisis. The paper shows how political decisions by successive Irish govern-
ments to attract financial services to Ireland and to encourage competition in the provision
of credit, led to the establishment of a permissive regulatory and supervisory environment.
This occurred through a supervisory philosophy and framework for supervision which was
inadequate. Furthermore, the paper shows how this had perverse effects on supervisors which
led to a deferential approach toward regulated entities and weak enforcement. This resulted
in distortionary effects for the competitive dynamics of the retail banking market in Ireland
and for the allocation of capital.
Although this is merely one singular case, the paper highlights how, even in advanced
economies with seemingly robust institutional frameworks for regulation and supervision,
biases towards domestic political objectives can result in the excessive expansion of banks
and can induce risk-taking. Such ‘banking nationalism’ appears to be a general phenomenon
in Europe where “governments have nurtured the birth and growth of mega-banks that could
act as “national champions” in the competition with foreign banks” (European Systemic Risk
Board, 2014).
Moving from the causes of financial crises to financial crisis management, previous re-
search on the public responses to banking crises lack explanations for cases like Ireland’s
recent bailout. The new empirical relationships uncovered in the second and third papers
enhance our understanding of how politics affects policy during financial crises. The second
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paper assesses the crisis management strategy of the Irish government, against our signalling
model of financial crisis containment. Our model can explain the Irish Government’s 2008
decision to put in place a blanket guarantee of all liabilities of the banking system, ulti-
mately forcing the State out of the sovereign markets and into an EU/IMF programme of
economic adjustment on the basis of asymmetries of information and biases. To demonstrate
the plausibility of our model we deduced the preferences of key actors in the decision-making
process.
The third paper (chapter 4) provides new empirical insights into how political institu-
tions and preferences condition policy choice and affect macroeconomic outcomes during
financial crises. Intervention to contain and resolve systemic crises can lead to distributional
costs given support means allocating costs to different groups in society. Institutions how-
ever shape decision-making and economic outcomes. The global financial crisis has led to
an increased number of observations by which to examine the relationships between polit-
ical institutions and fiscal costs. It has also led to the collection of detailed policy and
outcome data, thus facilitating further analysis of the interplay between political economy
factors. Whereas previous research explored the differences between autocratic and demo-
cratic countries, or that of broad checks and balances, we use cross-country econometric
evidence to examine the impact political and party systems have on the fiscal costs of fin-
ancial sector intervention. We find that presidential systems are associated with lower fiscal
costs when managing systemic banking crises. Our empirical results suggest a deeper com-
parative analysis of political systems, rather than veto players, is necessary to capture how
political institutions impact policy choice following systemic crises.
We further examine the channels through which political variables impact fiscal costs
by analysing the policy instruments governments use in response to such financial shocks.
Consistent with our main results our further empirical analysis shows that governments in
presidential systems are less likely to use accommodative instruments such as guarantees on
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bank liabilities and bank recapitalisations, which we show are more costly policies for finan-
cial crisis management. Furthermore, we show that multi-party governments in presidential
systems are more likely to impose losses on depositors.
The final paper (chapter 5) analyses the economic rationale for reform of the frame-
work for crisis management in the EU and the politics surrounding the policy response. It
demonstrates how the political economy equilibrium changed, leading to agreement on a
harmonised legislative framework, institutional architecture and tools for crisis management
across the EU. However, it shows how the distributional consequences of financial sector sup-
port, as well as agreement on the SSM, led to deeper integration and the establishment of the
SRM. It analyses in detail the negotiations on the financing structure for future resolution,
decision-making procedures and crisis management tools that are provided for in the new
framework. It shows in particular how the power of certain Member States and distributive
conflict with regard to legacy issues, shaped the new architecture. It also highlights the
important role which the European Parliament played in the negotiations.
6.2 Theoretical contributions
In addition to the empirical contributions, this thesis also makes a number of theoretical
contributions to the study of political economy. The first paper (chapter 2) shows the
usefulness of frameworks of analysis such as ‘capture theory’ and the ‘governance nexus’
to examine to complex motivations underlying financial policy and regulatory governance.
Further, through an in-depth case study, it shows the impact government policy can have
on supervisory performance and ultimately financial stability.
One factor that has been largely ignored in previous work on the public responses to
banking crises is the role of information asymmetries. The second paper (chapter 3) shows
that when responding to financial crises, close to full information is extremely important
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for decision-makers. We provide a formal model to understand the interactions between
policymakers, bureaucrats and other actors, when choosing optimal policy responses during
financial crises. Our signalling game of financial crisis containment shows that although de
facto operational independence may ensure protection from blatant crony capitalism, this
does not ensure that decision-makers will receive un-biased information from strategically-
minded signallers. We show that if the preferences of strategically-minded signallers’ differ
from those of the decision-maker, incentives may exist to give inaccurate information. The
paper again looks at the Irish case and uses comparative statics to demonstrate the plausibil-
ity and usefulness of the model, firstly by making predictions about containment levels based
on our model and the underlying health of the Irish banking system, and then showing how
the case closely matches these predictions. The signalling model also extends the empirical
tools that researchers can use, to enhance our understanding how asymmetries and biases
affect policy choice in financial crises, thus also making a methodological contribution to
research in the field.
The third paper (chapter 4) extends the broad analysis of the economic effects of consti-
tutions to financial crisis management by exploring the impact variant political systems have
on the fiscal costs resulting from financial crises. We demonstrate how political institutions
may condition policy choice leading to different economic outcomes. Both the second and
third papers contribute to the generation of a general understanding of the political economy
of financial crises.
The fourth paper (chapter 5) contributes to two theoretical literatures by providing a
positive analysis of the reform of the framework for crisis management in the EU. Firstly,
through analysis of the economic rationale for reform as well as the politics surrounding the
policy response, it confirms many of the theoretical propositions from the political economy
of reform literature derived from formal analysis of the reform process. These models try to
better understand the factors that lead to reform, as well as the reasons for inaction, delay
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or sub-optimal outcomes. Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature on the politics
of EU policy which inter alia examines the shaping of regulatory and supervisory space, as
well as the inter-institutional dynamics of bargaining process.
6.3 Directions for future research and policy implications
The limitations outlined in each paper provide fruitful avenues for further research. The
first paper explains how regulatory and supervisory failure must be analysed in the context
of the politics of financial services policy. Hopefully, future research will include analysis
of the political context of such failure, given the important role that governments have in
designing the legislative and institutional framework in which supervisors operate. As the
paper shows, this can occur in advanced economies with seemingly robust regulatory and
supervisory frameworks.
The second paper shows how future research should focus in greater detail on how im-
provements in institutional design can change bureaucrats’ preferences, so that the correct
incentive structures are set to provide more accurate information. This research also lends
itself to the broader debate on bureaucratic independence, as well as political discretion in
bureaucratic appointments (Persson and Tabellini, 1993, Satyanath, 2006). Such research
should treat all such actors as strategic players with potentially divergent preferences.
The third paper highlights the need for better quality data to enhance our understanding
of the links between systemic financial crises and politics. Whilst we have shown some
important and new empirical relationships, we have not sought to develop an over-arching
theory of crisis management. More granular data on institutional and political variables and
policy responses will help deepen our understanding of these factors and allow for a more
general understanding of the political economy of financial crises.
Finally, the fourth paper explains four reasons why crises upset the old political economy
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equilibrium in the EU and therefore led to reform. Broader comparative work could help
facilitate a greater understanding of the reform process following crises.
This thesis also points to a number of implications for policy. Whereas the first paper
(chapter 2) highlights how a clearer mandate and more independent institutions could have
helped to overcome time-inconsistent government objectives, the second paper (chapter 3)
stresses how, even with clear mandates and independent institutions, good information on
which to take decisions may be very hard to come by during financial crises. Both imply the
need for a robust regulatory and supervisory framework and a more intrusive and challenging
approach to supervision.
For crisis prevention, a robust regulatory and supervisory framework can ensure that clear
objectives can be derived from a mandate, thus reducing the risk of bias towards political
objectives. Ensuring a clear institutional architecture which protects ‘agents’ can also reduce
the susceptibility to any potential biases. Both a clear mandate and robust institutional
framework should be accompanied by a deeper understanding of the risks which banks are
taking, their business models and strategies, as well as corporate governance structures. This
can be achieved with a more intrusive and challenging approach to supervision.
The mandate and institutional architecture are also central to crisis containment, as
these play an important role in shaping the preferences that strategic actors will have when
providing information to decision-makers, who may have to step in to stabilise financial
markets in times of crises. Similarly, a more intrusive approach to supervision will ensure that
more accurate data and valuations are available to key bureaucrats (supervisors, ministries
and central banks) and hence decision-makers. This in turn will enable decision-makers to
design more effective crisis containment strategies, which can both stabilise financial markets
and limit the exposure of the State to such enormous costs which we have seen in the recent
financial and sovereign debt crisis.
Although further research is warranted before more direct institutional implications can
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be drawn from the results, the third paper (chapter 4) shows how certain institutional and
political characteristics are associated with higher fiscal costs in crisis management. This
helps us to understand and thus predict, how governments may react to future crises.
The final paper contributes to a deeper understanding as to how, and why, certain factors
lead to reform following crises. The analysis in the final paper can help bureaucrats and
researchers understand why the new framework for crisis management in the EU has been
designed in such a way, as well as to guide further research on the analysis of how future
improvements could be realistically achieved, politically.
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Appendix I : Equilibrium with Two Signallers
Building on Satyanath (2006, 139-140) a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for two signallers is
a set of strategies g∗k(m1α, m2α), m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk), m∗2α(αi, m1α, gk), and posterior beliefs,
h∗(αi; m1α, m2α) such that;
1. m1α(αi,m2α, gk) ∈ arg max EUs1, given g∗k(m1α,m2α) and m∗2α(αi,m1α, gg)
2. m2(αi,m1α, gk) ∈ arg max EUs2, given g∗k(m1α,m2α) and m∗1α(αi,m2α, gg)
3. g∗k(m1α,m2α) ∈ arg max EU
´ 0.95
0.65
uc (gk, αi)h ∗ (αi,m1α,m2α)dαi
4. h∗(αi;m1α,m2α) = Pr(α = αi | m∗1α,m∗2α), as per Bayes’ rule.
Assuming that α is uniformly distributed in [0.65, 0.95], though another range could be used.
Proposition: There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which;
1. m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk) = αi if αi = α¯+ 2xs1 or αi = α¯+ 2xs2, and s1 randomises with equal
probability over [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2] otherwise.
2. m∗2α(αi, m1α, gk) = αi if αi = α¯− 2xs1 or αi = α¯+ 2xs2, and s2 randomises with equal
probability over [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2] otherwise.
3. g∗k(m1α, m2α) = αi if m1α = m2α, and α¯ otherwise.
4. If m1α = m2α, h∗(αi; m1α, m2α) = 1. If m1α 6= m2α, h∗(α;m1α,m2α) = 0 for all
αi /∈ [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2]
Note that we used a more general notation (s1 and s2) than above to denote the two signallers,
where s1 prefers an outcome xs1 < 0 and s2 prefers an outcomes xs2 < 0.
Proof: There are four parts to the proof.
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1. To show that s1 maximises her expected utility given the PM’s policy choice and
s2’s optimal signalling strategy, as in part 1 above, we discuss each component of
m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk):
(a) m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk) = αi if αi < α¯ + 2xs1:
i. When αi < α+ 2xs1 the PM will choose α¯ and xk > 2xs1 if m1α 6= m2α, as in
the proposed equilibrium g∗k(m1α, m2α) = α¯.
ii. When m1α = m2α = αi, g∗k(m1α, m2α) = αi, and xk = 0 which results in s1
having a greater utility than x > 2xs1.
(b) m∗1α(αi, m2α, gk) = αi if αi > α¯+ 2xs1: If m1α 6= m2α the PM chooses α¯. This is
less utility for s1 than x = 0 because x < 2xs2.
(c) s1 randomises with equal probability over [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2] when αi ∈ [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2]:
If αi ∈ [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2] signaller s2 will randomise between these two values
and therefore s1 will not be able to match his signal. Her signal will thus have
no effect on the PM’s decision as she will think that αi ∈ [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2]
regardless.
2. To show that s2 maximises his utility given the PM’s policy choice and s1’s optimal
signalling strategy, as in part 1 above, simply use the same logic as in the previous
section, reversing the signaller notation.
3. To show that the PM maximises her utility given her posterior belief about the value
of α:
(a) If h∗(αi; m1α, m2α) = 1, which happens when m1α = m2α, she can simply choose
her optimal strategy gk = αi if her ideal point is x = 0.
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(b) If, however, h∗(αi; m1α, m2α) = 0 for all αi /∈ [α¯ + 2xs1, α¯ + 2xs2], which happens
when m1α 6= m2α, she chooses gk to maximise:
ˆ α¯+2xs2
α¯+2xs1
−(gk − αi)2h∗(αi, m1α, m2α)dαi
which produces gk(m1α, m2α) = α¯ .
4. The consistency of h∗(αi; m1α, m2α) was established in 1(c) of the proof.
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Appendix II: Definition of banking crises episodes
Following Laeven and Valencia, we define a banking crisis episode if two conditions are met:
1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant
bank runs, losses in the banking system and/or bank liquidations.
2. Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the
banking system.
Moreover, significant policy intervention is considered when at least three of the following
policies are undertaken:
1. extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to non-residents)
2. bank restructuring gross costs (at least 3 percent of GDP)
3. significant bank nationalisations
4. significant guarantees put in place
5. significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP)
6. deposit freezes and/or bank holidays.
In the past, however, some countries intervened in their financial sectors using a combination
of less than three of these measures, but on a large scale (for example, by nationalising all
major banks in the country). Therefore, Laeven and Valencia consider a sufficient condition
for a crisis episode to be deemed systemic when either:
1. a country’s banking system exhibits significant losses resulting in a share of nonper-
forming loans above 20 percent, or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking
system assets, or
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2. fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are sufficiently high, exceeding 5 percent
of GDP.
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Appendix III: Construction of LIEC and Checks and Bal-
ances
Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC) (see Beck et al., 2001,
2012, codebook p14)
Legislative IEC Scale:
No legislature: 1
Unelected legislature: 2
Elected, 1 candidate: 3
1 party, multiple candidates: 4
multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats: 5
multiple parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats: 6
largest party got less than 75%: 7
Checks and Balances (see Beck et al., 2001, 2012, codebook, p18-19)
Checks and Balances equals one if LIEC OR (the Beck et al, 2012, Executive Index
of Electoral Competition) EIEC is less than 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX) – countries where
legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries where only the executive
wields a check.
In countries where LIEC and EIEC are greater than or equal to 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX):
Checks and Balances is incremented by one if there is a chief executive (it is blank or NA
if not).
Checks and Balances is incremented by one if the chief executive is competitively elected
(EIEC greater than six).
Checks and Balances is incremented by one if the opposition controls the legislature.
In presidential systems, Checks and Balances is incremented by one:
for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president’s party has a majority in the
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lower house AND a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential control of
his/her party, and therefore of the legislature).
for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president’s party has a majority in the
lower house AND a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential control of
his/her party, and therefore of the legislature).
In parliamentary systems, Checks and Balances is incremented by one
for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain
a majority (the previous version of CHECKS – Checks3 in DPI3 – incremented by one for
each of the three largest parties in the government coalition, regardless of whether they were
needed for a legislative majority).
for every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues (right-
left-center) closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive.
In parliamentary systems, the prime minister’s party is not counted as a check if there is
a closed rule in place – the prime minister is presumed in this case to control the party fully.
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Appendix IV: Banking Crises 1970–2011
Table 6.1: Banking Crises, Dates 1970- 2011
Country Start End Country Start End Country Start End
Albania 1994 1994 Equatorial Guinea 1983 1983 Nicaragua 2000 2001
Algeria 1990 1994 Eritrea 1993 1993 Niger 1983 1985
Argentina 1980 1982 Estonia 1992 1994 Nigeria 1991 1995
Argentina 1989 1991 Finland 1991 1995 Nigeria 2009 ongoing
Argentina 1995 1995 France 2008 ongoing Norway 1991 1993
Argentina 2001 2003 Georgia 1991 1995 Panama 1988 1989
Armenia 1994 1994 Germany 2008 ongoing Paraguay 1995 1995
Austria 2008 ongoing Ghana 1982 1983 Peru 1983 1983
Azerbaijan 1995 1995 Greece 2008 ongoing Philippines 1983 1986
Bangladesh 1987 1987 Guinea 1985 1985 Philippines 1998 2001
Belarus 1995 1995 Guinea 1993 1993 Poland 1992 2001
Belgium 2008 ongoing Guinea-Bissau 1995 1998 Portugal 2008 ongoing
Benin 1988 1992 Guyana 1993 1993 Romania 1990 992
Bolivia 1986 1986 Haiti 1994 1998 Russia 1998 1998
Bolivia 1994 1994 Hungary 1991 1995 Russia 2008 ongoing
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 1996 Hungary 2008 ongoing Sao Tome & Principe 1992 1992
Brazil 1990 1994 Iceland 2008 ongoing Senegal 1988 1991
Brazil 1994 1998 India 1993 1993 Sierra Leone 1990 1994
Bulgaria 1996 1997 Indonesia 1997 2001 Slovak Rep 1998 2002
Burkina Faso 1990 1994 Ireland 2008 ongoing Slovenia 1992 1992
Burundi 1994 1998 Israel 1977 1977 Slovenia 2008 ongoing
Cameroon 1987 1991 Jamaica 1996 1998 Spain 1977 1981
Cameroon 1995 1997 Japan 1997 2001 Sri Lanka 1989 1991
Cape Verde 1993 1993 Jordan 1989 1991 Swaziland 1995 1999
Central African Republic 1976 1976 Kazakhstan 2008 ongoing Sweden 1991 1995
Central African Republic 1995 1996 Kenya 1985 1985 Sweden 2008 ongoing
Chad 1983 1983 Kenya 1992 1994 Switzerland 2008 ongoing
Chad 1992 1996 South Korea 1997 1998 Tanzania 1987 1988
Chile 1976 1976 Kuwait 1982 1985 Thailand 1983 1983
Chile 1981 1985 Kyrgyz Republic 1995 1999 Thailand 1997 2000
China 1998 1998 Latvia 1995 1996 Togo 1993 1994
Colombia 1982 1982 Latvia 2008 ongoing Tunisia 1991 1991
Colombia 1998 2000 Lebanon 1990 1993 Turkey 1982 1984
Congo, Dem Rep 1983 1983 Liberia 1991 1995 Turkey 2000 2001
Congo, Dem Rep 1991 1994 Lithuania 1995 1996 Uganda 1994 1994
Congo, Dem Rep 1994 1998 Luxembourg 2008 ongoing Ukraine 1998 1999
Congo, Rep 1992 1994 Macedonia, FYR 1993 1995 Ukraine 2008 ongoing
Costa Rica 1987 1991 Madagascar 1988 1988 United Kingdom 2007 ongoing
Costa Rica 1994 1995 Malaysia 1997 1999 United States 1988 1988
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 1992 Mali 1987 1991 United States 2007 ongoing
Croatia 1998 1999 Mauritania 1984 1984 Uruguay 1981 1985
Czech Republic 1996 2000 Mexico 1981 1985 Uruguay 2002 2005
Denmark 2008 ongoing Mexico 1994 1996 Venezuela 1994 1998
Djibouti 1991 1995 Mongolia 2008 ongoing Vietnam 1997 1997
Dominican Republic 2003 2004 Morocco 1980 1984 Yemen 1996 1996
Ecuador 1982 1986 Mozambique 1987 1991 Zambia 1995 1998
Ecuador 1998 2002 Nepal 1988 1988 Zimbabwe 1995 1999
Egypt 1980 1980 Netherlands 2008 ongoing
El Salvador 1989 1990 Nicaragua 1990 1993
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Appendix V: List of variables used
Variable Source Note
Crisis duration Laeven and Valencia (2012) Years
Fiscal Costs (%
of GDP)
WEO, IFS, IMF Staff
reports, Laeven and
Valencia (2008), and
authors’ calculation.
Fiscal costs are defined as the component of
gross fiscal outlays related to the
restructuring of the financial sector. They
include fiscal costs associated with bank
recapitalizations but exclude asset
purchases and direct liquidity assistance
from the treasury.
Liquidity
support
WEO, IFS, IMF Staff
reports, Laeven and
Valencia (2008), and
authors’ calculation.
Percentage points increase in central bank
claims on financial institutions over deposits
and foreign liabilities.
Monetary
expansion
WEO, IFS, IMF Staff
reports, Laeven and
Valencia (2008), and
authors’ calculation.
In percent of GDP. Monetary expansion is
computed as the change in the monetary
base between its peak during the crisis and
its level one year prior to the crisis.
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Credit World Bank Averaged over the three pre-crisis years,
domestic credit provided by the banking
sector includes all credit to various sectors
on a gross basis, with the exception of
credit to the central government, which is
net. The banking sector includes monetary
authorities and deposit taking banks, as well
as other banking institutions where data
available (including institutions that do not
accept transferable deposits but do incur
such liabilities as time and savings deposits)
Credit boom WEO, IFS, IMF Staff
reports, Laeven and
Valencia (2008), and
authors’ calculation
As defined in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012).
Form of
government
World Bank - DPI2012 Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected
President (1), Presidential (0)
Government
orientation
World Bank - DPI2012 Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No
information (0); No executive (NA)
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Legislative
Index of
Electoral
Competitiveness
(LIEC)
World Bank - DPI2012 No legislature: 1; Unelected legislature: 2;
Elected, 1 candidate: 3; 1 party, multiple
candidates: 4; multiple parties are legal but
only one party won seats: 5; multiple
parties did win seats but the largest party
received more than 75% of the seats: 6;
largest party got less than 75%: 7.
Years to next
election
World Bank - DPI2012 Only full years are counted. Thus, a “0” is
scored in an election year.
Degree of checks
and balances
World Bank - DPI2012 Degree of checks and balances, from 1 to 7.
Snap elections
held during the
crisis
World Bank - DPI2015,
own calculations.
Cumulative number of snap executive
elections held during the crisis years // The
executive who formally (de jure) holds
power is counted.
GDP per capita IMF, WEO Gross Domestic Product divided by midyear
population. Data are taken in current U.S.
dollars taken at t-1
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